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Exploring identity within the institutions of the EU and 
assessing its impact on the Turkish membership bid. 
by 
Hamish R. Leese 
 
Abstract 
 
Although social constructivism has gained in popularity and increased in application in 
studies of the European Union, a deficiency still exists in the understanding of identity 
in the European Parliament and the interests of MEPs. In this study I formulate and 
employ a social constructivist theoretical framework to answer research questions 
concerning the presence and nature of European identity; the role the European 
Parliament plays in the constitution of identity and the impact of identity and normative 
factors on the interests of MEPs concerning Turkish accession. My analysis is grounded 
in secondary data sources, primarily statements made by MEPs and members of other 
EU institutions, and backed up by primary research, interviews and questionnaire 
responses from MEPs. My research indicates that a European identity is present within 
the European Parliament, largely based on the stated values of the EU, and is felt 
alongside other identities by the majority of MEPs. I found the European Parliament 
itself to be a key factor in the constitution of the identity of actors within it, with an 
important role in the socialisation of norms, as well as in selecting appropriate norms. 
Finally, I found that in debates concerning Turkish membership of the EU arguments of 
identity are sometimes used explicitly, but that ‘rational’ factors in decision making are 
inextricably tied to ‘normative’ factors, with the result that an analysis ignoring norms 
and identity would be fundamentally flawed. These findings are important in 
understanding identity within the EP, and have implications for EU decision making 
and, potentially, in understanding identity in other institutions. My research allows me 
to build on the basis of social constructivist theory concerning institutions to explore a 
model of actor identity within the European Parliament. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Union, and the movement which was to create it, have been the subject of 
academic study since its inception 50 years ago. This study has taken a wide variety of 
forms and rested on a variety of theoretical bases, but virtually all have shared similar 
underlying assumptions. The institutions of the EU have generally been viewed as 
intervening variables which facilitate rational choice decision making and nothing more. 
Membership of the institutions had no role to play in the identity of the actors within 
them, the tactical approach to bargaining could be affected but nothing more. Identities 
were, for the most part, seen as fixed and unchanging, those which did see some 
variation in identity1 saw this as happening away from the EU level. Once again EU 
institutions are reduced to the level of arenas for compromise finding, often lowest 
common denominator decision making. Within these theories of European integration 
decisions are made using rational choice models, with each actor arguing for their 
national interest. I believe that the nature of the institutions of the EU, and the decisions 
which have been reached demonstrate that these  models for the European Union and its 
institutions are inadequate, and a shift in theoretical approach could reap rich rewards in 
our understanding of these issues. 
 
Although I believe that there are a number of areas in which current theoretical 
approaches to European integration are inadequate, I do not assert that there is no value 
to these approaches. For that reason it is important that I outline a comprehensive 
theoretical framework which does not irrevocably oppose the current approaches, but 
which is complimentary and commensurable with them. I will begin this process by 
reviewing the literature concerning social constructivist theory in international relations 
and attempt to introduce concepts such as norms, dynamic identity and “thick” 
institutions into the theoretical landscape of European integration.  To achieve this a 
programme of empirical research must be devised which is appropriate for, and based 
in, the variables being studied. Through this empirical research, allied to the social 
constructivist theoretical framework, I aim to answer a series of research questions. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Eg. Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik, A., 1998. The Choice for Europe. London: 
Routledge. 
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1. Is there a “European identity” within the European Parliament? If so, on what norms is 
this identity based? 
Approaches to European integration have traditionally viewed actors in the European 
Union as having fixed identity, based either in universal or national factors. I will 
investigate whether this captures the identity of actors within the institutions of the 
European Union, or whether traditional approaches to European integration lack the 
ability to accurately model actor identity. 
 
The issue of European identity amongst the population of the European Union is 
frequently discussed, often in relation to questions of legitimacy, but I intend to look 
specifically at the élite level, actors within the European Parliament. Identity within the 
European Parliament is the key focus of study within this research and, as such, this is a 
vital research question to answer. As I go on to study the role of the European 
Parliament in identity creation and transmission, and the way identity influences actor 
interest and behaviour, establishing the nature of identity in the EP is a cornerstone of 
the research. If a European identity is found to be present I will then asses the basis of 
this identity, what it means for actors to feel European, and ways in which this differs 
from national identity. 
 
It is highly unlikely that there will be unanimity of responses in relation to identity and 
adherence to European identity, and throughout the research I will attempt to elucidate a 
framework for which actors will feel a European identity, as well as how norms come to 
comprise that identity. Although I believe that this European identity will extend beyond 
the European Parliament, in order to study these phenomena in appropriate depth, my 
research will focus solely on the EP. 
 
2. How strong is this identity, and how does it interact with pre-existing identities? 
The subjective nature of identity means that it will be impossible for me to objectively 
measure the strength of European identity and I will have to consider this problem 
carefully when designing my empirical research programme. Despite this, it is not 
enough merely to point to some norms which might be influencing actors. I will attempt 
to assess the relative importance of different identities in given situations, and this will 
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allow me to analyse the factors which influence the relative strength of identities in a 
particular situation.  
 
It is my contention that it is too simple a model of identity in the European Union that 
actors will either retain a national identity to the exclusion of European level norms, or 
“go native” and abandon their national identity entirely, rather that factors of European 
identity will be experienced alongside national identity. If this contention proves correct 
I will investigate how these different norms interact and are interpreted by actors to 
produce a complex identity. To assess this, it will be necessary to investigate actor 
interests, which are inextricably linked to identity, and how these are expressed in 
attitudes towards Turkish membership. 
 
3. What effect does the institution of the European Parliament have on the identity of 
actors within it? 
This is another key area in which I believe social constructivist theory can add value to 
existing approaches, and I will examine the literature in this area closely in the next 
chapter. I intend to investigate the constitutive power of the European Parliament in 
actor identity, and the ability of the EP to socialise norms. 
 
Within a social constructivist framework, it might be expected that European identity 
would be felt more strongly within the European Parliament than amongst the 
population of the EU as a whole, and that it will play a role far stronger and more 
important than that afforded to it by existing theories of European integration and 
decision making. For this reason I will investigate whether this effect is present and, if 
so, the ways in which this effect is felt and the factors which afford the European 
Parliament this strong role in actor identity. Although the key focus of study is identity 
within the European Parliament, this line of study may point towards a broader role for 
European institutions in identity creation and transmission.  
 
4. What is the role of identity within the European Parliament? 
I will address this question in two connected ways: by looking at the role which the 
European Parliament is seen to play in broader European identity, and by investigating 
whether identity influences actor preferences and attitudes within the Parliament itself. 
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If, as anticipated, European identity is felt more keenly in the European Parliament than 
by the population at large, I intend to investigate whether there is perceived to be a role 
to play for the EP in propagating and strengthening European identity as a whole. 
Similarly, I intend to investigate whether there is seen to be a special role to play for the 
European Parliament as the elected body of the EU. I believe that similar questions 
could profitably be asked of the European Commission, having as it does the power of 
initiative, but this is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
It is also my intention to investigate whether the strength of identity varies by policy 
area within the European Parliament. In line with social constructivist theory, I 
anticipate that this variation will be present, and I foresee it being along two broad axes, 
the degree to which a common European position is required, and the degree to which 
identity is threatened. In competences where a common position is required there will 
be greater discussion and greater recourse to factors of European identity. In such 
instances it would be difficult for an actor to convince a colleague using arguments 
relating to an identity which is not shared. Similarly issues which are perceived to 
challenge European identity would bring these factors to the fore in discussion and 
prioritise argument based on European identity over national identity. It was for these 
reasons that the Turkish efforts to gain membership of the EU have been chosen as the 
case study for this research. I believe the issue of Turkey’s potential accession fulfils 
both these criteria and, as such, will result in identity arguments gaining importance, 
allowing me to analyse them. I will assess the validity of this contention and attempt to 
refine my model so that it is applicable more broadly within the European Parliament. 
 
5. Is European identity observable in the interests and behaviour of actors in the 
European Parliament? 
One area in which my research has the potential to add value is in the area of the 
prediction of outcomes, which will come through establishing whether European 
identity influences the interests of actors and the decision making outcomes within the 
institution. In this area it is not sufficient merely to highlight a European identity, to 
demonstrate the influence of European level norms on identity and interests requires me 
to identify mechanisms through which this influence is exerted. While I believe that 
European identity will have a discernible influence on decision making in the European 
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Parliament (although I do not anticipate this being felt to the exclusion of rational 
factors), policy outcomes will not be the focus of this research. Instead, decision making 
within the European Parliament will only be studied with a view to informing 
understanding of identity, the key focus of the research. I will attempt to construct a 
framework for the analysis of actor interests which marginalises neither normative nor 
rational factors and investigate the interaction of the two. Through this analysis I will be 
able to investigate the degree to which interests and decisions are shaped by identity. 
 
6. What are the implications for Turkish membership? 
It is quite probable that answering the preceding questions and introducing a social 
constructivist theoretical framework will change our understanding of the possible 
accession of Turkey to membership of the EU. I believe that an understanding of 
European identity will allow scholars a better understanding of the attitudes of actors 
towards the candidacy of Turkey, as well as highlighting issues and factors which are 
neglected within a rationalist approach to European integration.  
 
Despite this improved understanding of certain factors in the accession process, the 
prospects of Turkish membership are not the focus of this study. What this question, and 
the case study of Turkey, will add to this research is an understanding of how European 
identity and norms are experienced, and how they are expressed in actor interests. If 
European identity is still strongly grounded in the founding ideology of the EU then it is 
possible that this will work in favour of the Turkish application. If, however, 
Christianity is seen to be a major factor it is likely that this will work against Turkey. In 
this way, the case study of Turkey will provide an important insight into the expression 
of European identity and norms. I believe that my research will be able to offer a more 
holistic approach to the study of Turkish accession which is not blinkered to factors of 
identity, and this could be explored in future research. 
 
Key to understanding these issues and answering my research questions will be a 
thorough understanding of the theoretical and meta-theoretical positions of social 
constructivism and, as such, the first chapter of this thesis will take the form of a review 
of the social constructivist scholarship. Having surveyed the underpinnings of social 
constructivism, I will look specifically at the creation and spread of norms, their role in 
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identity, and the nature of institutions and the way in which they influence actor identity. 
Through these foci, I will build an appropriate theoretical framework to address the 
research questions outlined above.  
 
Having completed a literature review to understand the theoretical basis of the research, 
it will be vital that I design and implement an empirical research programme which is 
appropriate to the research questions I aim to answer and the theoretical concepts I am 
working with. For this reason my methodology section will examine different 
approaches to, and theories of, knowledge and how we understand it. Through this 
examination I will outline the method of empirical research I will be employing to 
answer the research questions in a way which is coherent with the theoretical 
understanding outlined in the literature review chapter. 
 
Having formulated my empirical research programme, the following three chapters will 
form the data analysis section of the thesis. In the first of these chapters I will look 
primarily at the first two of my research questions, whether a European identity exists, 
and if it does, investigating the norms on which it is based. This is, of course, a vital 
section of analysis, and a key part of the research as a whole. In a thesis which focuses 
on identity within the European Parliament, an understanding of the norms comprising 
identity which come from a European level is of utmost importance. Alongside an 
understanding of norms which comprise a European identity, this chapter will explore 
the interaction between European identity and national identities, as understanding this 
coexistence or friction will be key if it is possible to move beyond a polarised view of 
the European Parliament as a “talking shop” for national identity or as a location where 
MEPs “go native”.  
 
Having examined the presence and basis of a European identity, the subsequent chapter 
will examine the specific role of the European Parliament in the identity of actors within 
it, addressing the third and fourth research questions above. A social constructivist 
understanding of institutions, which will be examined in detail within the literature 
review, moves away from a view of institutions as intervening variables in the 
bargaining of rational choice actors, to emphasise the role of the institution within actor 
identity itself. For this reason the second analytical chapter is dedicated to the role of the 
European Parliament in the creation and transmission of European level norms and the 
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resulting impact on the identity and interests of actors who comprise the institution. This 
analysis is key to gaining an understanding of identity within the European Parliament 
and, as such, forms an important part of the thesis. 
 
The third analytical chapter will examine the expression of identity in interests, 
particularly in reference to the Turkish application for membership of the EU. This 
chapter will address the final two research questions above. Although the preceding 
chapters will have examined European identity and the role of the European Parliament 
in MEP identity, I believe that an examination of the expression of interests within the 
EP will be an important part of the exploration of actor identity within the institution. 
Social constructivist approaches argue that interest and identity are inseparable, and I 
believe that the analysis in this chapter will shed important light on the nature of 
European identity, as well as the strength of European norms relative to those from a 
national level. 
 
Having analysed the empirical data generated by my research in the manner outlined, I 
will conclude by revisiting the research questions set out above. Although I will remain 
cognizant of the fact that the social constructivist framework I am employing asserts 
that issues of identity are dynamic rather than static, I aim to provide answers to these 
research questions. Through this concluding examination I will aim to show the novel 
contribution I have made in this field and the broader applicability of my work in future 
research. 
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Social Constructivism and the European Parliament 
 
Key to understanding the role of normative factors, identity and interest within the 
European Union is establishing a specific, coherent theoretical framework within which 
to work. To this end this chapter examines the existing scholarship in the field of social 
constructivist theory and its applicability to the European Parliament, the identities of 
the actors within it and the ways in which identity will be observable from actor 
interest. From a starting point looking at the theoretical and meta-theoretical bases of 
social constructivism and what this approach can add to rationalist approaches, I will go 
on to look closely at the social constructivist understanding of identity, the creation and 
spread of norms and their influence on identity, and the vastly different concept of 
institutions espoused by social constructivists. Having established a social constructivist 
theoretical framework I will outline how I will employ this framework in studying the 
European Parliament and how this will allow me to address each of my research 
questions. This will form an important part of the exploration of methodology which 
will follow, and provide a basis for the analysis of research data in subsequent chapters. 
 
The added value of social constructivism 
 
Realist theory has held a place of dominance within international relations for many 
years, and the debate between realist and liberal theories of international relations is a 
well-established one. In many cases today this takes the form of a debate concerning the 
effect on state action of structure (such as anarchy and the distribution of power) against 
process (interaction) and institutions,1 but the similar meta-theoretical assumptions 
underpinning these theories mean that in this respect, as in many others, neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism share a great deal of common ground. These approaches 'share a 
view of the world of international relations in utilitarian terms: an atomistic universe of 
self-regarding units whose identity is assumed given and fixed'.2 These 'neo-utilitarian'3 
theories offer a purely materialistic, individualistic ontology and adhere to the principle 
of rational choice, affording the process and institutions of world politics the power to 
                                                 
1
 Wendt, A., 1992. 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics' in Der 
Derian, J., 9ed.) International Theory – Critical Investigations. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995. p.129. 
2
 Ruggie, J.G., 1998. Constructing the World Polity. Routledge, London, p.3. 
3
 Ibid. 
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affect the behaviour of states, but not their identities and interests. '[L]ike all social 
theories, rational choice directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating the 
identities and interests of agents as exogenously given and focusing on how the 
behavior of agents generates outcomes'.4 'The postwar academic aversion to idealism in 
the United States...resulted in a widespread discounting of, and thus a poor grasp on, the 
role of [ideational] factors in international life, be they identities, norms, aspirations, 
ideologies, or simply ideas about cause-effect relations'.5 These approaches have led to 
an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the working of the European Union and 
its relations with third countries, with particular deficiencies in the understanding of EU 
institutions. These shortcomings in perception stem from the metatheoretical 
assumptions on which neo-utilitarian theories are based, and other approaches and 
theories have been suggested to address these shortcomings. One such approach is 
social constructivism. 
 
It is difficult to give a single, satisfactory definition of the social constructivist 
movement, which has branches throughout the social sciences, so it is useful to examine 
the evolution of thought which led to modern social constructivism. The term 'social 
constructivism' was coined in international relations theory by Onuf in his 1987 work 
World of Our Making,6 although Moravcsik attributes the creation of a self-conscious 
constructivist theoretical approach to world politics to Wendt in the same year.7 In a 
broader context, however, '[t]he roots of the movement may properly be traced to earlier 
eras, and one might prefer to speak of a shared consciousness rather than a movement'.8 
Modern social constructivism owes a great deal to the central role afforded to ideas in 
the work of Durkheim and Weber and, while they left many questions unanswered, the 
social nature of their theoretical work provided a basis for future research into social 
action.9 Another important stage in the development of social constructivism came with 
Mead's 1934 work Mind, Self and Society and his exegesis of 'symbolic interactionism', 
                                                 
4
 Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it' p.129. 
5
 Ruggie, J.G., 1998. 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge' International Organization 52:4 p.855. 
6
 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity p.11. 
7
 Moravcsik, A., 'Constructivism and European Integration: A Critique' in Christiansen et al (eds.) The 
Social Construction of Europe. SAGE, London, 2001. p.176. 
8
 Gergen, K.J., 1985. 'The Social Constuctionist Movement in Modern Psychology' American 
Psychologist 40:3. p.269. 
9
 Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together?' p.861. 
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which views identities as constructed through social interaction.10 Further constructivist 
themes are found in Garfinkel's 'Ethnomethodology', 'an organizational study of a 
member's knowledge of his own ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, 
where that knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that makes it 
orderable'.11 Garfinkel begins to elucidate a 'duality of structure' which is both created 
by, and creates people within it, and this is continued by Berger and Luckmann in The 
Social Construction of Reality. They argue that the object of sociological study should 
be 'society as part of a human world, made by men, inhabited by men, and, in turn, 
making men, in an ongoing historical process'.12 They argue not only for the mutual 
constitution of agents and structure, but 'the ideas [they] tried to develop [also] posit 
neither an ahistorical 'social system' nor an ahistorical 'human nature'',13 important 
constructivist concepts. 
 
In recent years these ideas have spread into more and more fields of social scientific 
inquiry and so, despite this shared history, social constructivist groups in different social 
sciences share only a 'family resemblance,14 with social constructivist theorising 
underpinning concepts like 'discourse analysis', 'critical psychology', 'deconstruction' 
and 'poststructuralism'.15 Indeed Hacking suggests that social constructivism 'has 
become trendy. So many types of analyses invoke social construction that quite distinct 
objectives get run together'.16 Even within each field of social scientific inquiry social 
constructivism does not present a single, unified theory. Social constructivism is 'not 
itself a theory of international relations...but a theoretically informed approach to the 
study of international relations',17 with 'very little clarity and even less consensus as to 
its nature and substance'.18 This lack of specificity requires caution be exercised in the 
use of the term, and requires a distinct research programme be formulated in order to 
provide meaningful progress in this area. Greater specificity can be found in the work of 
                                                 
10
 Burr, V., 1995. An Introduction to Social Constructionism. Routledge, London. p.9. 
11
 Garfinkel, H., 1968. 'The Origins of the Term 'Ethnomethodology'' in Turner (ed.) Ethnomethodology. 
Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974. 
12
 Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T., 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge. Penguin, Harmondsworth. p.211. 
13
 Ibid, pp.208-209. 
14
 Burr, V., Introduction to Social Constructionism, p.2. 
15
 Ibid, p.1. 
16
 Hacking, I., 1999. The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press. p.35. 
17
 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. p.11. 
18
 Adler, E., 1997. 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics' European Journal of 
International Relations 3:3 p.320. 
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Adler, who agrees that social constructivism is not itself a theory of politics,19 but he 
does not accept that it is an 'ism' or paradigm, arguing for a three layered undertanding 
'involving metaphysics, social theory and international relations theory and research 
strategies – of social reality and social science and of their dynamic mutually 
constitutive effects'.20 I will remain cognizant of this multi-layered approach to social 
constructivism, particularly when considering methodology, to ensure a coherent 
research programme, and it is through an investigation of this social constructivist meta-
theory that I intend to analyse the potential 'added value' of social constructivism in 
European integration theory, and in the action and identity of the institutions of the 
European Union.  
 
Rationalist theories of international relations subscribe to the 'exogenic perspective'  to 
knowledge, which 'tends to view knowledge as a pawn to nature',21 and such approaches 
to international relations hold that ideas and beliefs reflect the real, material world and 
do not have a constitutive role to play. In contrast to this is the social constructivist 
adherence to the 'endogenic perspective' which treats knowledge as the result of human 
processes22 and distinguishes between brute, material facts and social facts. Social 
constructivists believe that, to a greater or lesser degree, 'reality is affected by 
knowledge and social factors',23 that a real, material world exists but that it is 
meaningless to us without social reality. '[M]eaningful behavior, or action, is only 
possible within an intersubjective social context'.24 Constructivists believe that 
international relations are grounded in social facts, which are facts by human 
agreement.25 While there is a role for brute facts, their effect is always shaped and 
mediated by the ideas which give them meaning. While post-modernist constructivists 
argue that social constructivism subscribes to an epistemology which rejects positivism 
and empiricism, and whose observations are therefore incommensurable with those of 
rationalism, Wendt argues the opposite. He suggests that 'constructivist social theory is 
compatible with a scientific approach to social inquiry. Constructivism should be 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, p.322. 
20
 Adler, E., 2002. 'Constructivism and International Relations' in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T. & Simmons, 
B.A. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. SAGE, London. p.96. 
21
 Gergen, 'The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology', p.269. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Adler, 'Constructivism in World Politics' p.324. 
24
 Hopf, T., 2000. 'The Promise of constructionism in International Relations theory' in Linklater, A. (ed.) 
International Relations: Critical concepts in political science. Routledge, London, p.1757. 
25
 Adler, 'Constructivism in World Politics' p.322. 
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construed narrowly as an ontology, not broadly as an epistemology',26 a point echoed by 
Berger and Luckmann, who assert that social constructivism 'does not imply that 
sociology is not a science'.27 This commensurability between rationalist and social 
constructivist observations is important as it allows the two approaches to complement 
each other in international relations theory, acting as analytical tools in problem solving. 
Fearon and Wendt suggest that far from there being a 'war of paradigms', rationalism 
and social constructivism ask different questions of the same situations and thus paint 
different pictures,28 and as such are complementary as often as they are contradictory. In 
this way I intend to employ a social constructivist framework not to rewrite theory 
concerning the institutions of the EU, but to show the added value of social 
constructivism and to refine existing theory. Through this approach I intend to create a 
new theoretical framework for understanding the institutions of the EU and the identity 
of their constituent actors, with particular emphasis on the competence of enlargement 
and the unique challenge of Turkish membership of the EU. 
 
Within a social constructivist framework, social life and reality are constructed from the 
intersubjective understandings which give meaning to the material world, 
'intersubjective knowledge and ideas...have constitutive effects on social reality and its 
evolution'.29 These intersubjective meanings cannot be reduced to the beliefs and 
knowledge of individuals, but are the collective knowledge of groups and are embedded 
in social practices and routines. 'Intersubjective meanings have structural attributes that 
do not merely constrain or empower actors. They also define their social reality'.30 
Therefore, unlike conventional social scientific thought, which holds that human action 
can be broken down to, and understood through, the actions of individuals within the 
system, social constructivists argue that understanding of social action is crucial and 
that knowledge is socially generated. Understanding does not come from nature, it is the 
result of active, cooperative enterprise of people in a social relationship.31 These rules, 
norms and causal understandings which comprise intersubjective knowledge do not 
dictate or prevent individual thought, but provide the concepts and framework for those 
                                                 
26
 Wendt, A., 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, p.41. 
27
 Berger & Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, p.211. 
28
 Fearon, J. & Wendt A., 2002. 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View' in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, 
T. & Simmons, B.A. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. SAGE, London. pp.52-53. 
29
 Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', p. 102. 
30
 Adler, 'Constructivism in World Politics' p.327. 
31
 Gergen, 'The Social Constructionist Movement in Modern Psychology', p.267. 
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thoughts,32 becoming the source of people's motives and interests and, when 
institutionalised, the source of international practices.33 As such interests are related to 
the material world but are ideational in nature and therefore 'cannot be mechanically 
deduced from international anarchy and the distribution of material resources'.34 Social 
constructivism goes beyond emphasising the regulatory role of intersubjective 
knowledge, claiming that '[s]ocially shared ideas...not only regulate behaviour but also 
constitute the identity of actors'35 and the 'rules of the game' governing the system.  
 
Constitutive explanations play an important role in social constructivist theory, 
investigating events and objects by examining what they are made of and how they are 
arranged36 with reference to social knowledge and conditions which give meaning to 
actions and events, as well as providing explanations. This does not mean that 
constructivism disregards causal explanations, indeed Adler asserts that 'constructivism 
has history 'built in' as part of theories',37 instead constitutive and causal explanations 
are linked – any 'attempt to understand the intersubjective meanings embedded in social 
life is at the same time an attempt to explain why people act the way they do'.38 The 
acceptance of constitutive explanations and constitutive norms are an important area of 
meta-theory in which social constructivism differs from rationalist approaches which 
have no concept of constitutive rules.39 It is through the altering of existing constitutive 
rules and the creation of new rules that social constructivists envisage change, rather 
than as an altering of material conditions, and 'it may be only a slight exaggeration to 
say that if constructivism is about anything, it is about change'.40 History plays a pivotal 
role in the genesis and nature of the time-space dependent context within which social 
reality is located and is therefore of great importance within social constructivist 
theorising. Social constructivism allows for changes in constitutive rules as well as 
changes in agents and structures, which are very closely linked, although the exact 
mechanisms for change are debated among constructivists. '[S]ome constructivists 
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emphasize collective learning, cognitive evolution, epistemic change and the 'life cycle 
of norms', all of which involve the institutionalization of people's novel knowledge, 
practices and discourses',41 but social interaction and the mutual constitution of agents 
and structures are key components in the social constructivist vision of change. An 
investigation of these mechanisms will shed new and important light on the changing 
nature of identity within the European Parliament, and this understanding of identity 
would have repercussions for the interaction between the two and the negotiation 
process on the way to possible accession. 
 
Social communication is another fundamental concept in social constructivism which 
can add value to rationalist approaches to international relations, enabling the 
transmission and diffusion of collective understandings, as well as providing an arena 
'for agreeing a common normative framework'.42 For a movement which focuses 
explicitly on change, mechanisms for the change of collective meanings and normative 
frameworks are very important components in the system and can influence the way 
social facts exert their influence,43 and constructivists have postulated a variety of 
theoretical positions to explain this change. Risse advocates a 'logic of arguing',44 
through which 'actors engage in a truth seeking discourse [in which] they must be 
prepared to change their own views of the world, their interests, and sometimes even 
their identities'.45 Through this process of argument, deliberation and persuasion 'they 
engage in a discourse that helps demonstrate the validity of their arguments; this 
discourse in turn promotes collective understandings'.46 This effect is likely to be felt 
strongest in an environment of high normative density, where identities and interests are 
in competition and where there is a high degree of debate and deliberation. These 
factors are pronounced within the European Parliament, particularly in areas of identity 
challenge such as the membership bid of Turkey. The concept of social communication 
is dependent upon language, and an understanding of the importance of language is a 
further added value of social constructivism. Language is a vehicle for the diffusion, 
transmission and institutionalisation of ideas and, as such, is a mechanism for the 
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construction of social reality.47 Not only is language the medium for the creation of 
intersubjective meanings, speech acts can also serve to construct the social world.48 
Within the European Union Euro-speak has come to be studied as both a reflection of, 
and a method of shaping, discourse49, and the ability to shape the discourse is a 
powerful tool. Although I will not be studying the use and meaning of Euro-speak 
directly, interaction within the EU is key, and this will be a key locus of study in this 
thesis. 
 
The mechanism for normative change advocated by Adler is ‘cognitive evolution’, a 
theory which argues that the social facts and intersubjective knowledge which give 
meaning to the material world are, once generated, subject to political and power based 
selection processes and can therefore be viewed as a process of evolution. ‘Cognitive 
evolution is thus the process of innovation, domestic and international diffusion, 
political selection and effective institutionalization that creates the intersubjective 
understanding on which the interests, practices and behavior of government are 
based’.50 Echoing Risse’s ‘logic of arguing’ which will be discussed in detail later, 
cognitive evolution is put forward as an explanation for the reification of ideas and 
institutions and the creation of ‘taken for granted’ knowledge,51 and in some respect the 
two approaches are complementary. Risse and Adler agree that 'it may not be the best-
fitted ideas, nor the most efficient institutions, that become 'naturalized' or reified, but 
those that prove most successful at imposing collective meaning and function on 
physical reality',52 and Adler does afford a role to ‘socialization processes that involve 
the diffusion of meanings from country to country and from political and diplomatic 
processes that include negotiation, persuasion and coercion’,53 but Adler places these 
cooperative and argumentative effects within a larger mechanism. In conjunction with 
these factors are others such as the collective awareness of problems, the power which 
backs the ideas and the ‘political leaders’ intersubjective expectations of progress’,54 but 
Adler stresses that institutional and normative selection does not take place ‘in an 
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‘instant’ of rational choice. It is rather the continuous rational institutionalization of a 
tradition that provides new or improved understandings of reality’.55 These mechanisms 
play an important role in constructivist study, and in the value which is to be added by 
social constructivism, because rationalist and constructivist scholars share an interest in 
‘common knowledge’.56 While rationalist accounts have little to offer in this area, 
‘[c]onstructivism analyzes discourses and practices that continuously recreate what 
rationalists refer to as common knowledge’57 and ‘focus on discursive and social 
practices that define the identity of actors and the normative order within which they 
make their moves’.58 It is these norms which are of primary concern to constructivist 
scholars as these constitutive norms generate identity and it is through study of these 
norms that an understanding of the structures, processes and institutions of international 
politics can be gained, as discussed later. In this way social constructivism plays an 
important role in the theory of international relations as it broadens study beyond the 
actions of actors in a fixed environment to include the context of such actions and the 
nature of the system as a whole. This has the potential to ‘add a wider and perhaps more 
sophisticated range of theories concerning the causal role of ideational socialization’59 
within the European Union, which I will argue is key to understanding identity in the 
European Parliament and will be demonstrated by the preferences of actors within the 
institutions. 
  
While power politics is a core concept of rationalist thinking it is another area in which 
social constructivism can add value, without norms ‘exercises of power…would be 
devoid of meaning’.60 Wendt asserts that ‘two ostensibly materialist explanations 
associated particularly with Realism – explanations by reference to power and interest – 
actually achieve most of their power through tacit assumptions about the distribution of 
ideas in the system’.61 ‘[N]ational interests are intersubjective understandings about 
what it takes to advance power, influence and wealth, that survive the political process, 
given the distribution of power and knowledge in a society’.62 Power is not merely 
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concerned with material capabilities however, it has an important role to play in the 
construction of social reality and the ability to determine shared meanings and 
understandings is a very real form of power. The ability to define the constitutive norms 
of a system affords the possibility of committing other actors to abide by those rules and 
to shape discourse. Power can also serve to define who has legitimate access to a 
discourse and what counts as a “good argument”.63 This is important in cognitive 
evolution, which argues that ‘to be taken for granted, institutional facts must be backed 
by power; in other words, intersubjective ideas must have authority and legitimacy and 
must evoke trust’.64 The ability to shape discourse and debate is an important locus of 
power for the European Parliament, particularly in areas of intergovernmental decision-
making. While the final decision is taken out of the hands of the EU bodies, the 
institutions take a leading role in framing the issue and shaping the debate. The issue of 
EU enlargement is a prime example of this effect, with negotiation proceedings largely 
controlled by EU institutions, before a decision is taken by member states. In this way, 
the institutions of the EU and the negotiators on behalf of the Turkish government will 
have the ability to shape the discourse and institute and alter collective understandings. 
 
One of the areas of difference between rationalist and social constructivist theories is in 
the treatment of structures and agents ‘which is often claimed to constitute the central 
problem in social and political theory’.65 This is a metatheoretical debate which has 
profound effects on theory generated, and rationalist approaches largely follow Popper’s 
assertion that ‘all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social 
institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, 
attitudes, etc. of human individuals…we should never be satisfied by an explanation in 
terms of so-called ‘collectives’’.66 This goes a long way towards explaining the 
rationalist belief in exogenously given, fixed identity in which interaction and 
institutions play no role – that is they are “thin” institutions. There is however ‘an 
increasingly widespread recognition that, instead of being antagonistic partners in a 
zero-sum relationship, human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense 
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interrelated entities’67 and that viewing one without the other, or viewing either as 
ontologically primitive, is an incomplete and inaccurate viewpoint. In contrast to the 
rationalist view, constructivists argue for a two way process with people making society 
and society making people continuously,68 echoing the work of Berger and Luckmann. 
‘[T]he constructivist position on the relation of agents to structures is that they 
constitute each other. Simultaneously, agents and structure enable and constrain each 
other’.69  One ‘highly acclaimed and vigorously contested’70 explanation for this mutual 
constitution of agent and structure has come in the form of Giddens’ ‘structuration 
theory’ which puts forward the concept of ‘the duality of structure’,71 a descendent of 
the concept advocated by Burger and Luckmann. ‘According to the notion of duality of 
structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of 
the practices they recursively organize’.72 In the same way as other elements of social 
constructivist theory, structuration theory has historicity built into it, and the basic 
domain of study becomes ‘social practices ordered across space and time’73 in which 
‘properties of collectivities and procedures of action in some way presuppose one 
another in the reality of social life’.74 Within structuration theory therefore, actors 
cannot be separated from the institutions in which they are embedded, nor can 
institutions be studied in isolation from the actors which comprise them. This sets it 
apart from both individualist rationalist theories and structuralist accounts, each of 
which reduces either agent or structure to an explanation in terms of the other. As 
already noted, Giddens’ structuration theory is not without criticism, and Carlsnaes 
suggests that despite the historical study of social practices which structuration engages 
in, the theory cannot incorporate temporal relations between action and structure.75 As 
action and structure ontologically presuppose each other it is not possible to analyze the 
interplay between the two or provide an adequate causal explanation of either. The 
recursive nature of the duality of structure goes some way to addressing these 
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criticisms, and Carlsnaes suggests ‘a continuous cycle of action-structure interactions, a 
dialectical process which not only serves to provide both continuity and change to social 
systems, but also can be penetrated analytically as a consequence of its essentially 
sequential thrust in societal transformation’.76 While the exact nature of this duality of 
structure is still very much under debate, the mutual constitution is an important concept 
within social constructivist thinking, and many of the areas in which it can add value 
flow from this concept. The social constructivist notion of institutions differs markedly 
from the rationalist viewpoint, as will be discussed later, and these institutions and 
norms provide one arena for systemic change. The constitution of agents from structures 
also goes against the rationalist assumption of exogenously given, fixed identities and 
interests and institutional norms play a major role in the social construction of these 
identities. For these reasons a study of the European Parliament will form a crucial part 
of my analysis, as the institution itself will play a key constitutive role in the identity of 
actors within it. I will argue that any model for identity in the EU which does not afford 
this key role to institutions is fundamentally lacking and flawed. 
 
One method for characterizing the different constraints on, and motivations for, 
individual action proposed by rationalist and social constructivist approaches is to talk 
of different modes or ‘logics’ of social action and interaction. A ‘logic of 
consequentialism’ is attributed to the rationalist approach, which views decision making 
as rational actors making choices based on a calculation of the consequences of their 
decision. While the ‘logic of consequentialism’ has evolved from and moved beyond 
Simon’s view of perfectly rational actors, with perfect information and a perfect ability 
to perform calculations, to include some measure of power given to beliefs and 
desires,77 the rationalist view of identities still views actors taking decisions which will 
have beneficial consequences for them. In contrast to this view is the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ which is associated with social constructivism. Within this mode of 
action decision making is seen as ‘driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, 
organized into institutions’,78 where actors attempt to fulfill the obligations of the role 
and identity which they occupy within an institution. This is not to say that social 
constructivists dismiss the notion of rational action, instead rationality, along with 
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everything else, becomes context dependant. ‘[H]umans take reasoned action by trying 
to answer three elementary questions: What kind of a situation is this? What kind of a 
person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this’?79 
Constructivists therefore argue that rationality is not merely instrumental rationality, 
advancing the notion of ‘practical or communicative rationality’.80 In this way rules and 
norms prescribe what is appropriate action in a given situation, although March and 
Olsen argue that actors have multiple roles and identities associated with different 
institutions which they help constitute, and a major factor in deciding actor behaviour is 
which role is appropriate to a given situation and which rules to obey. Because decision 
making within a ‘logic of appropriateness’ is rational it is possible to predict the 
behaviour of actors, as it is within a ‘logic of consequentialism’, but these predictions 
require knowledge of the role of the actor, the situation the actor finds themselves in and 
the most appropriate norms for that situation. Despite the neat division of modes of 
social action it is not always possible or desirable to separate the two within analyses, 
and each logic may have a role to play within a single decision making process.81 As 
such social constructivism has value to add to a rationalist analysis of decision making 
and allows the identities and interests of actors to be problematised. This move to 
problematise identity will allow me a more nuanced understanding of the identity of 
actors within the European Parliament, so I will investigate in detail the presence and 
effectiveness of norms in the EP and the expression of these norms in interest and 
behaviour. 
 
While social constructivism has value to add to rationalist approaches to international 
relations, the meta-theoretical assumptions which underpin the movement are not 
without problems. The belief that 'the objects of our knowledge are not independent of 
out interpretations and our language'82 extends beyond giving individual meaning to the 
world around us, knowledge is also 'the theories, concepts, meanings and symbols that 
scientists use to interpret social reality'.83 In this way interpretations and language play 
an important role in the social scientific study of the social world, including social 
constructivist work, and the time-space dependent nature of intersubjective meanings 
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requires the acceptance of the impermanence of knowledge. Social constructivism is 
therefore an interpretation of the social world, 'a set of paradigmatic lenses through 
which we observe all socially constructed reality'84 and, despite advocating different 
methods for selecting which interpretations are selected and accepted,85 Risse and Adler 
agree that the ideas and institutions which become reified and naturalised are not 
necessarily those which fit best. It may be that social constructivism is not the 
interpretation which best fits the real world, it is merely successful at imposing its 
collective meaning through the institution of social constructivism. Wendt’s definition 
of an institution as ‘a relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests’86 can 
be viewed as applicable to the social constructivist movement, and constructivist 
adherence to the duality of structure results in the implication that the movement and its 
followers are mutually constitutive. ‘The terms in which the world is understood are 
social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people’,87 and the 
discourse which is social constructionism, the ‘set of meanings, metaphors, 
representations, images, stories, statements…[the] version of events’88 which comprise 
the movement, is merely one of multiple possibilities. 
 
These objections are those which have long been levelled at reflectivist approaches and, 
although it is important to be cognizant of problems of the impermanence of 
knowledge, a Wendtian view of constructivism subscribing to a social ontology but 
sharing the rationalist epistemology goes some way to addressing these problems, and it 
'constitutes...the somewhat messy middle ground between the rationalist mainstream 
and more radical 'reflectivism''.89 Viewed in this way constructivism complements 
rationalism rather than opposing it, and, by asking different questions, provides a 
different picture. Constructivism provides a framework to address the shortcomings of 
international relations theory with respect to ideational factors, but while '[i]t may make 
sense for analytical purposes to distinguish between “material” structure and 
“ideational” structure...in the end a social system has just one structure, composed of 
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both material and ideational elements'.90 When analysing the added value of social  
 
constructivism the analogy of a 'conceptual toolbox'91 is a useful one, and 
constructivism adds analytical tools to this conceptual toolbox. Walt argues that 'the 
“compleat diplomat” of the future should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis of the 
inescapable role of power, keep liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in mind, and 
occasionally reflect on constructivism's vision of change',92 and I believe that an 
examination of norms has an important role to play in studies of the European Union 
generally, the European Parliament specifically, and the enlargement of the Union. The 
dominance of rationalist theorising in studies of the EU has led to the neglect of the 
roles of identity and institutions and the roles of norms in these areas and an analysis 
utilising a social constructivist framework will complement the existing literature 
concerning the European Union. A study of interest and identity in the EP will also 
allow a more nuanced view of the enlargement process and decision-making within the 
EU, although this will be explored within this thesis only to shed light on the issue of 
identity in the European Parliament. 'By itself, each school explains important elements 
of the integration process; working together, or at least side-by-side, they will more 
fully capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in contemporary Europe'.93 
 
I have demonstrated that there are advantages to be gained by applying a social 
constructivist framework to the study of the EU, in particular in relation to the 
institutions and the identity of actors within them, which are not found in more 
traditional, rationalist approaches. To investigate how this “added value” can improve 
our understanding and modelling of the EU, I will look at a number of areas in which I 
believe social constructivist theory can be applied to the EU and construct a theoretical 
framework within which questions can be answered concerning the nature of European 
identity. 
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Norms and Identity 
 
One of the most useful tools which social constructivists can bring to bear on 
International Relations theories is an appreciation of norms. ‘Norms and normative 
issues have been central to the study of politics for at least two millennia’94 and, despite 
long being neglected within IR, norms have come to be afforded an important position 
within social constructivist theory. Areas as diverse as ‘foreign aid, opposition to 
slavery, piracy, trafficking in women, science policy, development, racism and laws of 
war’95 have been employed to demonstrate the effectiveness of norms, with 
constructivists arguing that non-material structures such as norms have a role to play in 
identity formation, and by extension interest formation. Despite this important role 
afforded to norms, much early IR scholarship recognised the presence of norms without 
theorizing the normative processes96 which are vital for continued theoretical debate and 
to provide legitimacy to empirical research. This is particularly true in the normatively 
dense environment of the EU, as will be discussed in detail later, and I believe that 
identifying norms and normative processes within the European Parliament is important 
in establishing an accurate model of actor identity and decision making, and that this 
should form an important basis for any empirical research within the EP, and indeed the 
institutions of the European Union more broadly. 
 
An important first step in theorising normative processes is to establish a definition of 
norms. Finnemore defines norms simply as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for 
actors within a given identity’,97 although I believe that this is too ambiguous. I believe 
that it is important to explicitly identify that any given norm will be only one of many at 
any given time which provide an actor with a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour’. 
Indeed Finnemore herself later asserts that ‘political scientists tend to slip into 
discussions of “sovereignty” or “slavery” as if they were norms, when in fact they are 
(or were) collections of norms and the mix of rules and practices that structure these 
institutions has varied significantly over time’.98 Chayes and Chayes define norms as a 
                                                 
94
 Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ International 
Organization 52:4, p. 889. 
95
 Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International 
Relations and Comparative Politics’ Annual Review of Political Science 4, 2001. p.396. 
96
 Finnemore & Sikkink, ‘Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ p.889. 
97
 Ibid, p.891. 
98
 Ibid. 
29 
 
‘broad class of prescriptive statements – rules, standards, principles, and so forth’ that 
are ‘prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a 
sense that they ought to be followed’.99 Again, I believe that this definition is helpful but 
not completely satisfactory. I believe that there is scope for norms which actors do not 
feel obliged to follow, such as those which are so institutionalised as to be subconscious. 
These norms will determine behaviour without influencing a ‘situation of choice’. I will 
address the way in which norms exert influence below. Another important facet of 
norms, and another reason that they are of interest to social constructivists, is their 
inherently social nature. ‘Unlike ideas which may be held privately, norms are shared 
and social; they are not just subjective but intersubjective…One could say that they are 
collectively held ideas about behavior’.100 Norms are shared amongst people, or a group 
of actors, and the norms are sustained by the actors attitudes towards the actions of 
group members with reference to the norm, whether approving or disapproving.101 
There are no absolute requirements as to the size of the group within which a norm is 
shared, norms relating to human rights are shared between many actors throughout the 
world, other norms are shared within states, organisations, companies or even amongst 
fans of a particular football team. I define norms as intersubjective forces towards 
appropriate behaviour for actors within a given social identity, and this is the definition I 
will employ throughout my research and analysis. 
 
One method employed by theorists to help shed light on normative processes is to 
investigate different types or categories of norms. Finnemore claims that there are 
‘many kinds of norms in the world – social, cultural, professional, moral, religious and 
famillial’,102 although a more common categorisation sees division into ethical, 
constitutive and regulative norms. Within this schema ethical or moral norms equate to 
judgements of right and wrong, beliefs of rectitude. Ethical norms are not universal, and 
they will not necessarily coincide with an individual agent’s notion of goodness, that 
notion is after all itself a result of ethical norms, by its very nature an ethical norm is 
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seen as good by the actors who subscribe to, and support, it. ‘Norms most of us would 
consider “bad” – norms about racial superiority, divine right, imperialism – were once 
powerful because some groups believed in the appropriateness…of the norm’.103 Within 
Europe and the EU ethical norms exist labelling as ‘appropriate’ notions of freedom, 
human rights, democracy, justice and progress, as well as defining what is understood 
by these terms, and these affect the attitudes and behaviours of individuals and states in 
their dealings with one another. Although I will not be making value judgments 
concerning the presence or absence of ethical norms, I will examine in detail the effect 
of these norms within European identity. The classification of these norms as “ethical” 
does not imbue them with universal applicability, and I will demonstrate later that they 
are interlinked with other norms and I believe can, therefore, be classified as “European 
norms” with an influence on European identity. 
 
Throughout the history of International Relations theory regulative norms have received 
the greatest attention, as they have a role to play in rationalist accounts of the 
international system. Regulative norms take the form of laws and rules – ‘specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action’104 and are generally attributed causative 
powers (although Ruggie objects to the terminology, arguing that they do not strictly 
cause the action).105 Finnemore has questioned whether legal norms have any special 
role to play in affecting state behaviour, arguing that ‘[w]hat distinguishes legal norms 
from other norms is simply not clear’,106 but I believe there are factors which set legal 
norms apart from their non-legal counterparts. Legal norms are explicitly stated in 
written form, this is in marked contrast to many other forms of norm which are 
interpreted by the individual. This allows legal norms to be backed by the power of the 
body from which they originated, ‘the state’s coercive powers exist precisely for the 
purpose of enforcing law’,107 and this provides a clear sanction associated with the 
violation of a legal norm. Further power is afforded to legal norms by ‘western’ ethical 
norms which treat the rule of law as appropriate behaviour not only on the part of the 
violators of legal norms, but also those violated against. These factors combine to make 
legal norms key factors in determining appropriate behaviour at the level of individuals 
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and at state level. Finnemore suggests that if legal norms enjoy a status distinct from 
other norms ‘we would expect that a prominent goal of norm entrepreneurs…would be 
consolidating unambiguous legal status for their norms’,108 and I believe this to be the 
case. While one of the goals of norm entrepreneurs is to ‘change peoples’ minds’ about 
their particular issue, the ultimate goal is to change the law, norms concerning women’s 
suffrage, slavery, child labour and many others are now codified in law. Within the EU 
ethical norms have been codified into the Copenhagen Criteria, a potential member 
country must reach certain standards with regard to the ethical norms before 
membership is permitted. The importance of legal norms can also be observed in 
Turkey, which has instituted a large number of law changes in the process of preparing 
for entry into the EU, these legal changes have been required by the EU, signalling their 
added importance.  
 
In contrast to norms with causal power are those with constitutive effects, the norms 
which dictate the practices themselves. While neo-utilitarian approaches to international 
relations have no concept of constitutive norms,109 they play an important role in 
constructivist theory. Constitutive norms generate identity and study of these norms 
allows understanding of the structures, processes and institutions of international 
politics. Wendt discusses three degrees to which norms can be socialised, with each 
degree of socialisation resulting in a different mechanism of norm compliance. When a 
norm is experienced with ‘first degree’ socialisation110 actors comply with the norm due 
to coercion, because they are forced to, ‘[h]e is neither motivated to comply of his own 
accord, nor does he think that doing so is in his self-interest’.111 There is a requirement 
for shared understanding, the actor is aware of the norm, but behaviour is externally 
rather than internally driven. The ‘second degree’112 of socialisation differs from the 
first degree in that the actor has a meaningful choice as to whether to obey the norm, the 
actor is free from coercion but adheres to the norm as they believe it to be in their self-
interest. Although at this degree of socialisation actors will not necessarily view the 
norms as legitimate, justification of behaviour will be by reference to shared 
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expectations113. The ‘third degree’ of socialisation114 corresponds to norms which have 
been accepted, and are followed by actors because ‘they think the norms are legitimate 
and therefore want to follow them’.115 It is at this third degree of socialisation that 
actors’ identities and interests are constituted by norms, and this process becomes self-
reinforcing as actors view the norms as part of their identity.116 Socialisation and norm 
compliance will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, but this Wendtian view 
of norm compliance gives an insight into the role norms play in dictating practice and 
generating identity. Social constructivism’s treatment of the constitutive nature of norms 
broadens the theoretical outlook beyond the actions of actors in a fixed environment to 
include context and the nature of the system in which the actors and actions are situated. 
 
Study of the EU has traditionally focused on regulative norms: the treaties, legislation 
and court judgements from the EU level and the effect that these exerted on member 
states, their national legislatures, and state interactions. Within the sphere of EU 
expansion, this takes the form of investigation of the technical procedures and rules 
which comprise the enlargement and accession processes. While these regulative norms 
still have a role to play in future enlargements of the EU, the normative power of 
European integration extends into other, less formal, areas. ‘The EU has developed 
institutional features beyond the original design and certainly beyond the purpose of 
managing economic interdependence’ to ‘include shared norms, commonly accepted 
rules and decision-making procedures’.117 An examination of constitutive norms within 
the EU and Turkey would not only shed light on the changing environment and context 
for action, but also any change in actor identity or interest, which could also have an 
observable effect on EU enlargement policy and decision making. Through an analysis 
of actor interests within the European Parliament, I aim to observe the effect of 
constitutive norms on the identity of actors within the EP. 
 
Unfortunately, despite this apparently neat distinction between constitutive and 
regulative norms, investigation of the nature and effect of norms is not that clear cut. 
Wendt does not subscribe to a distinction between regulative and constitutive norms, but 
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rather views them on their effect. He states that ‘I assume that norms are norms but that 
they vary in their balance of causal and constitutive effects’, ‘[a]fter determining 
empirically that a particular norm has only causal effects we might decide to call it a 
“regulative”, but this should be taken to describe a pattern of effects, not a “kind” of 
norm’.118 For this reason it is difficult in practice to divide norms into this neat 
categorization so, while it is useful in understanding the different elements and effects 
of norms, I will view norms on the influence they have on actor identity and interests. 
Similarly, however, the compliance with norms is not a simple, clear cut procedure 
either, as each norm will only be one of many acting at any given time. It is entirely 
possible that different norms will be contradictory with one another in a given situation, 
and by their nature norms are open to interpretation and discussion as to which are 
relevant to the situation. The interaction between norms within a group will have a large 
role to play in questions of interpretation and relevancy, as will individual actor choice. 
Finnemore and Sikkink cite a study of ‘ten countries’ reactions to international human 
rights norms [which] showed how regime type, civil war, and the presence of domestic 
human rights organizations affect the degree to which states will comply with 
international human rights norms’.119  
 
Despite these difficulties, mechanisms have been put forward to explain the normative 
processes, Ruggie suggests that ‘[n]orms may “guide” behavior, they may “inspire” 
behavior, they may “rationalize” or “justify” behavior, they may express “mutual 
expectations” or they may be ignored’.120 Onuf sees norms as the vehicle for the 
creation of agents and structures, ‘[s]ocial rules…make the process by which people and 
society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal’,121 a view echoed by Kubálková 
who argues that norms mediate, mutually reproduce, enable and co-construct agency 
and structure.122 While the role that norms play in the formation of identity will be 
discussed in greater detail later, Reus-Smit identifies three mechanisms through which 
behaviour is affected by norms: imagination, communication and constraint.123 The 
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presence of norms can impose limitations on the range of strategies and solutions to 
problems which an actor can imagine and restrict the realm of possible actions. 
Linguistic constructivists, such as Onuf and Kratochwil, point to the role and power of 
language in creating and enforcing rules and limiting the realm of thought and action 
possible to actors. It is normative effects of this nature which I do not believe directly 
present the actor with a choice concerning their actions. Communication allows actors 
to debate the interpretation and relevance of particular norms, to justify action with 
reference to the norms of conduct and to express approval and disapproval of other’s 
actions. ‘Because they are intersubjective and collectively held, norms are often the 
subject of discussion among actors. Actors may specifically articulate norms in 
justifying actions, or they may call upon norms to persuade others to act’.124 Constraint 
is closely tied into communication, and represents the influence of the norms on the 
choices faced by the actors.125 These choices will in many cases be influenced by 
normative discussions and arguments, and the effect will be felt within the decision-
making frameworks established by the normative effects on imagination. Despite the 
term ‘constraint’, norms acting in this way can still be disregarded or ignored, and this 
will often feed back into the ‘communication’ sphere, with other group members 
expressing disapproval and potentially imposing sanction. For these reasons it is 
important to take a multi-faceted approach to understanding norms within the European 
Parliament. It will be important for me to gain an understanding of identity as 
interpreted by the individual actor, but it will also be necessary to investigate the impact 
of norms on actor interest and behaviour within debates. This will be considered in 
more detail in the subsequent methodology section, as it will be important for me to 
design an appropriate research programme. 
 
The role played by norms in identity genesis is elucidated by the Wendtian approach to 
identities and interests, and Wendt suggests four different kinds of identity: personal (or 
corporate), type, role and collective. Although Wendt concedes that ‘the closer [one] 
look[s] the fuzzier the differences get’,126 this multiple identity model allows a more 
nuanced view of the normative factors affecting identity. The personal identity (which 
becomes the corporate identity when addressing state actors) is a unique identity with a 
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material base (in the case of the individual this is the body), but the personal or 
corporate identity is distinguished by ‘a consciousness and memory of Self as a separate 
locus of thought and activity.’127 Type identity can be seen as taking the form of a 
socially important label, one which is seen to bracket off those with certain shared 
intrinsic qualities such as attitudes and beliefs. In this way individuals can have many 
type identities by belonging to many distinct groups and, by definition, the type identity 
will be shared with other individuals. While type identity refers to intrinsic properties, 
role identity refers to properties and qualities which exist only in relation to others. To 
illustrate this point Wendt suggests roles such as master and slave, professor and 
student, roles which are meaningless on their own. Because it is impossible to enact a 
role identity in isolation they are inherently social, and the relationships which form role 
identities are normatively created and maintained. The final kind of identity, collective 
identity, in many ways builds upon the preceding forms, which, in specific areas and in 
relation to definite issues, allows individuals to identify with others and assume 
common positions and attitudes. ‘Collective identity, in short, is a distinct combination 
of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the 
welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self’.128 Social constructivism views as 
possible the development of Other regarding perspectives and collective rationality,129 
which has important implications for the sphere of international relations and the 
cooperation of state actors. This could be particularly important within relations 
between the EU and Turkey, and the possibility of Other regarding perspectives in this 
relationship will be addressed within this research. An important corollary of this view 
of identity is the possibility for actors to display multiple identities in different 
situations or, indeed, in the same situation. It is clear that an actor could assume 
multiple type or role identities, I could be teacher and pupil in different situations, but it 
is also possible to experience and exhibit multiple collective identities. A Member of the 
European Parliament is likely to feel collective identity in relation to their nation 
(possibly also a region within that nation), but may also experience collective identity in 
relation to the European Parliament specifically or the European Union (or both). For 
this reason it is necessary for empirical research to be specific as to the identity being 
studied, and I will create a framework within which my research will be conducted 
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which accounts for the interplay of different identities and has context specificity built-
in. 
 
Wendt moves on from his discussion of identity to look at corporate agency, and he 
argues that ‘states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute 
anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality’,130 attempting to 
demonstrate this through his different forms of identity. Perhaps most importantly, the 
state has a corporate identity due to its material components, that is the people and 
structures which comprise it and, as social constructivism attests, a state cannot be 
reduced simply to the collection of individual actors which are contained within it  – 
‘States are people too’.131 Once corporate identity at state level has been established, 
type and role identity and state preferences quickly follow. Within the international 
system, states gain type identities such as “democratic” (which could in practice cover a 
vast range of different systems of government) and role identities include classifications 
such as “friend”, “enemy” and “ally”. While the degree of collective identity between 
states is widely debated, collective identity is widespread within a state, with the Other 
regarding nature of nationalist feelings often becoming unconscious, and allowing the 
possibility of collective action. It should be noted, however, that, despite a widespread 
acceptance of the state as actor in the international system, Wendt’s claim that ‘states are 
people too’ is far from undisputed. It has been suggested that Wendt’s location of 
agency in the state is incompatible with his broader position in the agency-structure 
debate,132 that he marginalises the role of humans in constructing states. This raises 
practical implications, with Wendt’s claim that states are exogenously given indicating 
that state identity is beyond his analysis, and ‘the domestic setting is ignored’.133 It is 
suggested, therefore, that Wendt’s theory neglects an important element of the 
construction he elsewhere advocates.  
 
Although there are difficulties with Wendt’s individual analogy, I believe that a case can 
be made for institutions to be classed as actors, which display identities and interests of 
their own, without neglecting the construction of identity within the institution itself. 
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Where an institution is sufficiently developed and complex that it cannot be reduced to 
its constituent parts,134 and it has a material base which becomes a ‘locus of thought and 
activity’,135 it gains a corporate identity. I believe that the argument can be made that 
these conditions are met by the European Union and even the European Parliament, as 
will be outlined later, and that role and type identities, and even collective identities, can 
be formed within the international system. Although this idea is not a key component of 
my empirical research, I will look at this in the section of analysis concerning the role of 
the European Parliament, and I believe that future research in this area could yield 
interesting and informative results. The perceived and articulated role of the European 
Parliament as representing the voice of the people makes the EP an interesting and 
important locus of study, and the interactions of the institutions of the EU would be 
profitable in this regard. 
 
Despite this view of identities and their interaction with norms, it remains problematic 
to identify the action of individual norms on actor choices and behaviour, ‘[w]e must 
recognise that the activity of human beings consists of meeting a flow of situations in 
which they have to act’.136 This statement is equally true of states and other actors, and a 
clearer understanding of normative processes can be gained through an investigation of 
these actions, as outlined above. It is for this reason that an investigation of preferences 
and attitudes of MEPs in relation to Turkey will play a vital role in understanding 
identity in the European Parliament. A key concept of social constructivism is the 
duality of structure which sees agents and structures mutually constituting one another. 
An important element in this process is normative action, with rules and practices 
frequently forming stable patterns of behaviour.137 ‘Over time, understandings of 
normative problems and categories of normative arguments become organized into 
intelligible patterns, traditions or ideologies’,138 and it is this idea which inspires the 
social constructivist belief in the constructed nature of the international system and 
Wendt’s famous claim – ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’.139 The iterated response of 
actors to normative pressures creates stable practices and institutions, and this stability 
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is important in the generation and transformation of actor identity – ‘the key to such 
transformations is relatively stable practice’.140 A social system which is unstable or in a 
state of flux will not have the normative or socialising power of a stable one, and the 
presence of institutions further strengthens the power of the norms, exerting influence 
on the imagination and communication of actors as well as constraining their actions. 
Within the institutions actors will, in most circumstances, aim to maintain a stable 
identity and abide by the norms governing them. This provides systemic inertia, 
inhibiting change and promoting stability. 
 
Despite these factors promoting stability, one key area in which social constructivism 
differs from rational theories of international relations is that normative change, and 
therefore systemic change, is possible. ‘New situations are constantly arising within the 
scope of group life that are problematic and for which existing rules are inadequate’141 
and, despite the relatively stable institutions they create, the nature of norms makes 
them somewhat changeable. ‘Norms are no less effective for being fluid and less real 
for being negotiable. Both ideally and actually the stuff which binds societies is more 
like mastic than cement’.142 The intersubjective nature of norms results in group 
members engaging in discussion and debate as to the nature, applicability and relative 
importance of norms in each situation, and this can lead to subtle shifts in the 
interpretation of the norms and normative processes. Changes of this nature, while 
appreciable, will generally be small and will not disrupt the stability of institutions and 
structures. Without threatening the stability of the institution it is possible, however, for 
appreciable change to occur over time. This change will arise from the accretion of 
small scale changes, and a process akin to evolution could occur within institutions. 
When studying institutions such as those within the EU it is, therefore, necessary to 
have an appreciation of the importance of stability while understanding mechanisms for 
change, and that the norms studied will only represent a snapshot of the complicated 
normative picture. 
 
‘Shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what give the 
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world structure, order and stability’,143 so while the framework within which the 
question lies may have changed within social constructivism, the question to be 
addressed remains the same – how can systemic change be explained? The social 
constructivist response is to argue that systemic change of an ideational international 
structure is brought about through shifts in ideas and normative processes. ‘Norm shifts 
are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist’.144 
Even with the identification of this macro-level mechanism, the social constructivist 
theorising of systemic change is not complete without an examination of idea and norm 
change at the micro-level because, as we have seen, norms tend to produce social 
stability and order. Constructivists have attempted to formulate mechanisms through 
which the systemic inertia of the ideational structure of norms and institutions can be 
overcome to produce significant shifts in national and international systems and 
structures. One theory advanced to explain normative change has grown out of the 
communicative aspect of norms is Risse’s ‘logic of truth seeking or arguing’145 
mentioned earlier. Risse suggests that actors make validity claims of their normative 
environment in one of three ways, questioning the truth of assertions made in relation to 
their perception of their normative environment, questioning the moral rightness of 
norms underlying arguments or questioning the validity and truthfulness of the 
speaker.146 It is through validity claims of this nature that actors engage in discourse, 
attempting to convince others of their point of view, and in turn being willing to be 
persuaded, with the successful argument being the most convincing one. Crucially Risse 
asserts that ‘an argumentative consensus has constitutive effects on actors’147 and as 
such can in turn produce normative change. For this debate and argument to occur 
however there must be a great deal of ground shared between the actors engaged in the 
argument, as it is with reference to shared norms and intersubjective meanings and 
understandings that validity claims are made. For this reason, despite the strengths 
outlined, I do not believe that a ‘logic of arguing’ is sufficient on its own to account for 
large norm shifts, and it does not explicitly contain a mechanism for norm emergence. 
 
One mechanism proposed to explain norm change which does cover the issue of norm 
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emergence is Finnemore and Sikkink’s “life cycle” of norms, a three stage cycle of 
‘norm emergence’, ‘norm cascade’ and ‘internalization’.148 Finnemore and Sikkink 
propose the notion of ‘norm entrepreneurs’, who play an active role in the emergence 
and adoption of new norms.149 Norm entrepreneurs call attention to issues about which 
they have strong feelings, and “frame” the issues by naming, interpreting and 
dramatizing them.150 These issues are brought into the normative processes which are 
already in place and compete with existing norms and interests. This is one area in 
which the systemic inertia of the normative system works against the new norms, as 
while the norm entrepreneurs will be operating with new beliefs and interests, those that 
they are trying to convince will be conditioned by the existing norms, and this could 
cause them to be opposed to the effects of the new norms, indeed ‘one has to wonder 
what could possibly motivate norm entrepreneurs’.151 Whatever their motivation 
(although one might presume it to be the strength of their beliefs), it is the job of the 
norm entrepreneur to convince those around them of the appropriateness of the new 
norm, although still working within the confines of the existing norms. I believe that the 
‘logic of arguing’ can add to our understanding of methods employed by norm 
entrepreneurs in this respect, and relating the new norm to existing, complimentary 
norms can provide a valuable point of argument. During the American civil rights 
movement, norm entrepreneurs attempted to show that norms of racial equality were not 
only compatible with existing norms of equality and freedom, but were actually more 
acceptable within the ethical normative framework. Of course this was not an easy 
argument for them to win, but ultimately it proved to be a powerful tactic.  
 
While the mechanism for norm emergence forwarded by Finnemore and Sikkink is 
phrased specifically in terms of the individual, I believe similarities can be drawn at an 
international level and the concept of norm entrepreneurs can be extrapolated to state 
level. Within an international organisation such as the EU, state actors take on a similar 
role to that of norm entrepreneur because, while their norms may be established at 
national level, they are, in some cases, new at EU level. In this way actors coming into 
the European Parliament will bring norms which are established at the national level 
into the institution of the EP, although they do not come directly from the government 
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of the member state. This introduction of new norms will, similarly, be into an 
established normative environment and the process of argument and persuasion will be 
a similar one. These changes have served to reduce the importance of the power of a 
state with regard to norms, and amounts to a substantive change in the nature of norm 
development in international relations, as in ‘the traditional legal order, dominant norms 
were created by states and depended directly on the consent of states’.152 With the 
increase in ‘global cultural homogenization’153 and the rise of complex international 
bodies and structures, such as the EU, the power to control normative processes has 
moved away from states, and international organisations have the ability to ‘socialize 
states to accept new political goals and new values that have lasting impacts on the 
conduct of war, the workings of the international political economy, and the structure of 
states themselves’.154 For this reason a key tactic for norm entrepreneurs is to gain an 
‘organizational platform’155 through which their norms can be promoted. Whether this is 
a platform with the primary purpose of promoting the norm (such as organisations set 
up to campaign against landmines or slavery), or whether norm promotion is just one of 
the functions of the organisation (such as the EU or UN) it is often through the action of 
an organisational platform that norms are socialised at state level. 
 
The process of arguing, persuading and convincing a state to subscribe to a new norm is 
a difficult one, but quantitative empirical studies have shown there to be a ‘tipping 
point’, at which point a norm cascade begins. While empirical work has suggested the 
presence of a tipping point, ‘[scholars] have not yet provided a theoretical account for 
why norm tipping occurs, nor criteria for specifying where, when and how we would 
expect it’.156 The nature of this tipping point and the time at which it is reached are 
different in each case, but it is possible to identify factors which will influence when a 
“critical mass” of actors or states will be reached. One crucial factor which influences 
the building of this mass is the ‘normative weight’157 of states which support the norm. 
The normative weight of a state will vary form issue to issue, but is influenced by the 
level of compromise required of the state, and the degree to which the norm would be 
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compromised without the support of the state. Whenever the tipping point occurs, it 
marks a pronounced shift in the “life cycle” of the norm. 
 
While the emergence phase of a norm’s life cycle is characterised by norm 
entrepreneurs creating powerful movements for change at a domestic level, a norm 
cascade represents the widespread adoption of a norm amongst states or state actors 
without the necessity for widespread domestic pressure. Once the tipping point is 
reached, ‘an international or regional demonstration effect or “contagion” occurs in 
which international and transnational norm influences become more important than 
domestic politics for effecting norm change’.158 As at the norm emergence stage, it is 
difficult to give a complete picture of the pressures which act on states to adopt the new 
norms, although socialisation pathways have an important role to play in the process. 
Checkel points to two mechanisms through which norms created by entrepreneurs at the 
EU can be transferred to, and have an effect at, the national level, societal mobilization 
and social learning.159 Social Learning is the process by which norms are internalised 
(generally by the élite) and shared, societal mobilization takes the form of the power of 
pressure groups brought to bear in an effort to institute policy change.160 Within the EU, 
norms which are created at the EU level will not only exert an influence at state level 
however, the effects will also be felt at European level, within the institutions of the 
European Union and on the actors who comprise them. This effect, combined with the 
high degree of transnational and international normative activity at work within the EU, 
aids in the process of norm cascade and, as such, makes the EU a good focus of social 
constructivist study into norms and normative processes. 
 
Alongside the socialisation of norms, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that a process 
similar to “peer pressure” may cause states to adopt new norms.161 In a world of global 
communication and cultural homogenisation, it is increasingly possible for citizens 
within a state to examine the policies and attitudes of other states and draw comparisons 
with their own. This means that people will be able to see the adoption of new norms 
within other groups, and the inaction of a state could compromise its domestic 
legitimacy. Therefore ‘international legitimation  is important insofar as it reflects back 
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on a government’s domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its 
ability to stay in power’.162 This is one way in which the European Union and its 
individual institutions aim to foster norm and identity change beyond Brussels, both 
within member states and within candidate countries such as Turkey. Once a norm has 
reached a tipping point of support the norm cascade phase of the life cycle begins and 
pressures at the international level such as socialisation and legitimacy become of 
primary importance, causing a spread in acceptance of the norm. 
 
At the extreme end of a norm cascade a norm can enter the third and final stage of its 
life cycle, internalisation. Internalisation occurs when a norm becomes so widely 
accepted that it becomes “taken for granted” and influences the behaviour of actors with 
little or no thought on their part. This status is not achieved by every norm which is 
created and framed by norm entrepreneurs, but some of the most powerful norms which 
have been created, such as norms against slavery, or those for women’s suffrage, are 
now accepted without debate in large parts of the world. Internalised norms such as 
these can be very powerful, but the fact that their effects can be hard to discern and they 
are not controversial means that ‘these norms are often not the centrepiece of political 
debate and for that reason tend to be ignored by political scientists’.163 While the nature 
and origin of many of these “taken for granted” norms has been neglected, the methods 
through which norms can become internalised has been an area of interest to theorists. 
When a norm becomes widely accepted and followed during a norm cascade, the 
behaviour it conditions will be iterated and will form a habit. As this norm following 
becomes habitual, patterns of behaviour will accrete which will become 
institutionalised. Iterated behaviour therefore plays a large role in the internalisation of 
norms and the achieving of “taken for granted” status. 
 
One theoretical field which has grown out of the study of norms, particularly ethical 
norms, normative change and systemic change is ‘normative theory’, ‘that body of work 
which addresses the moral dimension of international relations…it addresses the ethical 
nature of the relations between communities/states’.164 Normative theory takes as its 
field of study a society’s rules, institutions and practices, that is its normative processes, 
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and attempts to theorise their role in society. All too often however, this takes the form 
of addressing ‘an ideal world that does not exist as such’165 and attempting to prescribe 
changes rather than studying or predicting them. This can be observed in Wendt’s 
‘Anarchy is What States Make of it’, where he suggests the possibility of directing 
change and proposes three possible transformations to the international system.166 The 
danger inherent in these attempts to ‘improve’ institutions and situations is that to a 
large degree our outlook to the particular problem will be conditioned by our normative 
environment, so notions such as ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ will be subjective. This 
problem is picked up on by Finnemore and Sikkink who suggest ‘a bias toward 
progressive norms’,167 those which fit with our existing normative frameworks, such as 
human rights and democracy, and a neglect for norms which are less palatable, such as 
xenophobia. As such constructivist study of systemic change has not produced 
substantive hypotheses of which norms will prove influential168 and ‘the focus on social 
structures most of us admire has continued’.169 Issues of morality and the existence of 
natural human rights and worldwide ethical norms have sparked argument and debate 
for many centuries and, while they are certainly important questions in many spheres of 
social scientific study, I do not believe that “normative theory” will provide a useful 
insight into the study of European integration and expansion, although I believe that it is 
entirely possible that actors will display attitudes which reflect this viewpoint I will 
investigate the norms in terms of the effect they have and this will, therefore, be picked 
up as an influence of the norms. 
 
Despite this bias towards progressive norms, some work has been conducted into which 
norms prove successful, the conditions within which the norms will thrive and the 
qualities of the norms which progress right through the life cycle and are internalised. 
As already discussed, domestic legitimacy has an important role to play in the life cycle 
of norms, and legitimacy remains an issue in state adoption of norms. Finnemore and 
Sikkink argue that states which are experiencing domestic turmoil should be more 
susceptible to pressures and claims based on legitimacy170 and norms would be more 
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likely to spread during periods of international turmoil and upheaval, where norms, 
interests and identities are subject to debate and argument. It is possible that this may be 
observed within the EU, with some actors (primarily “euro-sceptics”) calling the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy into question, and it could be that norms based on the legitimacy 
of European identity based in democracy, justice etc. will spread for this reason. This 
also gives the basis of a counter argument, however, with euro-sceptics arguing the 
hypocrisy of a body promoting norms of democracy when it does not fulfil them itself.  
 
Alongside the issue of legitimacy is the concept of ‘prominence’, which a norm gains 
when it is employed by ‘successful’ states, those which are seen as role models.171 
Prominence could also be gained by the norms themselves if they are seen as beneficial 
to a state (or its people, at which point issues of legitimacy would be raised) which has 
previously employed the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink mirror Risse’s requirement of a 
‘common lifeworld’172 for norm change, by pointing to the relationship between new 
norms and existing norms as influencing the effect of the new norms. In a similar way 
to Risse’s actors finding common normative ground around which to argue, ‘[p]olitical 
scientists also make arguments about adjacency, precedent and fit’.173 In this way norm 
entrepreneurs and activists frame the issues surrounding the emergent norm in relation 
to, and in terms of, the existing normative framework. This makes it easier for group 
members to understand the problem and empathise, and can be a persuasive argument in 
favour of emerging norms. Within the EU this highlights another key role for the 
European Parliament, which provides an arena for this normative framework, as will be 
discussed below. 
 
An area of theory which has gained importance in the study of European integration is 
the concept of “soft power”, which has become a ‘buzz word’, and is now ‘at the heart 
of discourses on the EU foreign policy’.174 Olli Rehn, during his tenure as European 
Commissioner for enlargement, defined European soft power as ‘its power to transform 
its nearest neighbours into functioning democracies, market economies, and true 
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partners in meeting common challenges’,175 and this allies with Nye’s definition of soft 
power as ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want – [it] co-opts people rather 
than coerces them’.176 This “soft power”, the ability for the EU to influence its 
neighbours and potential member states is often seen as key to the EU being perceived 
as a viable actor in international politics, and a consistent commitment to ‘European 
values’ is seen to underpin this soft power.177 I believe, however, that this “soft power” 
could helpfully be viewed in normative terms, and that there is a strong normative 
component in the relations between the EU and neighbouring states. 
 
Nye argues that ‘the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its 
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to 
them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and 
having moral authority)’.178 I believe that the preceding discussion highlights the 
resonance of these factors with those of normative transmission and diffusion, and I 
believe that talk of a ‘normative power Europe’179 can help to shed light in this area. 
Nye’s reference to culture and political values will, I believe, echo identity within the 
institutions of the European Union and the EU as a whole, and the requirement for 
legitimacy and consistency is closely mirrored in Finnemore and Sikkink’s account of 
norm diffusion. Although this is unlikely to be addressed directly by my empirical work, 
it is an area which will impact on the relationship between Turkey and the EU, and is 
another area in which a greater and more nuanced understanding of norms could be 
beneficial in studying the European Union. 
 
While norms have been a focus of study in the social sciences for a long time, the 
advent of social constructivism has brought a greater theoretical understanding of norms 
into international relations. Norms have important constitutive roles to play in the 
formation of the international system and individual actor’s identities and interests, as 
well as performing regulative functions on actor behaviour. The inherent sociality of 
norms is important in their effect, and the construction of institutions and patterns of 
behaviour which provide a degree of stability to the international system and to the 
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socialisation of actors. Despite this stability, it is also through norms and their change 
that systemic change, a key aspect of social constructivist theory, can be achieved. I 
believe that these mechanisms for normative and systemic change can shed light on the 
changes which will take place in relation to identity in the European Parliament with 
Turkey’s application for membership and the change which will be required for the 
normative adaptation required to be accepted and socialized by member states.  
 
I suggest that the EU is a prime candidate for an investigation into the normative nature 
of institutions due to its unique structure and an institutional and normative density not 
found elsewhere in international politics. This is particularly true of the European 
Parliament, where the role of actors is to be representatives of the people of Europe. For 
this reason, actors within the European Parliament will experience norms from 
European and National levels, as well possibly as regional norms, and are free of 
national governmental constraint. 
 
Institutions and Social Constructivism 
 
As with many other areas of International Relations theory, a rational choice theory of 
institutions has long prevailed, but social constructivism has, in recent years, allowed 
for a different, thicker view of institutions building on the enhanced understanding of 
the role of norms and the prominent position they are afforded within international 
politics. This alternate theorising can have a profound effect, not only on the nature and 
effectiveness of the institutions themselves, but also on the identity and interests of the 
actors who comprise and constitute them. Even within the EU, with the new institutions 
and polity which have been created, the traditional attitude has been to adopt the thin 
view of institutions, such as within Moravcsik's 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism', but I 
believe that an exploration of the alternative, social constructivist, attitude to 
institutions, utilizing the deeper conception of norms, will allow a better understanding 
of the European Parliament, and the actors who comprise its membership. 
 
The rational choice, neo-utilitarian, understanding of institutions stems from the key 
assumptions which underpin the theoretical position. Rational choice theories seek to 
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explain social systems with reference to individual actors,180 the individual being the 
basic unit of social analysis. The individuals who are being studied are attributed 
'transitive, fixed, and given (exogenous) preferences',181 which in the case of the 
European Parliament and the EU would manifest as the preferences of the nations from 
which the actors are drawn. Alongside this is the optimality assumption, that '[w]hen 
faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe is likely to 
have the best overall outcome',182 the eponymous rational choice. These factors combine 
to form the thin view of institutions which is found within a neo-utilitarian framework, 
in which the extent of their effect is to influence the strategy of actors and to constrain 
or enable their behaviour. Actor behaviour can be modelled within the theorised 'thin' 
institutions, as courses of action will be decided upon based on calculations of 
consequences, 'in situations of interdependent choice...actors will of necessity behave 
strategically'.183  
 
While rational choice institutionalism views institutions as 'at most...a constraint on the 
behaviour of self interested actors',184 historical institutionalism does afford them a 
slightly stronger role. In the short term, historical institutionalism affords the same 
limited power to institutions, that of constraining actors, but does concede that 
'institutions can have deeper effects on actors as strategies, initially adopted for self-
interested reasons get locked into and institutionalized in politics'.185 Despite the slight 
increase in institutional 'thickness' which is attributed to historical institutionalism, 'the 
great majority of contemporary work on European integration views institutions, at best, 
as intervening variables'.186 In contrast to these theories is the form of institutionalism 
which is advocated by social constructivists, one which postulates an explanation of 
changeable identities and interests of members and groups. 
 
The social constructivist concept of an institution differs markedly from the neo-
utilitarian one, and is grounded in the concepts of social facts and shared intersubjective 
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meanings, '[i]ntersubjective meanings have structural attributes that do not merely 
constrain actors. They also define their social reality'.187 In direct contrast to the 
methodological individualism of rational choice institutionalism, socially constructed 
institutions cannot be reduced to the actions of individuals. Institutions are also far from 
structures designed to constrain and frame action. 'An institution is a relatively stable 
collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures of resources that make action 
possible – organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and structures of meaning that 
explain and justify behavior – roles, identities and belongings, common purposes, and 
causal and normative beliefs'.188 This understanding of institutions is so important to 
constructivists that Checkel argues that constructivism 'is an argument about 
institutions',189 and the polity of a democratic system is 'a configuration of formally 
organized institutions that defines the setting within which governance and policy 
making take place'.190 As with all of the concepts formulated by social constructivists, 
ideas and norms play a key role in the construction and action of institutions. Much as 
norms and collective understandings among actors create institutions, 'institutions—
conceptualized, say as social norms—have deeper effects on core properties of agents 
(identities and interests)'191 than the rationalist conception of institutions. Institutions do 
not merely constrain their members, they constitute them. I believe that the social 
constructivist image of institutions can add to the understanding of the nature of the EU 
and its constituent bodies and to the identity and interests of actors within the system. 
 
Due to the difference in theoretical positions, the concept of an 'institution' is a fuzzy 
one, and '[i]nstitutions are often discussed without being defined at all'.192 I intend to 
examine the European Parliament within the definition of an institution as 'rules, 
enforcement characteristics of rules and norms of behaviour'193 which manifest as 'a 
relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests'.194 While the rationalist 
approach to institutions has an important role to play in the formal institutions of the EU 
and the study of the codified and written rules, the largely neglected social constructivist 
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viewpoint can help to understand the identities and interests of the participant actors. 
The 'rationalistic theories seem only to deal with one dimension of multidimensional 
reality [and serve to] obscure rather than illuminate the sources of...policy 
preferences'.195 
 
While rationalists and social constructivists concur that ‘membership matters’196 the 
membership of the European Parliament is seen by rationalists as having little or no 
effect on the nature of the bodies themselves (beyond the scope of rational decisions 
taken by the members). In contrast, the social constructivist view of institutions as 
shared understandings and norms means that it is the members who constitute the EP, 
and that it amounts to more than rules aimed to constrain. While the formation of the EP 
is set out in intergovernmentally agreed treaties, the constructivist assertion is that, in 
their current state, the Parliament amounts to more than that. It also consists of 
agreements, common understandings and iterated practices, which lead to behavioural 
norms. An example of these can be found in the form of informal decision-making 
procedures within the institutions, perhaps the most famous example coming from the 
European Commission, with the preference for unanimity in decision making. The high 
degree of interaction between actors within the European Parliament can lead to 
changes in its nature and constitution. The constructivist view of agency and structure 
views neither as ontologically primitive, and indeed agent and structure are viewed as 
mutually constitutive. In this way the high interaction density within the EP creates 
norms which constitute both the institution itself and the actors within it.  
 
While the European Parliament came into existence through treaties and saw members 
thrust into a 'new' body, there still did not exist a 'normative vacuum',197 the members 
brought with them their normative understandings, national and international norms 
and, possibly norms concerning Europe and the emergence of the EU. Through these 
norms and the discussion, argument and understandings which followed, the normative 
framework of the Parliament was created. It is within this framework which new norms 
would be created and propagated, along the schema outlined earlier. As with the general 
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model, within the EU 'individual agency is central'198 to norm emergence, with 
individual actors attempting to turn personal beliefs into common understandings and 
shared viewpoints. The European Parliament serves as a strong arena for normative 
action, effect and change due to its nature and composition. The novel nature of the EP 
when it was created led to the opening of many 'policy windows',199 where a problem 
presented itself for which the group had no adequate normative framework and no 
answer could be found. At this point a new shared understanding is required to address 
the issue, resulting often in the generation of new norms, but also of communication on 
normative issues as discussed earlier. While these policy windows were particularly 
abundant at the genesis of the EU institutions, these windows are still found at EU level, 
as at all levels, and the expansion of the responsibilities and competences of the 
European Parliament is a particularly fruitful source of these windows. 'The EU has 
developed institutional features beyond the original design and certainly beyond the 
purpose of managing economic interdependence'200 to 'include shared norms, commonly 
accepted rules and decision making procedures'.201 The complex nature of identities and 
interests mean that actors do not come to new situations with a clear, defined list of 
preferences, what Wendt refers to as a 'portfolio of interests',202 instead interests and 
preferences are dependent upon social context. Where a situation is encountered for 
which an actor does not have a precedent, the meaning of the experiences must be 
assessed and the resulting interests constructed. This is not to suggest that interests are 
plucked from the air, an actor will draw upon similar experiences, their identity, and the 
actions and beliefs of others. Rules and norms ‘tell actors where to look for precedents, 
who are the authoritative interpreters of different types of rules, and what the key 
interpretative traditions are’.203 These new experiences afford an opportunity to norm 
entrepreneurs, who can shape interest and identity in other actors. For this reason the 
importance of institutions as arenas for actors is not diminished, rather it is built upon 
drastically in other areas. 
 
One of the key differences between rationalist and social constructivist views of 
institutions lies in their understanding of the density of the institutional environments. 
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While the rationalist model of institutions continues to limit their power to restraining or 
facilitating action, social constructivists afford a role to norms which extends into the 
conceptualization and framing of  interests within the European Parliament, and Legro 
advocates an ‘organizational culture’ approach.204 Legro’s approach combines elements 
of organizational theory and cultural theory through a focus ‘on the way that the 
patterns of assumptions, ideas and beliefs that prescribes how a group should adapt to 
its external environment and manage its internal affairs influences calculations and 
actions’.205 In this way cultural factors, such as norms, shape how organisations and 
actors within them understand and interact with their environment, and will also 
influence which decisions and courses of action are deemed appropriate. In this way 
organizational culture does not only concern itself with the framing and understanding 
of problems, but extends further into the constitution of agents and structures, 
'organizational culture is important because it shapes organizational identity, priorities, 
perception, and capabilities in ways unexpected by noncultural approaches'.206 The high 
density of interaction between actors in the European Parliament combines with the 
nature of the interactions, sometimes without precedent or even in novel policy areas, to 
provide fertile ground for norm entrepreneurs and new norms, opening actor identity 
and interest to challenge and debate. This will not be uniform across all policy areas, 
however. Areas with the greatest density of normative rich interaction in which 
normative consensus has yet to be reached will likely prove the most challenging to 
actor identity, and the debate concerning Turkish accession to the EU fulfils these 
criteria. It is for these reasons that this is the focus of my study, and I will investigate 
this effect in detail in a later chapter. 
 
While rationalists and social constructivists agree on the importance of rules within 
institutions, they differ greatly in their perceived nature and scope. Once again for 
rationalists the rules of institutions can be reduced to their impact upon the behaviour 
and strategies of involved actors, while social constructivists afford a much deeper role 
to rules, in the form of both regulative and constitutive norms.  While the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative norms is not, in practice, always clear,207 the social 
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constructivist study of constitutive norms is a vital departure from rationalist 
approaches.  
 
Constitutive norms do not merely affect behaviour within the game, they define the 
game itself. These norms, for which rationalist approaches can provide no 
explanation,208 specify what counts as the activity,209 as well as proscribing actor roles. 
'Those engaging in a practice recognize the rules as defining it. Were the rules of a 
practice to change, so would the fundamental nature of the activity in question'.210 Thus 
the rules do not merely constrain actor behaviour, they define what the actor 
understands to be acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and, as with all other areas, 
the social constructivist notion of structure is inherently ideational and based in shared 
understandings. Tied into the concept of constitutive norms is the idea of systemic 
change, an idea which is neglected in the thin view of institutions. The ability to put 
forward explanations for this change, couched in terms of constitutive norms, is a 
strength of social constructivist approaches to European integration.  
 
While the suggestion that ‘integration has led to a fundamental shift in actor loyalty and 
identity’211 is perhaps a contentious one, the accompanying changes to the European 
Parliament and its constitutive norms are more readily apparent. To a social 
constructivist this can be seen as an indication of identity change, as agents and 
structures are mutually constitutive. Change has taken place throughout the institutions 
of the EU, with the expansion of competences, the alterations in structure and focus and 
in the alteration of voting behaviour. The effect of these norms is felt both within 
individual institutions of the EU and between the institutions and they produce 
observable effects. Voting behaviour in the Council of Ministers provides an example 
where the internal workings of the institution are dictated by more than just the formal 
rules which constrain actors. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's empty-chair policy in 1965 
and 1966, the Luxembourg agreement called for all decisions which covered areas of 
important national interest to be discussed until unanimity was reached. While the 
agreement only called for unanimity in cases of important national interest, it paved the 
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way for what became, in essence, a veto which would be respected by the other member 
states. Despite the wording of the agreement, '[r]ecourse to qualified-majority voting 
became the exception rather than the norm'212 and into the 1980s 'even when the treaties 
permitted majority votes, the Council normally preferred to proceed on the basis of 
consensual agreements'.213  
 
In practice the “veto” rarely had to be employed, the Luxembourg compromise was one 
element in the creation of a norm for consensual decision making within the EU. 
Although qualified-majority voting is now more common within the Council of 
Ministers the norm for consensual decision making remains, 'decision-making in the 
council...usually proceeds on the understanding that difficult and controversial decisions 
are not imposed on dissenting states without full consideration being given to the 
reasons for their opposition'.214 These norms play an important role in the working of 
the Council of Ministers, preventing rifts between actors and ensuring that actors 
behave in a way which allows the continuation of the institution, thus actor behaviour 
has shaped the institution, and in turn the institution shapes the actors. Beyond the scope 
of a single institution, norms also play an important role in the decision-making 
structure of the EU as a whole, acting as 'a sort of constitutional glue'.215 While the 
interplay between the institutions, like the institutions themselves, is formally governed 
by Treaty provisions, 'their actual functioning and interaction are determined by a range 
of inter-institutional agreements and practices'216 which form a decision-making style, 
normatively generated and enforced “rules” which govern actor behaviour and shape 
their identity and interests. 
 
The mechanisms through which institutions affect the actors within them is a key locus 
of social constructivist study, and socialization is a key concept in this area. While 
rationalists do allow for a 'thin socialization'217 within institutional environments, where 
ideas of reputation and trustworthiness affect rational choice optimality calculations, 
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social constructivists focus on “thick” socialization, 'going beyond behavior to include 
cognitive or attitudinal effects witnessed by the internalization of norms and rules'.218 
For Wendt, 'institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, 
not something occurring outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a 
cognitive process, not just a behavioral one'.219 'Social learning involves a process 
whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional contexts...acquire new 
interests and preferences – in the absence of obvious material incentives'.220  
 
Socialization, or social learning, occurs within an institution as a result of the interaction 
between actors and between the actors and the normative structures of the institution, 
and this affects their identity and interests. The European Parliament, with its high 
normative and interactional density, provides a good environment for socialization of 
norms, and thus provides a strong mechanism for affecting actor identities. Finnemore 
and Sikkink assert that '[s]ocialization is...the dominant mechanism of a norm 
cascade',221 and ultimately the internalization of norms can lead to 'deep socialization', 
in which the norms become taken for granted, and compliance becomes almost 
automatic.222 While this degree of socialization is observable within some institutions, 
at least within the social constructivist definition, I hypothesise that it is likely to be 
found only to a limited degree within the European Parliament. Norms such as those 
concerning human rights and democracy will, I believe, be taken for granted, these 
norms predate the European Union and will influence actors before they arrive within 
the European Parliament. Although the EU does provide a hotbed for normative activity, 
the relative novelty of the EP, the clash between European and national norms and the 
normatively charged nature of the issues which are debated in the Parliament all serve to 
limit the ability of specifically European level norms to become taken for granted. 
Rather than this deep socialization, actors experience partial socialization, where norms 
are internalized but do not override existing norms and become taken for granted.223 The 
norms at European level shape actors' roles within the Parliament, and these will in turn 
shape actor interests and attitudes, but they are unlikely to be complied with 
automatically. Even while European norms are shaping institutional roles, conflicting 
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national norms are likely to remain strong, and actors will often perceive themselves to 
fill different roles, with different identities and interests. The Logic of Appropriateness 
perspective on human action argues that actor behaviour will be grounded in the 
normative frameworks in which the actors find themselves, and that actors will behave 
in ways which are appropriate to their role and the normative rules which govern action. 
This perspective also allows for the presence of multiple roles and identities, indeed this 
fact is a major facet of the approach, and March and Olsen argue that '[o]ne of the 
primary factors affecting behavior...is the process by which some...rules, rather than 
others, are attended to in a particular situation, and how identities and situations are 
interpreted'.224  
 
To understand actor behaviour it is therefore important to have an understanding of the 
different normative pressures exerted on actors, and the identities that they inhabit. 
While this degree of socialization will not result in the actors “going native”, 'the 
difference between partial socialization in the constructivist image and thin rationalist 
socialization accounts remains stark. Whereas the former predicts that cognition, 
attitudes, and role conceptions are affected, the latter only sees changes in behaviour as 
strategies and tactics adapt'.225 One of the distinctive features of the social constructivist 
project is the problematization of identities and interests, and a thick view of 
socialization, particularly partial socialization, allows for a more nuanced view of actor 
identity within the EU. It is very difficult for actors at a European level to leave behind 
national roles, even in the European Parliament where MEPs are not national 
governmental representatives, and national norms will exert their influence at European 
level. Norms associated with roles at national and European level will be present 
simultaneously when an actor is interpreting situations and making judgments of 
appropriateness in individual cases, and an understanding of these cognitive changes 
will allow a better understanding of interests and identities within the EU. I believe that 
the European Parliament itself has a role to play in allowing actors to select the 
appropriate norms for the given situation, prioritising norms associated with the EU and 
Europe over conflicting norms generated elsewhere, such as national or regional level. 
This is another area in which the European Parliament and other institutions have an 
important role to play in the shaping of identity within the European Union. 
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With the varying degrees of socialization advocated by the different theoretical 
frameworks comes a different stance concerning debate and argument within the EU. In 
a model which subscribes to the rational choice assumption 'there is no obligation to 
justify positions and little evidence where delegations feel compelled to provide 
explanations of their positions',226 negotiation is based in cost-benefit analyses, and 
persuasion requires recourse to threats of exclusion, isolation or veto. One theory which 
attempts to move beyond these constraints is Schimmelfennig's 'rhetorical action',227 
which he situates within the debate between rationalists and social constructivists. 
Schimmelfennig begins his investigation into the Eastern expansion of the European 
Union positively from the point of view of social constructivists, with his assertion that 
rational choice alone is insufficient to account for the enlargement, 'the decision to 
enlarge the EU to central and Eastern Europe...cannot be explained as the result of 
egoistic cost-benefit calculations and patterns of state preferences and power'.228 Indeed 
Schimmelfennig examines norms at the EU level, most notably liberal norms of 
democracy and common identity, and argues that states which adhere to these norms 
have an increased likelihood of acceding to membership. Where Schimmelfennig differs 
from mainstream social constructivist thinking is in the mechanism through which these 
take effect. In place of the constitutive effects of institutionalized, socialized norms, he 
proposes “rhetorical action” which is the strategic use of norm based arguments. 
Schimmelfennig asserts that '[i]n an “institutional environment” like the EU, political 
actors are concerned about their reputation as members and about the legitimacy of their 
preferences and behavior. Actors who can justify their interests on the grounds of the 
community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into 
norm-conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that would have 
resulted from constellations of interests and power alone'.229 While Schimmelfennig 
acknowledges the presence of norms he affords them little, if any, power to directly 
influence identity and interest, a central concept of social constructivism, instead they 
are employed strategically in attempts to influence the cost-benefit analyses of other 
states. Within this model of normative activity, debate within the EU is extended beyond 
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merely discussions of gains and losses, side payments and concessions, with actors 
employing rhetorical language to manipulate the preferences of others and to pursue 
their national interests. While “rhetorical action” provides an interesting, and in some 
cases persuasive, alternative and supplement to the model of intergovernmental 
bargaining, I believe that the effect of norms on debate within the European Parliamen 
and the EU runs deeper and has an effect on identity, not merely behaviour. Although I 
believe norms have a constitutive role in identity, I will remain aware of 
Schimmelfennig’s model, and examine actor behaviour in this regard so that I can 
analyse the effect of each in order to draw valid conclusions. 
 
On a first examination Risse's 'Logic of Arguing'230 shares many aspects with “rhetorical 
action”, with actors challenging the validity of normative statements, but the “Logic of 
Arguing” has a much “thicker” normative basis. 'In arguing mode, actors try to convince 
each other to change their causal or principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned 
consensus about validity claims. And, in contrast to rhetorical behavior, they are 
themselves prepared to be persuaded'.231 While the concept of validity challenges are 
shared between rhetorical action and the logic of arguing, it is not only the truthfulness 
of the arguments themselves which are tested within Risse's model, actors also make 
validity claims concerning identities and interests. '[A]rgumentative rationality appears 
to be crucially linked to the constitutive rather than the regulative role of norms and 
identities by providing actors with a mode of interaction that enables them to mutually 
challenge and explore the validity claims of those norms and identities'.232 Norms play a 
crucial role within the logic of arguing, they provide the collective understandings, 
identities and interests which make the arguments possible and frame which arguments 
are legitimate, and they also provide the arguments with the power to reconstitute the 
collective understandings. Risse argues that a high degree of international 
institutionalization, such as that found within the EU, could lead to the creation of a 
“common lifeworld”, based on 'a collective identity and shared values and norms',233 
and that this can provide the basis for argumentative rationality. While I would not 
suggest that intergovernmental bargaining, and indeed interaction which could be 
viewed as “rhetorical action”, are absent from the European Parliament, I believe that 
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the model of the logic of arguing adds an important dimension to the study of actor 
interaction within the European Parliament, and provides another mechanism through 
which actor identity and interest can be constituted through participation in the 
institution.  
 
A further difference between rationalist and constructivist images of institutional 
bargaining comes in their attitudes towards consensus seeking within institutions. From 
a rationalist perspective, the requirement for consensus is to be avoided, as it slows and 
impedes the decision-making process which tends to result in lowest common 
denominator outcomes. In contrast, social constructivists see consensus seeking very 
much as a positive, with the possibility of integrative bargaining and win-win outcomes 
replacing lowest common denominator ones. Lewis even suggests that consensus 
seeking and other-regarding practices can become a reflexive habit, routinized into 
durable practices.234 This fits in with Wendt’s image of a collective identity outlined 
earlier, where actors make ‘the generalized Other, part of their understanding of Self’.235 
Once these norms become internalized and the practice becomes habit, the welfare of 
the group becomes an interest in itself, thus affecting the identities, interests and 
decision making procedures of actors within the institution. I believe that the nature and 
history of the EU has led to the possibility of a collective identity being formed. This 
strengthens the case for a European Union with identity and interests as outlined above, 
but more importantly for the work at hand will have a real and measurable effect on the 
identity and interest of actors within the European Parliament 
 
There is a great deal of potential within the social constructivist movement to add value 
to the study of international institutions and, while there has been a move towards a 
“thicker” conception of institutions, constructivist study of the European Parliament 
remains limited. The mutually constitutive nature of structures and agents means that 
institutions can have a constitutive effect on the identities and interests of the 
constituent actors, and thus a model which does not cover this effect is in danger of 
misrepresenting the identities and interests of the actors studied. This effect is likely to 
be heightened within the distinctive institutional framework of the EU, and as such a 
social constructivist take on this framework has the potential to add great value to the 
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current scholarship. 
 
The social constructivist movement is a relatively young one, but in its short life it has 
come to challenge the dominance of rationalist theorising. The social ontology of 
constructivism results in markedly different theories being produced from their 
rationalist counterparts, however the power comes from the commensurability of these 
theories with the established beliefs. Social constructivism does not require a complete 
overhaul in international relations theory, it can add value to the existing scholarship. 
This added value can be seen most acutely in social constructivism's vision of norms, 
and throughout the history of social constructivism a theory of norms has gradually 
developed. Theories of the life-cycle of norms have informed social constructivist ideas 
of systemic change, and it is through the power of norms which institutions and agents 
constitute each other. For this reason an examination of norms provides an important 
insight into the changeable and changing nature of identities and interests within the 
European Parliament, and the dense normative and institutional frameworks can have a 
profound effect on preferences and outcomes within the EP. I believe that the effect of 
EU norms within the EP will be real and observable upon the actors within it. 
 
Social constructivism and my research questions 
 
It is clear that a research project investigating European identity cannot be based in an 
approach to international politics which views identity as exogenously given and fixed. 
The application of a social constructivist theoretical framework is vital to a coherent 
approach to identity, norms and institutions, and through the application of social 
constructivist theory I aim to gain a more nuanced understanding of the identity and 
interests of actors within the European Parliament, how this affects actor behaviour, and 
the role played by the EP itself. 
 
My first research question concerns the presence and nature of a European identity, but 
throughout this chapter I have established that a research question phrased in such a way 
is not specific enough to generate solid, defensible conclusions, and that greater 
specificity is required. Actors within the European Parliament will experience and be 
influenced by a plethora of different norms from different sources, many of which will 
be in place before entering the Parliament although many others will only be 
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experienced by those within the institution. For this reason it is very important to be 
specific as to the identity being studied, talk of a ‘European identity’ as covering the 
identity and interests of actors in the EU is insufficient. The identity I will be studying is 
that expressed by members of the European Parliament when in that context. Despite 
this I will not limit my research to an investigation of the norms which are generated at 
EU level because, as mentioned above, these will not be the only norms influencing 
actor identity. I believe there will be strong overlaps between the norms influencing 
MEPs and those acting on the population of Europe as a whole, so I will attempt to 
uncover these norms, but I will remain cognizant of the fact that I am studying the 
identity of a relatively small group, an élite, and not the identity of the population of the 
EU as a whole. I believe that these identities will be interconnected but distinguishable. 
 
The norms influencing actors will not be limited to EU norms and broader European 
norms - I do not foresee actors leaving behind national identity entirely. It is probable 
that I will find norms from a broad spectrum of levels influencing actors including, but 
not necessarily limited to EU level, European level, national and sub-national regional 
level. An important point in my research will be discerning how these norms (or more 
broadly these identities) interact, and which norms have relevance and importance in a 
given situation. I believe that the area in which my study focuses, European 
enlargement and the prospect of Turkish accession, will involve the prioritisation of EU 
and European level norms, but this will be investigated throughout my research. 
 
A further area requiring caution will be in dealing with the individual nature of identity. 
If EU level norms are found to exist, it is likely that their influence will not be 
universally experienced by the actors concerned and, as such, the exact nature and 
strength of identity within the European Parliament will likewise vary. For this reason it 
is important to look beyond identity and investigate the norms which underpin that 
identity, as well as the mechanisms which influence norm acceptance and spread. These 
will all form key elements in my research and analysis. 
 
Due to the nature of norms and identity outlined above, I will not look in detail at 
Turkish identity, instead I will investigate the perception of Turkish identity within the 
EpP I believe that this perception will manifest itself in norms regarding behaviour and 
attitudes towards Turkey and that it is these norms and discourses which will play an 
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important role in deciding the fate of Turkey’s membership bid rather than a direct 
impact of Turkish identity. It is for this reason that an understanding of attitudes and 
discourses regarding Turkish accession will play an important role in understanding 
identity within the European Parliament. Mechanisms of norm transfer can also provide 
some indication as to whether these norms can transfer beyond the bodies which 
conduct negotiations towards other bodies and states, as it is with states that the ultimate 
decision on enlargement rests. Although this will not be a focus of study it is an 
interesting area for future research raised by a social constructivist theoretical approach. 
 
As indicated throughout this chapter, it is only possible to gain an understanding of 
actor identity and normative processes through study of the institutions of which that 
actor is a part. For this reason a great deal of my research and analysis will deal with the  
European Parliament, and the role it plays in the constitution of the identity of actors. I 
will investigate the EP as a “thick” institution, a body which both constitutes and is 
constituted by its membership. In this way I can generate a much clearer and more 
nuanced view of actor identity, as well as the role of the European Parliament itself. 
 
I have chosen to study the European Parliament, as I believe the institution will provide 
a hotbed of norms, the socialisation of norms, and interacting identities, which will form 
the focus of my research. The European Parliament will provide a particularly 
interesting focus for research, as there is a high interaction density amongst MEPs, and 
often matters under discussion are of a normatively rich nature. Alongside this there is 
likely to be a strong connection to the national identity as well, with each MEP 
representing an electorate in a way not required of actors within other EU institutions 
(indeed national sentiment and identity is discouraged in the European Commission). 
For this reason I believe that the European Parliament will provide a good study for 
assessing the interplay between norms and the interaction of different identities. It will 
also allow me to investigate the way in which institutions facilitate norm diffusion and 
encourage norm compliance. Although the European Parliament is generally viewed as 
having a small part to play in the overall decision on membership of a new country 
(although the EP must vote in favour of accession), I believe that the importance of the 
Parliament lies in the shaping of identity and attitudes throughout the negotiation 
process and that it is in this way that the influence of these institutions will be exerted. 
For this reason an understanding of identity in the European Parliament has practical 
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implications beyond the institution itself, although that is not a focus of this research. 
Having studied identity within the European Parliament in detail I will then look at the 
interests and attitudes of actors within the decision-making process. Although it is 
important for me to identify the norms which are present within the European 
Parliament, it is also important to assess the degree to which these norms influence 
behaviour and attitudes. As noted earlier, there are many norms which each actor will 
experience, generated at a number of different levels and these will all influence the 
actor to a greater or lesser degree and, for this reason, merely being aware of the 
presence of norms is not enough to gain a real understanding of MEP identity. To fully 
understand actor identity requires an understanding of the logic of appropriateness and 
the outcome of normatively based decisions. In this way I will look closely at the 
behaviour of actors in relation to the debate over potential Turkish accession, and this 
will allow me to come to conclusions regarding European identity and the attitude 
towards Turkey, as well as potentially allowing me to extrapolate identity to other 
candidate countries and other policy areas. Although I believe this extrapolation will be 
possible, I will need to remain aware of the context dependent nature of the influence of 
norms on decision making. This will form another key point in my analysis, 
investigating the factors which influence the selection or prioritisation of certain norms 
so that this knowledge can be applied in other areas. I will have to remain aware, 
however, of the problem of the impermanence of knowledge, highlighted earlier, that I 
am looking at a particular snapshot of the complex picture of norms within the 
European Parliament, and that I am looking through a paradigmatic lens. 
 
The case study for the empirical research in this thesis looks at the issue of enlargement 
of the European Union, with particular reference to the candidacy of Turkey, and the 
attitudes of actors in this regard will provide an important indication of the norms which 
exert an influence on identity in the European Parliament, as well as the interplay of 
different norms.  The case of Turkey was chosen because I believe that the negotiations 
and decisions taken in this area will be particularly useful in understanding normative 
factors within the European Parliament and highlight the importance of social 
constructivist theorising in the field of European Union politics. As I have outlined in 
this chapter, social constructivism argues that the expression of identities and the 
associated interests are context dependent, that is outcomes are dictated by the norms 
experienced and the situation encountered. For this reason I believe that the selection of 
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a single case study will be beneficial in focussing the research. The issue of 
enlargement, and the case of Turkey, is one in which there is likely to be challenge to a 
European identity without an associated challenge to national identity. European norms 
and issues of European identity are likely to be raised and challenged in the European 
Parliament in relation to Turkish membership, and this will allow for analysis of the 
mechanisms outlined in this chapter within the broad issue of identity in the European 
Parliament. Although the EU is in discussion with other candidate countries, I believe 
that the case study of Turkey is the most appropriate to answer the research questions 
posed. The Turkish membership bid presents a broad spectrum of issues to be analysed 
which I do not believe can be found with regards to other candidate countries. The 
broad spectrum of normative factors (such as culture and religion) alongside more 
traditional rationalist foci of enquiry (such as demographics and economics) and even 
questions of geography make the case of Turkey a fascinating and important one. 
Alongside, and perhaps due to, this combination of factors, Turkey is, arguably, the 
most contentious of EU candidate countries, and this is likely to be reflected in the 
nature of debate on the issue in the European Parliament. As this chapter has outlined, 
communication and debate is key in norm creation and change, so debate and 
interaction is vital in analysis of identity. ‘The prospect of Turkey’s membership has 
forced the discussion of controversial issues, including not only ‘the borders of the EU’ 
and its ‘geographical limits’, but critical questions of European identity, Islam’s place 
on the continent and its role in European society’236 and for that reason I believe it is 
important that it act as a case study for this research. 
 
As already indicated, key to answering the research questions outlined in the previous 
chapter is collecting and analysing data in a way which is coherent with the theoretical 
framework of the research. This chapter has set out the theoretical underpinnings of this 
research project: the importance of a social constructivist approach to identity and 
interest; the nature of norms, their creation, spread and impact on identity; and the 
important role of institutions in actor identity. The following chapter will investigate the 
relationship between social constructivism and methodology in order to generate a 
programme of empirical research appropriate both to the theoretical outlook expounded 
in this chapter, and the research questions of the thesis. 
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Methodology 
 
As previously indicated, a thorough consideration of methodological issues is absolutely 
vital if valid data is to be gained and defensible conclusions are to be made. If empirical 
research is to generate data which makes sense within a theoretical framework, the 
method for the research must take this theory into account in its design. For this reason 
empirical research into identity within the European Parliament which looks at norms 
and “thick” institutions and seeks to understand actor identity and interests must be 
drawn from the social constructivist theories which underpin it. This chapter will 
discuss the methodological issues involved, and set out the plan for empirical research 
which has taken these factors into consideration. 
 
As social constructivist study of the European Union is relatively novel, the body of 
research and literature is notably lacking in some key areas. Although a fair body of 
work has been conducted in the field of social constructivist theory in the European 
Union (see the preceding chapter), there has been significantly less empirical research 
conducted. It has been alleged also that the empirical work is less useful than it could 
be, with ‘exceptionally low standards of empirical confirmation’1 which merely ‘select a 
particular action in world politics, then seek to demonstrate that ideas or norms - often 
‘altruistic’ ideas or norms – lie somewhere behind it’.2 Indeed Checkel concedes that 
‘[i]n all too many constructivist studies of the EU, tough questions of research 
methodology and operationalization have been neglected’.3 Despite these criticisms 
some empirical studies of the EU have been conducted,4 perhaps the closest in nature to 
mine being Scully’s investigation of attitudes, behaviour and socialization in the 
European Parliament.5 Scully takes a behavioural approach to his research, analysing 
voting patterns as well as results of surveys, and he analyses his data statistically. I 
believe that this quantitative approach to an investigation of identity and norms is 
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problematic, and I will explore the methodological considerations below before arriving 
at a research programme which I believe is suited to the focus of my research and the 
theory which underpins it. 
 
As with all areas of academic endeavour, politics and international relations are subject 
to fundamental debate in two areas. Alongside questions of substance, what might be 
called “facts” and theories, is the debate over methodological issues, ‘conceptual and 
philosophical questions that are involved in the way that we carry out research’.6 
Despite this neat semantic distinction between substantive and methodological issues, it 
is neither possible nor desirable to separate the two in practice. An appropriate method 
of research will be mindful not only of the conceptual and philosophical questions of 
methodology, but also of the substantive issues being addressed. It is with this in mind 
that Adler advocates a three layered approach to social constructivism, ‘involving 
metaphysics, social theory and international relations theory and research strategies – of 
social reality and social science and of their dynamically constitutive effects’.7 
 
‘The prestige of the physical sciences has…ensured that the social sciences have tried to 
adopt their methods.’,8 and the view of scientific study as a search for absolute truth is a 
longstanding one. For a long time the success of the natural sciences in explaining the 
physical world, and the ability of modern science to manipulate the world, resulted in 
the belief that naturalism was the only appropriate way forward for social scientific 
endeavour. This took the form of an empiricist outlook, with the exclusion of areas that 
could not be subsumed under scientific laws. This dedication to scientific method is 
demonstrated in the terminology, where the disciplines are referred to as social sciences, 
even where other epistemologies and methods, and post-modern and discursive analyses 
are more common. The social scientific method was exemplified by the Vienna Circle, a 
group of philosophers who met in Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s. The Vienna Circle 
advocated a positivist and empiricist ‘science world-conception’,9 going on to claim that 
‘[t]here is knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is immediately given. 
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This sets the limits for the content of legitimate science’.10 This approach places 
perception as the basis of theory, attempting to explain causal connections from 
objective observations. Reliance on perception proves problematic for theories which do 
not treat observations as objective, rather they are affected by social constructions, so it 
is not possible for observations to be made beyond the context of existing theories and 
those which are to be tested. Within this view there is no absolute truth that can be 
found through the employment of scientific method, and other approaches to research 
are required. This is the case when looking at issues such as identity and norms which 
have a degree of subjectivity inherent to them, so it is important to look at methods 
which are not drawn directly from the physical sciences. 
 
Methodological issues were brought to the forefront in IR scholarship with the 
‘behavioural revolution’ of the 1950s and 1960s,11 and it was the goal of the followers 
of behaviouralism to unify the methods employed in IR with those already in evidence 
in the natural sciences, that is to make IR a true “social science”. Behaviouralism holds 
to the exogenic perspective on knowledge, which ‘tends to view knowledge as a pawn 
to nature’,12 and has a logical, empiricist perspective in the tradition of Locke, Hume 
and Mills. Eulau states that ‘behaviouralism investigates acts, attitudes, preferences and 
expectations of people in political contexts’,13 and this investigation takes the form of 
the rigorous collection of empirical data which is then analysed using a toolbox taken 
from the natural sciences. Quantitative methods are emphasised, and the focus is on 
building theories which explain and predict, through the gathering of precise, verified, 
objective data. Behaviouralism is viewed as a precursor to the most common 
methodology employed today, positivism, which shares many features with the earlier 
work performed by behaviouralists. 
 
Positivist methodology in international relations is an important concept to understand, 
as positivism is the framework within which the majority of accepted theories are based. 
The positivist methodology underpins the majority of research within the field of 
European integration and, as such, an understanding of the conceptual and philosophical 
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issues involved is important when conducting study in the area. As noted, positivism 
shares many features with behaviouralism, including the belief in an objective 
knowledge of the world which is gained through observation, and a subscription to 
empirical research techniques. Vasquez outlines seven criteria of a good positivist 
theory14: that it is accurate and limited; that it is non-relativist; that it is able to be 
falsified (in line with the work of Popper); that there is power in its explanations; that it 
is open to improvement and refinement; that it is consistent with well-established 
knowledge and that it is parsimonious. These criteria provide a useful summary for 
positivist theorising, and highlight the similarities between this social scientific 
methodology and the methodology of the natural sciences. Alongside its attitude to 
theory generation, positivists also employ scientific methods of data collection and 
analysis, and Nicholson asserts that the two general research programmes for positivists 
consist of quantitative research and rational choice analyses.15 Despite the important 
role played by the positivist methodology, it is not universally accepted, with Trigg 
going as far as to say that ‘[t]he bright hopes for human progress which were once 
pinned on science already seem childishly optimistic’,16 and this has led to empiricism 
being ‘put on trial’.17 
 
Debates over methodology are often divided into questions of ontology, the very nature 
of the world, and epistemology, the way we know the world. The ontology of positivist 
research, as we have seen, is one in which there is an absolute truth which is to be 
strived for through scientific study, one where actions and effects can be reduced to 
individual agency. This ontology is in marked contrast to the anti-essentialist, social 
ontology advocated by social constructivists. It is not possible to give a complete, all 
encompassing definition of an ontology subscribed to by all social constructivists, as I 
do not believe such a thing exists. While the ontology subscribed to by each social 
constructivist will vary subtly, it is possible to draw common threads of the social 
ontology. While the hypothesised extent of their effect varies, social constructivists 
believe that intersubjective understandings are constitutive of our reality. Constructivists 
distinguish between ‘brute facts’, which are true independent of human action, and 
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‘social facts’. While few constructivist scholars argue that there are no material facts 
about the world, they do argue that an explanation of the world based on brute facts 
where ideas ‘do not construct and structure social reality, but only reflect the material 
world and serve to justify material causes’,18 is fundamentally flawed. Adler illustrates 
this point by suggesting that we ‘take a group of people, a nation or various nations and 
metaphorically toss them in the air. Where they go, how, when and why, is not entirely 
determined by physical forces and constraints; but neither does it depend solely on 
individual preferences and rational choices. It is also a matter of their shared 
knowledge, the collective meaning they attach to their situation, their authority and 
legitimacy, the rules, institutions and material resources they use to find their way, and 
their practices’.19 That is, our understanding of the social world cannot be reduced to 
‘brute facts’, nor can it be reduced to the level of individuals within society. To study 
the social world we must examine ‘social facts’, intersubjective meanings and shared 
understandings. This social ontology has had profound effects on the research agenda of 
social constructivism and has led to methodological adaptation from the positivist 
model in a number of areas. 
 
One consequence of the adoption of a social ontology is the rejection of the concept of 
absolute truth, and a view of knowledge as impermanent. Where the natural scientific 
view of the world is one where truth and facts are independent of time and space, this 
independence is not possible when facts are dependent upon social context for meaning, 
they are ‘facts only by human agreement’.20 ‘The terms in which the world is 
understood are social artefacts, products of historically situated interchanges among 
people’21 and, as such, knowledge cannot be permanent or immutable. Because social 
constructivists do not attempt to discover brute facts, a different approach to study is 
adopted. Constructivists often move away from issues of mechanical causality favoured 
by positivists, instead favouring an approach which follows from Max Weber’s notion 
of Verstehen, ‘interpretive understanding’. Weber’s goal in advocating Verstehen was to 
integrate ‘the naturalist insistence upon causal explanation, and the anti-naturalist 
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demand for the interpretive understanding of subjective meanings’.22 In this way social 
constructivists do not merely strive for what Weber describes as ‘direct 
understanding’,23 but also search for motives. The nature of the concepts I am studying 
lends itself to this interpretive approach and, as such, I will pursue this form of research 
programme. Wendt eloquently summarises the social constructivist research agenda in 
this respect thus, ‘[w]hen Liberals offer economic interdependence as an explanation for 
peace, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute states with identities that 
care about free trade and economic growth. When Marxists offer capitalism as an 
explanation for state forms inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute 
capitalist relations of production. And so on’24. In this way social constructivists 
examine the collective, social understandings and discourses which have constitutive 
effects in an attempt to gain “understanding”. ‘Each meaning is understood in relation to 
the overall practice which is taking place, and each practice in relation to a particular 
discourse. Hence we are only able to understand, explain and evaluate a process if we 
can describe the practice, and the discourse within which it is occurring’.25 Despite this 
constructivist emphasis on understanding, the other element of Weber’s Verstehen, 
causal explanation, has not been lost, indeed the two cannot be separated. Any ‘attempt 
to understand the inter-subjective meanings embedded in social life is at the same time 
an attempt to explain why people act the way they do’.26 This acceptance of the 
continuing importance of causal explanations within social constructivism allows 
constructivists to retain the power of prediction, while acknowledging that ‘causality in 
social science involves specifying a time-bounded sequence and relationship between 
the social phenomena we want to explain and the antecedent conditions, in which 
people consciously and often rationally do things for reasons that are socially 
constituted by their collective interpretations of the external world and the rules they act 
upon’.27  
 
Through interpretive understanding, advocates of social constructivism argue that the 
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social ontology provides a greater explanatory power to scholarship than is afforded by 
the rationalist ontology, but with the adoption of a new ontology have come questions 
concerning the social constructivist epistemology. Alongside the social ontology has 
come an acceptance of the ‘endogenic perspective’28 on knowledge, where knowledge is 
a result of human processes. This has led some scholars to suggest that social 
constructivist study is incompatible with empirical, scientific approaches, with an 
incommensurability of results between discourses. Despite this suggestion, many 
scholars of social constructivism believe that the different ontology does not by 
necessity result in an altered epistemological outlook. Wendt stated explicitly that 
‘constructivist social theory is compatible with a scientific approach to social inquiry. 
Constructivism should be construed narrowly as an ontology, not broadly as an 
epistemology’.29 These differences of opinion are drawn on by Ruggie, who divides 
social constructivist theorising into three categories, ‘neo-classical constructivism’, 
‘post-modernist constructivism’ and ‘naturalistic constructivism’.30 Within this 
classification, neo-classical constructivists draw directly from the work of Durkheim 
and Weber, with a strong commitment to social science but with a greater degree of 
social analysis than is displayed by rationalists. This form of constructivism has gained 
some popularity within International Relations in recent years, but due to the similarities 
between neo-classical constructivism and a positivist, rationalist outlook it has been 
suggested that it has come to be used by rationalists who acknowledge that social 
analysis can be beneficial, without entailing any shift in methods.31 In contrast to neo-
classical constructivism is the post-modernist branch, which does differ markedly from 
rationalist approaches. Post-modernist constructivists draw inspiration from the work of 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida and argue that objective analysis is impossible. Within 
this branch discursive practices form the ontological primitives, with a “regime of truth” 
replacing social science.32 Ruggie’s ‘naturalistic constructivism’ treads a road between 
these extremes. Naturalistic constructivism, the branch which most interests me, 
subscribes to the social ontology, but remains empirical, albeit with a different focus. 
While notions of ‘ultimate truth’ are rejected, observation of social phenomena still 
provides us with knowledge of them, and conclusions can be drawn and predictions 
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made within the discourses that comprise international politics. Social constructivism 
views discourses as stable, this is a prerequisite for intersubjective understandings, and 
stability allows conclusions to be extrapolated. This ability for social constructivist 
work to form conclusions and make predictions based upon empirical evidence is an 
important one, as it allows research conducted from this point of view to be 
commensurable with rationalist work, which overwhelmingly provides the backdrop for 
IR research. Ruggie suggests that ‘this takes the form of maintaining that constructivist 
concerns are a useful tool in the context of discovery, but that at the end of the day they 
do not affect the logic of explanation’,33 social constructivists can work alongside 
rationalists and provide commensurable, often competing hypotheses that can be tested 
through empirical research. For Adler ‘constructivism means, not abandoning reason or 
rationality, but rediscovering how rational considerations are brought to bear in 
collective human enterprises and situations’.34 This is the avenue I will pursue with my 
research programme in order that the data I generate and the predictions I make are 
commensurable with those which exist already and come from the dominant theoretical 
framework. 
 
Marsh and Furlong view ontology and epistemology as analogous to a researcher’s 
skin,35 rather than a sweater which can be removed or even changed at will. Even if not 
explicitly stated, ontological and epistemological orientations shape theory and method 
alike. This analogy holds true for social constructivists, and the ontology and 
epistemology of constructivism has a profound effect on the methods employed in 
constructivist research. Where a positivist employs quantitative research methods in an 
attempt to deduce generalised laws of causation, quantitative methods are often viewed 
as rather blunt research instruments by constructivists, which do not help us gain an 
interpretive understanding. To gain an understanding of the social world which goes 
beyond mechanical causation, social constructivists largely employ qualitative research 
methods. These research methods, which will be discussed in greater detail later, 
correspond more closely with social constructivist theory, and afford greater power to 
explain the concepts studied by social constructivist scholars. Although causation 
                                                 
33
 Ruggie, J.G., ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge’ International Organization 52:4, p.884. 
34
 Adler, ‘Constructivism in World Politics’ p. 348. 
35
 Marsh, D., & Furlong, P., ‘A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science’ in 
Marsh & Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 
2002. p.17. 
 73 
 
remains important within social constructivism, an understanding of causation is not 
enough to appreciate the effect of norms and the nature of identity. I believe that these 
concepts are not quantifiable, so an approach of this nature is not sufficient to 
understand fully the issues I am studying. 
 
As with everything investigated by social constructivists, interests and identities are 
seen to be based in shared understandings and intersubjective meanings, and 
fundamentally ideational in nature. As discussed earlier, social constructivist theory 
does not view identities and interests as exogenously given and fixed, their ideational 
nature makes them changeable. This means that while rationalist study is broadly 
limited to the outcomes generated by these identities, constructivist study focuses on the 
generation and nature of identities, interests and preferences before theorising on the 
effect of these factors on international politics. The ideational basis of identity also 
necessitates a different approach to research. Where exogenous identities remain fixed 
over time, and it would potentially be possible to establish the nature of these identities 
through quantitative methods drawing general conclusions, this is not the case from a 
social constructivist viewpoint. While this approach might go some way to establishing 
the current ‘state of play’, results would be influenced by the time and place at which 
they were collected, and constructivists strive for a deeper understanding of identity. 
Due to the ideational nature of identities and interests it is important to view them as in 
process. Through study of intersubjective meanings and norms it is possible to gain a 
deeper understanding of identities, actors’ motives, and the rules that govern practices, 
refining existing models of causation within the international system. This investigation 
is only possible through the employment of qualitative research methods, which allow 
us to view the changing process of identity. This understanding of the ideational and 
normative processes which underpin the social world will play an important role in the 
investigation which I will carry out. My investigation of identities and interests within 
the European Parliament will drawn from this understanding of the ideational, 
changeable nature of these concepts, as will my view of the EP itself. As with identity 
and interest, the prevailing view of the European institutions attributes them a fixed 
nature, constraining action and little more. Ideationally constituted institutions are 
similarly changeable, and an understanding of the normative processes that underlie 
them is pivotal in understanding the role that they play. An understanding of the role of 
the European Parliament will be key throughout my research, as it will have an 
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important role in the creation, spread and adoption of norms and in constituting actor 
identity. I intend to gain an understanding of these concepts by employing a qualitative 
research programme. 
 
Despite the traditional, neat distinction between quantitative and qualitative research 
methods, exact definitions and differences between the two are often blurred, and 
qualitative research ‘certainly does not represent a unified set of techniques or 
philosophies’.36 Despite this, it is possible to identify strands which run through 
qualitative research, and I intend to justify why qualitative methods are applicable to my 
research, before going on to look at the exact techniques which I will employ. The 
terminology involved indicates one of the primary differences between quantitative and 
qualitative research. Quantitative research techniques are primarily concerned with 
numerical analyses and measurement, whereas qualitative work is not concerned with 
measurement and rely on words as a basis for analyses. While this can be a useful 
distinction, it is an oversimplification to suggest that this is the sum of the differences.37 
 
One major difference between quantitative and qualitative research is the role of theory 
and the form of reasoning involved. While quantitative research is often conducted with 
the purpose of proving a theory, qualitative research is conducted with the aim of 
generating a theory. For this reason qualitative research often employs deductive logic, 
with the perspective of those being studied influencing the nature and orientation of the 
research.38 This allows for a study of identity and interest which is anchored in the 
viewpoint of the participant, the person whose identity and interests are being studied, 
rather than being driven by the researcher. A participant focused research programme 
allows for a more nuanced view of interest and identity than would be afforded by 
quantitative techniques. This is another difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research, while quantitative research is seen to give harder, perhaps more precise results, 
qualitative research gives richer, deeper data.39 The less structured form of research 
which is generally found within a qualitative research programme is seen to give results 
which are less clear cut, but with increased precision the researcher loses the capacity 
for interpretive understanding. Qualitative research is better placed to investigate the 
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collective understandings and shared meanings of social constructivism, allowing study 
of ‘social facts’ and affording an understanding not just of behaviour, but of the 
meanings behind it. This quality also allows qualitative researchers a better 
understanding of change and the nature of social phenomena as in process rather than 
static, an important concept in social constructivist study. While quantitative research is 
primarily aimed at the production of general rules independent of time and space, 
qualitative research can be context dependent, and this is an important factor for a 
theoretical approach which disregards the concept of absolute truth in the social world. 
For these reasons, qualitative methods will have a key role to play in this research 
programme. 
 
Despite the differences between qualitative and quantitative research there are some 
similarities. For the social constructivist who broadly shares an epistemology with the 
sciences, important concepts remain present in qualitative research. Despite the 
tendency towards less structured research techniques, qualitative research must be 
systematic and rigorous in the same way that quantitative research is if the data and 
analysis generated are to be commensurable with those from a quantitative research 
programme. The research must also meet the criteria of reliability and validity which are 
applied to quantitative research, although the criteria are expressed differently. The 
criterion of reliability refers to the requirement for consistency of method, producing 
consistent, commensurable results, and is important in drawing accurate, viable 
conclusions. While within quantitative research validity refers to how accurately results 
mirror reality, it is not simple to assess this within qualitative research. As such, Bryman 
divides qualitative validity into concepts of credibility and transferability.40 For research 
findings to meet the criterion of credibility, they must be accepted as the most credible 
account of the aspect of the social work being studied. One prominent tool for achieving 
this is triangulation, where multiple research methods are employed on the same area of 
study with the purpose of cross-checking findings. The criterion of transferability also 
differs within qualitative research from the established concept within quantitative 
research. The context specificity of qualitative research precludes the transfer of 
methods into other fields, but it does require that methods are set out clearly so that it is 
apparent how conclusions were reached, and it is possible for other theorists to examine 
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the evidence and test the conclusions. This also affords transparency of method, 
allowing the researcher to demonstrate that good practice has been followed and that 
they have acted in good faith.  
 
A further area of overlap is the requirement for an ethical research programme. Ethical 
questions in research can be broken down into four broad categories: harm to 
participants; lack of informed consent; invasion of privacy and the use of deception.41 
Many ethical issues are more prominent in conducting qualitative research than the 
quantitative counterpart because the qualitative researcher is often closer to the subject 
being studied, and experiences a greater degree of human interaction. An understanding 
of ethical concerns is vital to the formulation of a viable qualitative research strategy, 
and the ethical issues of individual techniques will be discussed later. The requirement 
for ethical approval relating to research originating in a university environment is not 
only important, it was also very helpful in the creation of both the interview guide and 
the questionnaire. 
 
It is through the employment of a qualitative research strategy that I intend to address 
the research questions that I have formulated. I propose to investigate the founding 
ideology of the European Union and the process of evolution it has undergone to create 
a modern European identity. The Treaty of Rome, one of the founding documents of the 
European Union, called for unity based on shared ideals, democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law, and called for all other nations with shared ideals to join the signatories 
of the Treaty.42 This ideological basis for unity is continued with much subsequent EU 
literature and, at least to this degree, the concept of a European identity remains present. 
The ideological and ideational nature of this research necessitates use of qualitative 
research techniques that will allow me to identify the makeup and expression of 
European identity, I do not believe that this would be possible through the employment 
of a quantitative approach to research.  
 
The founding ideology of the EU dates back 50 years, and the change and evolution of 
the identity is an important focal point of my research, necessitating an approach which 
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allows a view of identity as a process rather than a static concept and sets identity in the 
appropriate historical context. Due to the historical nature of the research into the 
founding ideology of the EU, documentary research will be conducted, focusing on 
Treaties and documents of the EU, with further evidence provided by scholarship on the 
issue. Documentary research will also provide an insight into the changing nature of 
European identity, but I intend to ally this with semi-structured interviews with, and 
questionnaire responses from, officials and members of the European Parliament to 
clarify the picture of the present nature of European identity and the factors that 
influenced its evolution. 
 
Once I have established the nature of the European identity, I intend to evaluate the 
strength of the identity within the European Parliament which, as indicated in the 
preceding chapter, I believe to be an important focus of research concerning identity 
within the EU. As one of the central institutions of the EU, one would expect the 
European Parliament to be a point of genesis for European level norms, and an arena in 
which European identity is felt most strongly, if not by all constituent actors. 
 
I believe that the most appropriate and informative way to study the strength of the 
identity, and the forces that contribute to it, is through an analysis of European 
Parliament debates in combination with semi-structured interviews with actors within 
the European Parliament who may be influenced by the norms and identity; a 
questionnaire which can be filled out by those members of the institutions it is not 
possible for me to speak to, and an analysis of official documentation. An analysis of 
documents generated by the European Parliament, especially transcripts of debates, will 
be a key resource in this research. As well as allowing me to understand and represent 
the views of a broader spectrum of actors, transcripts of debates will allow me to 
analyse one element of actor interaction which plays such an important part in the action 
of norms. Debates analysed will focus on the issue of enlargement and the case of 
Turkish accession, but not to the exclusion of other debates involving and invoking 
issues of identity. In practice this will cover an array of topics, reflecting the broad 
spread of issues which relate to the issues of Turkish accession. Cognizant of the 
dynamic nature of identity, analysis will focus on contemporary documents and debates 
in understanding contemporary identity. 
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The focus of the interviews and questionnaire will be identity in the European 
Parliament, how this relates to broader European identity, and the issue of Turkish 
accession to membership of the EU. As indicated in the previous chapter, Turkey has 
been chosen as the case study for this research due to the potential for this area to 
highlight different facets of identity. The issue of enlargement of the EU will challenge 
the established European identity, so it is an issue which is likely to see this identity 
invoked and debated. The issue of Turkish accession is a long-standing one within the 
EU and a good deal of documentation has been produced by the bodies of the EU, I will 
examine these historical data to improve my analysis and to help me achieve valid 
conclusions. Although, as indicated above, the dynamic nature of identity necessitates 
an analysis of contemporary sources, I believe that it is also important to place this 
debate within its historical context. The length and intricacy of the historic relationship 
between Turkey and the EU makes a thorough investigation of this matter infeasible in 
this thesis, but I believe that an understanding of attitudes from within the EU towards 
Turkey will be beneficial to the analysis. For this reason I intend to look at the attitudes 
of EU actors towards Turkey, particularly in the years preceding the acceptance of 
Turkey as a candidate for membership. This will be achieved by examining and 
analysing documents and reports relating to the Turkish application for membership of 
the EU, and will provide an historical basis for analysis of contemporary identity. 
 
Although it is not possible to validate the opinions of actors within the European 
Parliament through the use of other sources, I believe that an approach which combines 
documentary evidence from within the EP and primary data collected from actors will 
provide me a broad spectrum of views, and from different contexts. This will provide 
me with a greater variety and depth of data, as well as ensuring the accuracy of data. 
 
Alongside the issue of European identity lies the issue of Turkish identity, and this will 
also prove important to a social constructivist reading of Turkey’s application to join the 
EU. The degree to which Turkey’s membership bid will challenge the established 
European identity is to a large degree dependent upon how compatible the Turkish 
identity is with the European identity, and perhaps more importantly, how compatible it 
is seen to be. An analysis of Turkish identity is beyond the remit of this thesis and 
would, arguably, add little to an understanding of identity in the European Parliament. I 
do believe, however, that an examination of how Turkish identity is viewed by those 
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within the European Parliament would be beneficial to understanding identity in the EP. 
The concept of the “Other” is an important one in understanding identity, and areas 
where similarity and difference between European identity and Turkish identity are 
highlighted will be indicative of the European identity experienced. Alongside this, I 
hope to assess how much importance the Turkish government and negotiators place on 
issues of identity within the membership bid, as the effect of identity on the negotiation 
process will provide further evidence of the strength of that identity. This data collection 
will also be conducted through the examination of documentary evidence relating to the 
negotiation procedure, and the statements of those involved. 
 
Once I have looked at the nature of European identity within the European Parliament, I 
intend to research how this identity is expressed in relation to Turkish accession. I 
believe a great deal can be learnt regarding identity in the European Parliament by 
looking at the attitudes and interests of actors within the EP with regards to Turkey. 
Although I believe that it may be possible to establish the existence of European level 
norms without employing the case study of Turkish accession, the real strength of this 
case study will be in accessing the degree to which European level norms influence the 
identities and interests within the European Parliament. Through an analysis of 
European Parliament debates (focussing on those relating to enlargement and Turkish 
accession), semi-structured interviews and questionnaires, I aim to gain an 
understanding of which norms of European identity are experienced and expressed 
within the European Parliament, and how these normative factors interact with factors 
more associated with rationalist approaches. 
 
Important to the view of identity and interest I have laid out is their ideational nature 
and their ability to change. I therefore intend to investigate the possible effect of the 
debate over Turkish accession on European identity. With the view of identity as in 
process rather than static, I believe that there is the possibility for the debate over 
Turkish accession to clarify and change the normative structures and processes within 
the European Parliament and, as a result, the European identity itself. This analysis will 
be carried out using the data collected in interviews in conjunction with official 
publications of the EU and statements made by the actors involved.  
 
Although my research focuses on the nature and strength of European identity, viewed 
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through the lens of the debate over Turkish accession, I believe that identity and 
normative arguments could play a role throughout EU policy making and decision 
making. An understanding of European identity as it stands, and the way in which it is 
shaped and moulded, will help to shed light on the ability of the EU to frame and direct 
the preferences of member states on contentious issues and create a coherent body of 
policy. 
 
As outlined above, my research plan relies upon the use of semi-structured interviews. 
This is because I believe that the semi-structured interview, in conjunction with 
documentary analysis, will be the most appropriate technique for the collection of data 
from those I will be talking to. Where fully structured interviews, often employed 
within quantitative research, help researchers to focus on the key concepts of their 
study, and is seen to maximise the reliability and validity of measurement, a qualitative 
interview takes the form of 'a conversation with a purpose'.43 What the qualitative 
interview lacks in specificity and exactitude, it makes up for in its flexibility. Because 
there is a less rigid format and less set content to the interview there is a greater 
possibility of discovering the point of view of the interviewee as they are allowed a 
greater degree of flexibility in their responses.  The ability of the interviewee to set the 
agenda of the interview and, to a degree, decide what is talked about, allows the 
interviewer to focus on what the interviewee believes to be relevant and important 
rather than what the interviewer might think. I believe that this will be important in my 
research into identity, allowing the interviewee to express in their own way the factors 
which influence identity and how this identity in turn manifests itself, rather than being 
bound by a rigid interview structure along lines I conceive in advance. I believe that this 
will also be beneficial with the group from which my interviewees will be taken, with 
the members of the institutions of the EU more likely to be responsive to a 
conversational style of interviewing than the more mechanical form of structured 
interviews.  Another result of the flexible interview technique is the ability to follow up 
answers given by interviewees and ask questions dependent on answers received. While 
this would be excluded in quantitative research as it would affect its standardised nature, 
this might allow me to explore areas which I had not considered before the interview or 
to adjust the emphasis of the interview to address more thoroughly issues which are 
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raised by the interviewee. Although the data generated from structured interviews is 
easier to codify and analyse numerically, I believe that the employment of a less 
structured interview technique will allow me richer, more detailed data focusing on 
factors of an ideational nature, and allow me to study better the changing nature of 
European identity. 
 
Despite the advantages associated with less structured interviews, outlined above, I do 
intend to have some degree of structure to the interviews. Unstructured interviews really 
do follow the model of a conversation, and would allow maximum flexibility, but I 
believe that a certain degree of structure is justified. As I have concepts and issues 
which I intend to address, as outlined above, I believe that a broad structure which will 
ensure that I address these concepts will be beneficial, while allowing me to follow up 
individual answers or themes as they arise in the interview. Through the employment of 
an 'interview guide', a list of topics I wish to cover,44 I can ensure that all the pertinent 
points are covered while ensuring I retain the flexibility afforded by qualitative 
interviews. The interview guide can be found in Appendix A. 
 
In order to take all possible data from interviews it will be necessary to record the 
events of the interview as accurately as possible. Ideally this will take the form of an 
audio recording of the conversation, but this must be done openly and, due to the wishes 
of the interviewee or circumstances, this may not always be possible. Whether it is 
possible to audio-record the conversation or not, it is important to make a record of 
everything which has been said, as well as how it is said and the order in which it is 
said. This will allow a greater insight into the thought process of the interviewee, which 
is important due to the ideational nature of the concepts being studied. If it is not 
possible to record the interview, or the interviewee does not wish me to, I will ask the 
interviewee if it is possible to take notes during the interview or, failing that, take notes 
of the discussion after the event. In all cases the wishes of the interviewee will be 
paramount, although due to the nature of my research interviewing élites within the 
European Parliament I would anticipate the majority of interviewees being happy for me 
to record the interview. Nevertheless, ensuring that all available data is taken from the 
interview will require competence in the use of recording equipment and note-taking, as 
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well as a high level of organisation. 
 
Sample size is an important tool in ensuring the accuracy of gathered data and, despite 
the ideational nature of the concepts studied, I will need to ensure that my sample is 
large enough for the conclusions I draw to be significant. Although a lot of my 
questioning will be focused on personal opinions and attitudes, my research is intended 
to discover about social constructions, shared understandings and intersubjective 
meanings, and an appropriate sample size is important. Although size of sample is 
important, my sample will not be randomly selected, I intend to employ 'purposive 
sampling'.45 The choice of interviewees will be strategic, those within the institutions of 
the EU who are involved in the area of study, Turkish accession, and the selection of 
interviewees is likely to follow a snowball model. A similar model will be followed if 
interviews with Turkish officials take place, selecting those involved in negotiations 
with the EU and those with a role in policy making in the area. The size of my sample 
will be limited by the strategic selection of interviewees and the percentage who are 
willing (and have the time) to be interviewed, but a minimum sample size of total 
respondents is suggested to lie somewhere between 20 and 60.46 I do not believe, 
however, that it is necessary for me to interview this number of respondents for my data 
and conclusions to be valid. My programme of interviews will not be my sole source of 
data, being employed alongside an examination of documentary evidence. Although it is 
my hope to conduct a sizeable number of interviews, it will be possible for me to 
understand and represent the views of actors not included in this primary research, 
through reference to debates within the European Parliament. 
 
It is important that my interviews are conducted in an ethical and open manner, as 
outlined earlier. A major factor in this is ensuring that I received informed consent from 
those participating in the interviews. I will ensure that every participant in the 
interviews fully understands the nature of my research and how the data from their 
interview will be utilised in my research. Along with this I will need to be mindful and 
respectful of the wishes of the interviewee with regards to recording of the interview, 
whether they are happy for audio recordings to be taken and whether there is anything 
they would prefer I didn’t use in my analysis, that is how much of the data generated 
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from the interview they are happy for me to use. It will also be necessary for me to ask 
the interviewee whether they are willing to let me attribute data to them by name, 
informing them that they have the option for all the data from the interview to be 
analysed and reported in an anonymous manner. Another facet of an ethical research 
agenda is the avoidance of all forms of deception. My questioning should be as clear as 
possible, without the employment of trick questions or attempts to induce the 
interviewee to say things which they do not wish to. It is also important that I should not 
deliberately misrepresent the views or responses of interviewees or misuse data 
collected in any way. If necessary this may involve asking for clarification from the 
interviewee, and this is another advantage of the semi-structured approach to interviews. 
The use of semi-structured interviews brings many strengths to my research 
programme, not least is the collection of large amounts of in-depth data in a relatively 
short period of time.47 It will also allow me to gather data from those who might be 
unresponsive to questionnaires or rigidly structured interviews. The interviewing of EP 
élites will also provide me with access to extensive and valuable data which would not 
be available from other sources. There are, however, weaknesses and limitations to the 
semi-structured interview method. The technique relies on having access to those who 
are to be interviewed, in this case primarily MEPs. This can be a difficult prospect, as 
they will be under a great deal of time pressure, and may be difficult to gain access to. 
The amount of data gathered during an interview is also dependent upon the level of 
cooperation granted by the interviewee, so the volume of data gathered from each 
interview is not guaranteed. Alongside the question of interviewee cooperation is the 
information that they give. It may not be in the interviewees' interest to provide the 
interviewer with the information they require, indeed it may be in their interest to 
actively withhold information. Even the information provided should not be regarded as 
infallible, the interviewees may have reasons to provide information which is not 
entirely accurate and may, in fact, be untrue. While the subject of many of the questions 
within my interviews will be opinion, and some answers will be subjective, the nature 
of the concepts I am studying will require me to analyse responses alongside other 
sources such as European Parliament debates, which will play a similarly key role in the 
research. This will ensure that conclusions drawn are valid and defensible. 
 
                                                 
47Marshall, C. & Rossman, G, Designing Qualitative Research. SAGE, London, 1999. pp.109-110. 
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While I believe the best method for me to gather deep and rich data to analyse 
concerning individual identity is through use of semi-structured interviews, I intend to 
complement this approach with the use of a questionnaire, a set of questions which will 
be sent to potential respondents to be self-administered (see Appendix B). One of the 
major weaknesses of the semi-structured interview approach is the high cost of data 
collection, and the large investment of time in each interview. These facts, combined 
with the unwillingness of some subjects to be interviewed, will serve to reduce my 
sample size, and I intend to use a questionnaire to help negate these effects. Through the 
use of a questionnaire I believe I can have a larger sample size than would be possible 
using only semi-structured interviews, reaching those I wish to talk to who are 
unwilling or unable to speak to me in person. If I have problems arranging meetings 
with individuals it may be possible to send them a questionnaire for them to fill in in 
their own time. A questionnaire will also allow me increase my sample size, as sending 
questionnaires to potential respondents requires a smaller investment of time than 
interviews. Although the data generated from completed questionnaires is likely to be 
less deep and rich than the data collected through interview, the greater quantity of data 
will be useful for my analysis. One perceived weakness of the questionnaire is the 
inability of the researcher to clarify any misunderstandings or to follow up pertinent 
points.48 While this will be a weakness of the questionnaire, if important points are 
raised but not fully covered it might be possible to follow them up outside the format of 
the questionnaire. This could also help to improve the focus of my interviews. 
 
As is the case with interviews, an understanding of the concepts of reliability and 
validity is important in questionnaire design. A questionnaire which produces reliable 
data is one which would prompt the respondent to give the same answers each time they 
would (hypothetically) take the questionnaire.49 While not all factors are within the 
researcher’s control, such as the state of mind of the respondent, it is important that 
questions are easy to understand and that the way of answering them remains consistent 
and is well explained, as this will increase the reliability of the data. The validity of 
questionnaire responses is a multi-faceted issue, but can be largely thought of as 
whether the data collected represents what the researcher believes it represents. This is 
                                                 
48
  Oppenheim, A.M., Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement. Continuum, 
London, 1992. p.102. 
49
  Punch, K.F., Survey Research: the basics. SAGE, London, 2003. p.42. 
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an important concept to bear in mind while designing a questionnaire, as validity will be 
maximised by ensuring that the questions asked and, by extension, the answers 
received, are addressing the desired issues and variables. Even where questionnaire 
design is mindful of issues of validity, problems can be raised by the possibility of 
dishonest or incomplete answers.  
 
Alongside the validity of individual questionnaire responses is the issue of the validity 
of generalisations drawn from the data. This is tied into the questionnaire response rate, 
the percentage of completed questionnaires returned. For a mailed questionnaire 
response rates of 30-40% are not uncommon,50 although I would anticipate my response 
rate being slightly higher. I will have had previous contact with those to whom the 
questionnaire is sent, and all recipients will have a high level of interest in the subject of 
the questionnaire. The problems generated by a low response rate are not ones of 
numbers, as indicated earlier it is possible to send many questionnaires out, and 30% 
could still constitute a sizeable sample. The problems come from the potential for bias 
in the data generated. The recipients of the questionnaire who choose not to complete 
and return it are very unlikely to represent a random sample of the overall recipients. 
Those who feel strongly about the issues addressed in the questionnaire are more likely 
to respond than those who have little or no interest in the subject. For this reason it is 
important for a researcher to maximise response rate, while being aware of the effect a 
low response rate will have on the validity of any generalisations to the population of 
any generated data. I will attempt to maximise my response rate by targeting recipients 
who will be interested in the subject of the questionnaire, having contact with the 
recipients prior to sending a questionnaire, and ensuring that the questionnaire is clearly 
explained, well set out, professional looking and of an appropriate length. The frame of 
mind of the respondent and their attitude to the questionnaire can have a profound effect 
on the data gathered, and indeed whether the questionnaire is completed at all. This is, 
of course, a difficult variable for the researcher to control, but a potential respondent is 
more likely to look favourably on a questionnaire when the approach is inviting and 
professional; when the questionnaire itself looks professional and clear, and when it is 
demonstrated that all ethical considerations have been taken into account.51 I intend to 
contact all potential respondents, generally by e-mail, asking for their participation in 
                                                 
50
  Punch, Survey Research, p.42. 
51
  Ibid. 
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my research before sending them a questionnaire, not sending any out to those who 
have not agreed to complete one. With the questionnaire I will send a cover letter 
outlining the use the data will be put to, reiterating the anonymous analysis of 
questionnaire data and outlining my ethical research programme. In this way I hope to 
maximise questionnaire completion and aim to get accurate, reliable data. 
 
Vital to generating reliable, valid data is a well designed questionnaire. The phrasing of 
questions can have a profound effect on the answers received. Even with apparently 
open questions, it is possible to alter the answers received through the phrasing and tone 
of the question.52 For this reason it is important that questions are phrased in a neutral 
manner to avoid influencing responses. There is also some evidence53 that the order of 
questions can influence answers, with the possibility of preceding questions altering a 
respondent’s attitudes to, or interpretation of, a question. While this is a difficult issue to 
remove entirely, it is one of which a questionnaire designer needs an awareness. 
Although these issues can affect reliability and validity, a well designed questionnaire 
can reduce these problems and the questionnaire has the advantage that there is no 
possibility of interviewer bias. 
 
Schuman and Presser54 assert that social surveys are generally based on closed, fixed-
choice questions, but when designing a questionnaire it is important to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of each question type. There are many benefits to the closed 
question format: they provide the most efficient method of asking questions with a finite 
number of possible responses; they are easier to analyse and evaluate, as they afford 
some degree of uniformity of response; there is less need for interpretation by the 
questioner; and they require less effort on the part of the responder, with the possibility 
of increasing response rate. Despite these advantages, if the number of ways the 
individual can respond is finite while there are an infinite number of possible answers, it 
may restrict possible responses and bias data. This can also have the effect of 
inadvertently misleading or frustrating the respondent. Open questions provide a greater 
degree of flexibility to the respondent, allowing them to answer however they like. By 
allowing the respondent to identify their own answer it is possible that some answers 
                                                 
52
  Schuman, H., & Presser, S. Questions & Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, 
Wording, And Context. SAGE, London, 1996. p.276. 
53
  Ibid., p.23. 
54
  Schuman & Presser, Questions & Answers in Attitude Surveys, p.79. 
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will emerge which the designer of the questionnaire had not considered. This also 
precludes the possibility of the available answers influencing the respondent’s answer. 
This advantage, however, requires the appropriate phrasing of the question, as a poorly 
phrased open question is still capable of biasing the response. I believe that the nature of 
the issues I am aiming to address is such that a mixture of open and closed questions 
will be the most appropriate technique for data collection. The questionnaire will 
require some questions which can be addressed by closed questions, such as the strength 
of certain feelings and values, for example how strongly a European identity is felt by 
the respondent. In other situations, however, open questions will be more appropriate, 
such as asking for the factors which contribute to this identity. When asking this 
question it is important to allow as much flexibility as possible in the answer, as order of 
answer could be as important as the answers themselves. 
 
There are two forms of closed questions which are typically employed by 
questionnaires, those which allow dichotomous response, and those which allow 
continuous responses. Dichotomous questions allow two fixed responses (eg. yes/no or 
male/female), whereas continuous responses generally take the form of rating scales 
(eg. how strongly the respondent agrees with a statement). Continuous response 
questions allow for more data, and a greater depth of data, resulting in better analysis, 
and will be useful for measuring attitudes as I intend to do in my questionnaire. I will 
use dichotomous questions only for basic factual information. For a question which 
elicits continuous response to be useful it must be phrased so that an appropriate scale 
can be used, and the scale must be ‘straightforward and stable’55 to produce reliable and 
valid data. 
 
To ensure that my research is conducted in an ethical manner there are a number of 
issues with questionnaire research which I need to take into account in the design of my 
questionnaire. While interviewees will have the option for their responses to be 
anonymised, all data generated from questionnaires will be anonymised before being 
analysed and presented, and kept in a confidential manner. At the beginning of the 
questionnaire I will state, in writing, that the data will be anonymised, as well as stating 
the nature and purpose of my research. I will also make clear the voluntary nature of the 
                                                 
55Punch, Survey Research, p.57. 
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questionnaire and the ability of the participant to withdraw from the research. These 
issues will be addressed in the initial e-mail contact and in the cover letter 
accompanying the questionnaire. 
 
The analysis of documents, many coming from the EU itself, will allow me to add 
context and depth to my analysis of interview and questionnaire data. The body of 
literature created by the EU is extensive, and documents are produced detailing the day 
to day activity of the institutions of the EU and covering negotiations and decision 
making procedures. Unlike interviewing, document analysis is entirely unobtrusive and 
can convey rich data of the values and beliefs of the participants within the context.56 
Many of the official documents of the EU which I will be studying will be produced, at 
least in part, by the subjects of my interviews, so the data will be used to corroborate the 
findings of my interview programme. Where it is not possible to interview members of 
the EU institutions or the Turkish government, and I am unable to generate data through 
questionnaires, it may be possible to find documents which they have had a hand in 
creating, and this could provide an insight into attitudes and beliefs. One area in which 
document analysis could provide information unavailable through interview is in 
examining arguments used within the context of the European Parliament itself, and 
could provide a better overview of the subject than the highly specialised data provided 
by interviews. These documents will prove particularly important in understanding the 
European Parliament, a key focus of my research, as many of the documents will be 
generated within the EP itself. In this way documentary evidence will help me to 
analyse the impact of the Parliament in European identity, as well as analysing the 
behaviour of actors in context – an important factor in the application of norms. In this 
way I will be able to study norms and argumentation in action which is not possible 
from interviews and questionnaire responses from individual actors. Particularly useful 
in this regard will be transcripts of meetings and debates within the institutions where 
this argumentation is likely to be pronounced, but I will also look at press releases and 
statements by those within  the institutions of the EU as this will corroborate other 
evidence concerning the presence or absence of norms and identity. I will also look at 
other sources such as eurobarometer, which will be less use in understanding the 
identity of the élites I am studying, but will provide an interesting and useful point of 
                                                 
56 Marshall & Rossman, 'Designing Qualitative Research', p.116. 
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comparison in establishing the effect the institutions have on the identity of those actors 
within them. 
 
As I have indicated, one of the real strengths of an analysis of sources other than 
personal interviews and questionnaires is the ability to analyse the arguments and 
behaviours of actors within the context I am studying, rather than removed from that in 
an interview environment. For this purpose, verbatim transcripts of European 
Parliament debates will prove an invaluable source of data. Unlike corporate press 
releases, the statements made within debates are the personal contributions of MEPs and 
are a very valuable indication of the identities of those actors, the norms acting on them 
and their understanding of “appropriate” behaviour. Where the interviews afford me the 
possibility of guiding conversations and exploring specific areas with actors, analysis of 
debates will afford me greater insight into the outworking of identity in context. For this 
reason it is my intention that neither data source be used merely to corroborate or 
triangulate data gathered elsewhere, but each will play an important role in the empirical 
research programme. 
 
 The official documents I will be looking at are published by the EU and the Turkish 
government and are freely available, but it is still important to be mindful of the context 
in which the documents were created. I am unlikely to be using any documents of a 
sensitive or private nature, but these documents should be used sensitively and within 
the bounds of the permission granted by the writer or owner. The use of documentary 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and questionnaires will allow me to build up as 
complete a picture as possible of the nature and strength of identity within the European 
Parliament, the role of the EP itself, and the factors which influence and change norms 
and identity. 
 
My research is grounded in the ontological and epistemological assumptions which 
underpin social constructivism, and it is important that my research strategy reflects 
these viewpoints. In this chapter I have outlined the importance of a qualitative 
approach to research in understanding the concepts which I am investigating - identity, 
interest and preference – which are ideational in nature and are not static, but in process. 
For this reason, I believe that a quantitative research method would be unsuited to 
studying these concepts, and I believe the best and most appropriate approach to 
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studying identity within the European Parliament, and the way this identity is expressed 
in relation to the Turkish membership, is through the employment of a qualitative 
research strategy, making use of semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and 
document analysis.  
 
This chapter has outlined the multi-faceted approach to research I intend to employ, 
which is informed and shaped by both the issues to be studied and the social 
constructivist theory which underpins the research. This method will provide me with 
valid, useful and coherent data which can be used to answer the research questions 
outlined earlier. In this way I will be able to produce meaningful analysis within a social 
constructivist theoretical framework which is commensurable with data generated by 
those adhering to competing theories. 
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Identity in the European Parliament 
 
The starting point for my empirical research is gaining an understanding of the identity 
of actors within the European Parliament and elucidating the norms which underpin that 
identity. In this chapter I will address the first two research questions set out earlier in 
this thesis – whether it is useful to talk of a European identity within the European 
Parliament; what form this identity might take and, if an identity is found to be present, 
I will start to look at how this identity interacts with other, pre-existing identities and 
norms. In this chapter I aim to gain an understanding of the identity of actors within the 
European Parliament which will form an important basis for later analysis of the role of 
the Parliament itself and the strength of normative factors in actor behaviour within the 
EP. 
 
 As I have indicated in the preceding chapters, the identity of actors within the EP will 
be unique to those actors due to the effect the Parliament itself has on norms and actor 
identity. Despite the unique nature of identity within the European Parliament I believe 
that this identity needs to be set in its appropriate historical context, and will be based 
on many of the same norms as other identities, such as a broader European identity, so 
highlighting similarities and differences will form an important element of my analysis. 
In this way I will be able to draw out the norms which shape identity within the 
European Parliament and identify where these norms originate. The presence of a 
European identity formed my first research question, as well as underpinning the later 
questions, and as such it was the starting point for my documentary research, and the 
way I began my interviews and questionnaires. 
 
When asked whether there is a European identity all but one interviewee, eleven out of 
twelve, responded that there is a European identity, although what this actually 
amounted to varied greatly, and all but one questionnaire respondent, two out of three, 
agreed. Of those who did not agree that a European identity existed, neither stated that 
there was no commonality within the institutions of the EU. While Martin Callanan 
MEP stated that he did not believe that a European identity existed he did suggest that 
there are those in the European Parliament who would express a European identity,1 and 
                                                 
1
 Callanan, Martin (MEP). Personal interview (12th October 2009). 
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this perception was certainly echoed by evidence from debates within the Parliament. 
The questionnaire respondent who does not believe in a European identity pointed out 
that there was a common feeling within the European Parliament that was based on the 
work being done, ‘shared goals, shared physical space, shared facilities, shared 
socialising’ rather than on identity. 
 
Although two responding MEPs argued against the presence of European identity there 
are many more who believe that such a thing does exist. This is reinforced by numerous 
references to European identity within the European Parliament itself2, as expressed by 
Italian MEP Debora Serracchiani who points to ‘the gelling of a European identity that 
is able to express the common values of our new Europe while incorporating, rather 
than glossing over, the individualities of its many occupants’.3 Although a neo-
utilitarian understanding of the international system points to states as the actors within 
the system, MEPs play a clear role in the international politics of Europe. This 
acknowledgement of the existence of European identity amongst MEPs points to a more 
complex and nuanced view of identity, interest and decision making than traditionally 
favoured by neo-utilitarian theorists of International Relations, that of exogenously 
given identity, and this view of identity will be explored throughout this analysis. The 
former President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering summed up his views 
on European identity, and those of social constructivists; ‘European identity relies on 
strong and intangible values and norms’.4 
 
Despite the broad agreement on the fundamental presence of European identity, each 
respondent has differing suggestions as to the nature and source of the identity, and I 
will investigate these issues. There is also disagreement as to the relationship between 
European identity and the European Parliament. Although I will look in detail at the role 
of the European Parliament itself in the next chapter, it is important to appreciate the 
view of actors themselves concerning the relationship between European wide norms, 
EU specific norms and actor identity. 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Traian Ungureanu MEP during EP ‘European Neighbourhood Policy debate’ 13.12.11; 
Ernst Strasser MEP, Francisco José Millán Mon MEP, Mirosław Piotrowski MEP during ‘Situation of 
Christians in the context of freedom of religion (debate)’  19.01.2011. European identity is also 
referenced many times in EP ‘Explanations of vote’. 
3
 Statement during the European Parliament ‘2009 progress report on Croatia – 2009 progress report on 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – 2009 progress report on Turkey (debate)’ 10.02.2010 
4
 Pöttering, Hans-Gert, MEP + former EP President (Personal correspondence). 
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The Nature of European Identity 
 
There is not universal agreement about the relationship between the EU and European 
identity, even though for some people the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘European Union’ are 
used interchangeably. ‘Europe can no longer be seen as a great pool of financial 
resources for resolving economic, social and infrastructural problems but as an 
institution to which everyone must offer an original contribution in order to establish a 
policy built on shared values’.5 Here Europe is used to refer to the institutions of the 
European Union and to shared European values. Indeed in conversation regarding 
enlargement of the EU, Philip Claeys MEP suggests that ‘Europe should remain 
European’6, a tautology unless the term “Europe” is used to refer to the European 
Union, and this further conflates the concepts of Europe and the EU. Indeed Bahar 
Rumelili argues that ‘the EU discourse currently constitutes the EU not as one among 
several institutions that make up the broader European international society, but as the 
defining institution of European identity, norms, and values’7. This association between 
European and EU identity was echoed by those respondents who believe that a 
European identity exists, the majority of whom pointed to this link and suggested that 
shared European norms are also the norms of the European Union. Although some 
respondents suggest that some norms on which European identity is based are equally 
applicable to other countries such as the United States and Australia8 a large majority 
believe that the European identity is felt within the institutions of the European 
institutions. Godfrey Bloom9 also questions whether someone from an EU member state 
would feel any more ‘European’ than someone from Switzerland which is a valid 
question but one which is beyond the scope of this research. I believe that MEPs will be 
subject to European norms and placed in an environment where these norms are 
expressed and debated. Due to this widespread acceptance of a European identity within 
the European Parliament, I will look at the nature of this identity as it is felt by those 
within the institutions before examining the role of institutions in European identity in 
the next chapter. 
                                                 
5
 Pöttering, Hans-Gert, MEP + former EP President (Personal correspondence). 
6
 Philip Claeys MEP, ‘Enlargement report for Turkey (debate)’ 28.03.2012 
7
 Rumelili, B ‘Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post-Enlargement Europe’ Journal 
of European Integration 33:2, pp.235-249. 
8
 Purvis, John (former MEP). Personal interview (21st October 2009) 
9
 Bloom, Godfrey (MEP). Personal interview (4th February 2010) 
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‘[T]he idea that the central values of Europe – democracy, human rights, solidarity – 
should encompass all the states of Europe has been, and will remain, at the heart of 
Europe’s identity’.10 From the very beginning of European integration there has been a 
normative underpinning to the process and the values on which the European Union11 
are based are stated clearly in the preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community.12 The preamble states that ‘the six’ are ‘[d]etermined to lay the 
foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ and that they will 
‘engage in common action to eliminate barriers which divide Europe’, ‘pooling their 
resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’.13 These founding values of the 
EU are concisely stated in Title I Article 2 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union:  
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 14 
 
Article 3 goes on to state that: 
 
 The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development 
of international law15 
 
Although there is no explicit mention of identity within the Treaties of the EU, 
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 György Schöpflin MEP, ‘Enlargement strategy 2009’ debate. 
11
 I use European Union to refer to the various bodies which subsequently became the European Union. 
12
 ‘Treaty of Rome’, Signed 25.03.57 
13
 Preamble, ‘Treaty Establishing the European Community: as amended by Subsequent Treaties’. 
[hri.org/docs/Rome57/Preamble.html] 
14
 Consolidated version of the TEU  
[eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF] 
15
 Ibid. 
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references to this ‘founding ideology’ occur regularly and prominently and the evidence 
of subsequent documents of the EU suggests that, to echo Schöpflin, these values and 
the associated norms remain at the heart of European identity. Within the ‘Declaration 
on the Future of the European Union’16 Europe is painted as 
 
The continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French 
Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above 
all diversity…The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights. The 
Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, 
respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law. 
 
These values and norms provide a sound base for identity within Europe, but they were 
originally set down by the six founding members of the European Union over 50 years 
ago when war within Europe was a recent memory and the Cold War a reality. Given the 
context of the creation of the EU it is little surprise that peace and security were stated 
as two of the overriding priorities of the fledgling integration process. What is less clear 
is whether this founding ideology remains relevant to a modern European Union of 27 
members in which the Second World War is a distant memory and the Cold War also in 
the past. 
 
Unlike many of the more established theories of International Relations, social 
constructivism does not view identity as fixed, allowing for the possibility of identity 
change. While identity is grounded in norms which are, by necessity, relatively stable, 
the change in context and situation would result in an evolving identity rather than 
making the founding ideology obsolete. ‘Europe is on its way to becoming one big 
family, without bloodshed, a real transformation clearly calling for a different approach 
from fifty years ago, when six countries first took the lead’.17 If the social constructivist 
approach to identity formation and change is true I would expect to see a changing 
European identity in the modern EU. 
 
When asked whether European identity is changing, there was unanimous agreement 
amongst respondents who believe in European identity that the identity is dynamic. In 
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 ‘Laeken Declaration’ 15.12.2001, produced after the European Council meeting in Laeken. 
17
 Ibid. 
 96 
 
line with the social constructivist view of identity Hans-Gert Pöttering and Bill Newton-
Dunn18 point to strong norms and values which underpin European identity while 
emphasising the dynamic nature of the identity itself. Although I will investigate in 
detail the effect of the European Parliament on European identity, I believe that it is 
clear from the empirical research conducted that European identity within the European 
Parliament has changed since the creation of the EU. John Purvis, who was an MEP 
from 1979 to 1984 and again from 1999 until 2009, stated that the identity had changed 
noticeably during his time in the Parliament with the founding values of the European 
Union becoming stronger and more important. I believe that this effect can be 
anticipated within a social constructivist framework of identity with the years of social 
interaction and normative debate which has occurred in the European Parliament. Fiona 
Hall points to the specific effect on European identity of Eastward expansion, with an 
increased sensitivity to what is happening in Russia.19 Although there is a rationalist 
explanation for greater awareness of one’s new neighbour than when one didn’t share a 
border with it, Fiona Hall points to a ‘visceral fear’ of Russia amongst the Eastern 
European member states of the EU and bringing these states into the normative debate 
of the European Parliament will have a socialising effect on these norms. The social 
constructivist concept of the dynamic nature of identity, and the evidence of my 
respondents leads me to conclude that an investigation of the founding ideology of the 
EU, while useful for establishing the presence of certain European norms, is insufficient 
to provide a comprehensive view of European identity as it currently stands. I will 
continue my analysis of European identity by investigating its current state, while aware 
that this identity is also subject to change and evolution. I believe that identity as it 
stands will be vital to understanding actor preference and behaviour within the 
European Parliament, but it will not remain static any more than did the founding 
ideology. 
 
In his hearing in front of the European Parliament on the 12th January 2010, 
Commissioner-designate Füle (now Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy) stated that: 
 
The Europe I believe in is built on shared values: a clear commitment to democracy, 
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 Newton Dunn, Bill (MEP). Personal Interview (9th March 2010) 
19
 Hall, Fiona (MEP). Personal interview (16th October 2009) 
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diversity and the rule of law; an economy that should provide opportunities and 
prosperity for all, and a general respect of the fundamental rights of its citizens. These 
are conditions for lasting peace and stability; stability at our borders is Europe’s 
stability. 
 
These are the basic values that all current Members of the Union share and respect 
every day. I will work with all the partner countries willing and able to fully implement 
these values and to actively promote them.20 
 
Commissioner Füle indicates that the values present in the founding ideology are still 
important, and indeed he has subsequently reasserted this importance in his new role. 
Commissioner Füle subsequently stated that ‘our shared values of democracy, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights will be at the heart of the revised Neighbourhood 
Policy’21. This view is supported by the evidence of my primary research, with both 
questionnaire respondents who believe in a European identity ranking democracy as a 
‘vital’ component of that identity, and this is echoed by some interviewees. Alongside 
this stands Eurobarometer research into public opinion in which members of the public 
in EU member states rated democracy as the joint most important value representing the 
EU (along with human rights).22 In the same poll, Turks ranked the importance of 
democracy as an EU value significantly lower. The importance of democracy within 
European identity is highlighted by Bill Newton-Dunn who stated that ‘it’s a sine qua 
non. If you’re not democratic you’re not even in the Union…if you want to join our 
particular family then you’ve got to be democratic’,23 and this appears to be the 
assumption which underpins many debates with the European Parliament. Debates 
concerning enlargement are littered with references to the requirement for democracy 
amongst member states, ‘there is no question of a compromise in this area’.24 This 
requirement led to a ‘Democratisation in Turkey’ debate within the European 
Parliament, ‘a matter directly related to the Union…bearing in mind that Turkey is a 
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 Füle, Š., Verbatim Report of Hearing 12.01.2010 
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/cre/fule.pdf] 
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candidate country’25 which saw Turkey criticised for the role of the military in the 
political process26 and for the treatment of opposition politicians.27 ‘Turkey has turned 
into a graveyard for political parties. Thirteen parties have been buried by Supreme 
Court judgements. Recently the DTP was banned; 200 party members, nine mayors, six 
former mayors and two former party leaders are in jail’.28 ‘Turkey holds elections but it 
is not a democracy in the accepted Western sense’.29 While this statement sets out the 
separation of Turkey from one of the fundamental principles of the EU it also suggests 
that the form of democracy practiced in the EU is based on particular Western norms, 
perhaps European in origin. This highlights the importance of norms of democracy 
which go beyond the implementation of the system of government itself. The form of 
democracy practiced within Europe has created norms which have become embedded 
within actors and influence identity. 
 
Alongside the norms of democracy are those of human rights and minority rights, ‘[t]he 
litmus test of any civilisation is not how it treats its majority, but how it treats the 
minorities that make up that majority’.30 It is not just public opinion which places 
human rights on a par with democracy in importance, it is also rated as a ‘vital’ 
component of European identity by those questionnaire respondents who believe a 
European identity exists. It has been argued within the European Parliament that the 
issue of human rights ‘is a symbol of European identity’,31 and that ‘[t]he defence of 
fundamental human rights forms the basis of our Union's principles and values’.32 
Despite this agreement, there is not unanimity amongst respondents with one suggesting 
that although there is a stronger commitment to human rights now ‘torture was the 
normal means of working out justice in the 16th-17th Century [and] slavery went on until 
the mid-19th Century’,33 while another suggested that human rights were an important 
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element of European identity without any direct link to the European Union.34 Despite 
these arguments there does seem to be a broad consensus that norms of human rights do 
have an important role to play in the constitution of European identity, and the broader 
applicability of human rights norms does not make them any weaker in the constitution 
of European identity. Marie-Christine Vergiat asserts that ‘there are quite a few of us in 
this assembly who believe that human rights are fundamental values, not only for the 
European Union and its citizens but also for humanity as a whole’.35 This is born out in 
European Parliament debates relating to Turkey – ‘there are still restrictions on 
fundamental freedoms, human rights violations…and discrimination against ethnic and 
religious minorities – all of which are problems that Europe clearly cannot ignore’.36 
‘For the good of Turkish society, democracy needs to be pluralist, secular and built on a 
bed-rock of respect for human rights, including those of its Kurdish minorities’.37 The 
central importance of human rights within the European Parliament is demonstrated by 
the assertion in the chamber that, despite the words of Commissioner Füle, ‘the 
European Neighbourhood Policy is wrong to tolerate thirteen countries which have 
failed to either sign or to ratify the UN Protocol against Torture’ before going on to 
single out the United Kingdom ‘which has shamefully obstructed EU ratification of the 
EU Convention on Human Rights’.38 Indeed, it could be argued that the importance of 
human rights is demonstrated by the mere existence of the annual debate in which these 
words were spoken, the ‘Human rights in the world and the European Union’s policy on 
the matter (debate)’. 
 
A third pillar of the founding identity which is still relevant today is the rule of law. 
Rule of law was, once again, rated as vital to European identity by questionnaire 
respondents who professed belief in European identity, and was rated the fourth most 
important value of the EU by members of the public.39 Within European Parliament 
debates, and those regarding enlargement in particular, the principal of pacta sunt 
servanda is mentioned often and, while candidate countries are expected to live up to 
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their obligations this principal appears to be most stringently applied to the EU itself. 
‘[B]oth sides…must meet their obligations and undertakings…pacta sunt servanda 
applies’,40 ‘if we ask Turkey to comply with EU standards, we must make sure to meet 
those standards ourselves’.41 Similarly it is suggested that ‘the European Union’s 
credibility as regards its foreign policy is measured in terms of how well it keeps to its 
fundamental values, which are human rights, democracy, the principle of legality, and 
freedom of religion’42. ‘After all, the basis of European integration is the saying pacta 
sunt servanda; that is, agreements must be adhered to’.43 
 
These fundamental values of the European Union were set down as precursors to 
joining the EU in the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ in 1993, and the Presidency conclusions 
from the Copenhagen European Council state that: 
 
 Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union.44 
 
These criteria for entry into the EU give pride of place to consideration of the values of 
the Union, before going on to refer to economic factors. Although there are normative 
forces present in these criteria it can be argued that their function is a rationalist one, as 
Monica Luisa Macovei pointed out ‘the Union’s objective has always been to export 
stability and not to import instability’.45 The presence of a functioning, stable 
democratic system of government within a candidate country goes a long way to 
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securing the stability of the country once it becomes a member of the EU. If Turkey 
were to join the EU before members of the institutions were satisfied that the military 
would not be involved in the political system it could cast doubt on their ability to 
implement EU policy and legislation and spread instability and uncertainty throughout 
the EU. The compatibility of legal systems is also important in a country fully 
implementing the acquis communautaire before acceding to the EU and in its ability to 
remain harmonised with other member states. The rule of law is important not only for 
the citizens of member states (and candidate countries) but also goes some way to 
realising implementation of EU legislation at a national level. Interactions between 
member states will be more stable, and the states themselves will have more confidence 
in them, if all these factors are realised. In this vein Bill Newton Dunn puts European 
integration and cooperation down to ‘hard-headed reality, Europeans have to work 
together, so not sentiment or affection or feeling or anything, it’s we’ve got a great 
peace, we’ve got to learn to trade together, we’ve got to get our act together. It’s hard-
headed reality in every case.’46 While Mr. Newton Dunn expresses an ostensibly 
rationalist viewpoint of European integration I do not believe that it is incompatible 
with a social constructivist notion of identity which does not see actions guided by 
feelings but by norms which are, in many cases, subconscious. It is this concept of 
identity which can go some way towards explaining who the ‘Europeans’ are who must 
work together and why it is this grouping who cooperate. 
 
Concepts of democracy, human rights and rule of law are frequently mentioned in the 
European Parliament, often within debates which are ostensibly far removed from these 
issues,47 and they are often phrased in normatively rich ways. This is in part due to the 
arena in which the debates take place and the efforts to persuade other participants of an 
individual’s point of view, which will be looked at later in the analysis, but I believe that 
it is indicative of a normative basis to the concepts.  
 
Turkey…must implement those reforms that are necessary to guarantee democracy, the 
rule of law, and the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities. In particular, 
cultural, religious and political pluralism are the foundations of a democratic society, 
but recognising them is a difficult process which is intertwined with historical, ethnic 
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and religious considerations.48 
 
I believe that documentary data from the European Parliament, supported by the 
primary research I have undertaken, suggests that the values of democracy, rule of law 
and human rights provide a normative basis for a component of identity of some 
members of the European Parliament. As a result of these norms, the actions of those 
MEPs is influenced by the logic of appropriateness and the appropriate way to respond 
to the norms rather than sentiment, feeling or affection. I believe that this is suggested 
by Konrad Szymański’s comment in the European Parliament that ‘ideology and human 
rights do not mix’,49 an intriguing argument within an institution which counts human 
rights as a fundamental value. This suggests that norms of human rights have become 
such an integral and taken-for-granted part of European identity that they have become 
ubiquitous and are seen to transcend ideology. Within the same debate fellow MEP  
Jelko Kacin asserted that ‘We will strengthen pro-European forces only if we adopt a 
realistic approach and behave appropriately…Let us be fair, let us be correct and let us 
be credible’.50 Taking up this theme Jaroslav Paška asserted that ‘we must act correctly 
and honourably and speak openly about all the problems’.51 Although the concepts of 
democracy, rule of law and human rights do have a rationalist underpinning within the 
EU my research has suggested that for some of the members of the European Parliament 
adherence to them also represents an appropriate way to act, to the extent that acting 
against them would be unthinkable. The presence of these norms throughout the history 
of the EU has, to use the terminology of Reus-Smit, limited the imagination of MEPs to 
exclude the possibility of actions which contravene them. 
 
The stated aim of the EU at its inception, and another of its fundamental values, is 
peace. Establishing and maintaining peace was a difficult process at the inception of the 
EU in the years after the Second World War, the EU is comprised of states which ‘hated 
each other for centuries and now…live happily together’, ‘you realize what a miracle it 
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is’.52 Othmar Karas argues that peace is the primary goal of the European Union, ‘the 
European Union...is a project that will integrate the continent, overcome the violent 
division of Europe, introduce peace, freedom and responsibility for one another instead 
of conflict’,53 and Mitro Repo describes the European Union as a “peace movement”.54 
Similarly, peace is rated as vital to European identity by questionnaire respondents and 
as the third most important value representing the EU by the public in member states, 
narrowly behind human rights and democracy.55 Turkey is seen by members of the 
European Parliament as not conforming to European standards of peace, ‘persisting in 
its occupation of a large part of Cyprus’,56 ‘with the casus belli in the Aegean’57 
threatening Greek frontiers. There is, of course, a clear rationale for those countries 
threatened to insist on a more peaceful outcome, and indeed these points are most often 
made by Greek and Cypriot MEPs. There is also a clear link between peace and 
international stability but again there is a normative link. There is a view amongst some 
MEPs that ‘the project of bringing peace and progress to what was once a volatile part 
of Europe is set to continue’.58 The link between peace and progress is an important 
one, indicating that there is a normative as well as rational motivation for seeking peace, 
and a component of European identity. 
 
Linked to the founding ideology of the EU is the drive towards enlargement. Since its 
inception the EU has grown from 6 to 27 member states, with one acceding country and 
five more candidate countries. It is easy to see how early enlargement served the 
rationalist goals of improved European security and greater prosperity for member 
states with the expansion of the free trade area. It has, however, been called into 
question whether subsequent enlargements can be explained in rationalist terms. In his 
article ‘The Community Trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern 
enlargement of the European Union’ Frank Schimmelfennig argues that the enlargement 
in question could not be adequately explained by rational intergovernmentalist 
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approaches to European integration.59 While Schimmelfennig attributes this 
enlargement to rhetorical action, the deliberate use of normative arguments to entrap 
opponents, I intend to argue that identity plays an important role in enlargement, and 
indeed that norms to enlarge the EU form part of a European identity. 
 
Although enlargement of the EU is not listed amongst the values of the Union, the 
founding ideology, in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome the founding members of the 
EU call for ‘the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts’.60 
While this does not set out a normative commitment to enlargement it does indicate that 
from the outset of the Union the conditions of membership have been ideological in 
nature, in tandem with the rationalist approach of the individual member states. The 
Preamble also states that the EU will engage in ‘common action to eliminate the barriers 
which divide Europe’61 and the Council of the European Union confirmed in 2002 that 
‘The Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe’.62 In the same 
document the Presidency of the European Council report that the ‘European Union and 
the acceding States agreed on a joint declaration “One Europe” on the continuous, 
inclusive and irreversible nature of the enlargement process’.63 The phrasing of these 
statements suggests that there is a normative drive towards enlargement and that 
decisions on applications are not taken using a pure logic of consequentialism. This 
accords with the statements of a number of MEPs within European Parliament debates, 
and the suggestion that ‘we wish to renew, in principle, the commitment towards 
continuation of the process of European Union enlargement and towards enabling all the 
states of our continent to develop under the aegis of Union membership’.64 MEP Cătălin 
Sorin Ivan highlights the normative basis of enlargement explicitly, arguing that ‘The 
EU is like a building under construction and therefore, the notion of halting its 
enlargement would run counter to the very principle it is based on.65 
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Although enlargement does not gain universal support,66 ‘there is a strong commitment 
by the European Parliament to enlargement’.67 Hans-Gert Pöttering points to the 
existence of a ‘European family’ existing of member states, but also other European 
states,68 and this concept is taken up by Wojciech Michal Olejniczak who welcomes the 
Eastern European countries into the European family but warns that ‘the accession of 
these countries cannot be thought of as the end of European Union enlargement’.69 The 
concept of a European family is one which is frequently mentioned in the European 
Parliament and, heightening the conflation of Europe and the EU, this is often used to 
refer to members of the European Union or those who should be accepted into 
membership.70 Although the process of enlargement of the EU is a conditional one 
which requires political will on the part of the acceding country and of the EU, there 
appears to be a normative drive towards enlargement which is closely entwined with the 
EU’s founding ideology. ‘Enlargement has enabled the EU to bolster basic values such 
as democracy and human rights on our continent and put the conditions in place for the 
rule of law based on independent courts and legal authorities with a functioning market 
democracy – a stable and peaceful Europe’,71 and former MEP John Bowis, reflecting 
on Viscount Grey’s comments of the lights going out across Europe compared the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU to the lights finally coming back on for those states.72 
Conversely, ‘When we close the door, we are running the risk of new problems and new 
threats to European values; we should underline the need to go forward together in order 
to achieve a better European enlargement based on the criteria we fully support’.73 As 
this quotation confirms, the criteria for membership of the EU remain important, but I 
believe norms within the European Union, and specifically the European Parliament, 
result in the appropriate behaviour for the European Parliament to be looking towards 
enlargement. John Bowis conceded that ‘there’s a lot of pressure to enlarge further’.74 
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Article 49 of the TEU states that ‘Any European state which respects the values referred 
to in Article 2 [see earlier] and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a 
member of the Union…The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European 
Council shall be taken into account’.75 This means that any ‘European’ country which 
fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria is eligible for membership, although there is no specific 
mention of what constitutes a European country. Perhaps the most obvious condition for 
a European country is a geographical one, and indeed the argument for a geographical 
component was substantiated with the refusal of membership to Morocco in 1987. 
Along the same lines the geographical argument is, on occasion, used against Turkey. 
William, The Earl of Dartmouth, argued in the European Parliament that ‘only 3% of 
the land mass of Turkey is in the continent at all, and this proposition that Turkey should 
become a full member of the European Union is, on geographical grounds, completely 
bizarre’.76 Similarly Magdi Cristiano Allam suggests that ‘If you consider Europe 
merely as a geographical entity, you should realise that Turkey is not Europe, given that 
97% of Turkish territory is in Asia’,77 and Hans-Gert Pöttering suggests that Turkey 
would ‘overburden the EU geographically’.78 Despite these arguments there appears to 
be widespread acceptance that, with the opening of accession negotiations, Turkey was 
judged to be sufficiently geographically European, indeed Richard Corbett, former MEP 
and member of the Cabinet of the President of the European Council, argues that Turkey 
was accepted as European as far back as 1949 when she joined the Council of Europe.79 
Conversely Russia, which also bridges Europe and Asia, is not supported for 
membership.80 Stretching the geographical argument to its extreme Silvio Berlusconi 
has stated that ‘we consider Israel one of the European countries’ and that ‘my greatest 
dream is to include Israel among the European nations’.81 While this is not official EU 
policy it is indicative of the ambiguity of the term European and that, for some at least, 
it is not purely a geographical criterion. Instead the borders of what is considered 
Europe are identity based, and this is an important distinction in the field of EU 
enlargement. 
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In describing Israel as a European country Berlusconi speaks of a ‘Judeo-Christian 
culture that is the basis for European culture’, a ‘Western civilisation’82 and this 
‘civilisation’ is an important constituent of European identity. This basis for identity is 
echoed by Franz Obermayr, paraphrasing Theodor Heuss, who states that ‘Europe…is 
built on three hills: on the Acropolis for Greek humanism, on the Capitol in Rome for 
the concept of the European state and on Golgotha for the Christian Western world’.83 
This inclusion of a location in Jerusalem for the foundation of European identity again 
belies the geographical argument for the boundaries of the EU, but does bring in new 
elements of identity.  
 
For many the values of the EU are inextricably tied to its culture and history. Indeed the 
preamble to the TEU states that the signatories of the treaty were ‘drawing inspiration 
from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have 
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’.84 Some respondents also 
point to a link between historical and cultural aspects of European identity and the 
founding ideology of the EU. Hans-Gert Pöttering suggested that the values of the EU 
are ‘the result of geographical, historical and cultural bonds’,85 and other respondents 
point to classical Greece, the renaissance and the wars in Europe as shared historical 
factors which contribute to shared values. John Purvis pointed to the invention of 
democracy in 4th Century BC Greece, although he notes that ‘they haven’t always been 
very good exemplars of democracy in more recent times’, while going on to observe 
that ‘I think [European identity] is much more cultural and possibly religious’.86 When 
looking at the possible accession of Turkey to EU membership Peter van Dalen 
remarked that ‘Turkey is not geographically part of Europe, nor is it part of European 
history, whose religious, cultural and political landscapes have been defined by 
Christianity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the democratic nation state’.87 
 
An historical basis to identity recurs throughout many debates in the European 
Parliament, and culture came to the fore in a debate concerning the “European Heritage 
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Label”, a label for culturally and historically important sites.88 Within the debate Marco 
Scurria asserts that ‘we are here because we believe in the European Union and we 
believe in certain values that the Union has established and has seen emerge. These 
values are the fruits of a common history created by so many individual components in 
our own nations, in our own cities and in our own lands, but which have then shaped a 
common civilisation, history, identity and tradition’.89 This draws a clear link between 
the culture and history of Europe and the EU and European identity, and the importance 
of interaction, a key focus of social constructivist study, is also emphasised in looking at 
‘a European heritage that transcends the history of each nation, reflecting the intense 
interaction and rich exchanges that have linked us for centuries’.90 These themes were 
echoed in a number of the answers given by interviewees, with some suggesting that the 
cultural and historical basis to identity goes beyond the creation of shared values. Many 
of the respondents point to particular aspects of shared European culture. Godfrey 
Bloom highlights the architectural similarities between cathedrals throughout Europe 
suggesting that ‘[i]t’s difficult for that not to seep into the pores’ and pointing to a 
‘cultural bond’.91 John Bowis points to ‘a feeling of the culture of Europe, which is 
literary, it’s music, it’s fashion, it’s all sorts of things’,92 while Richard Corbett speaks of 
‘an awful lot of cultural overlap and affinity, and shared history’.93  
 
Despite these suggestions of shared culture the opinion is not held unanimously. Fiona 
Hall talks of the cultural diversity of the EU, particularly after the Eastern expansion, 
pointing instead to regional cultural similarities,94 while Bill Newton Dunn points out 
that ‘we don’t say to the Turks or the Croatians or the Icelanders or anybody “do you 
like classical music?”, we don’t say that at all’, going on to reiterate the criteria of equal 
rights, democracy, rule of law and the separation of powers.95 Although this is a valid 
point I would suggest that the relationship between culture and identity is a more subtle 
and nuanced one than this suggestion would allow. The shared history and culture, 
amplified by the high level of interaction within the European Parliament, creates and 
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transmits norms of appropriate behaviour to MEPs and others within the EU, going 
some way to determining interests. The effect of these norms would be exerted 
subconsciously, so there would be no element of asking candidate countries how similar 
their culture was to a perceived European one. 
  
In the case of Turkey, concerns relating to factors of culture have been raised in the 
European Parliament. Monika Flašíková Beňová argues that Turkey does face difficulty 
in relation to ‘differences compared to European culture, tradition and values’96, while 
Barry Madlener goes as far as to claim that ‘a backward Islamic culture has no place in 
Europe’.97 Interviewees point back to the fall of Constantinople in 145398 and ‘the Turks 
at the gate in the Ottoman days’99 as being in the minds of people within Europe and 
ideas like these would cast Turkey in the role as the “Other” compared to a Europe with 
shared history and culture. This again does not go uncontested, with MEPs arguing that 
‘Turkey’s historic affiliation with Europe is undeniable’100 and that Turkey ‘took the 
first steps to adopting European values almost 100 years ago and, despite the various 
historical winds, it did not go off the road’.101 Richard Corbett points out that:  
 
Turkey has been part of European history for 400 years or so, a large part of 
Southeastern Europe was part of Turkey, Istanbul is still Europe’s largest city. It’s been 
integrated into the European context from the Council of Europe to its charter of human 
rights which is a set of common values. 
 
One of the most contentious issues within the field of European identity is religion. It is 
often mentioned that ‘[t]here is no religious yardstick to evaluate a candidate 
country’’102 and that Article 49 of the TEU does not have religious criteria, and this is 
true but for the ambiguity of the term ‘European’. It is clear from my research that for 
some of those within the European Parliament religion has a role to play in European 
identity, indeed Barry Madlener’s comments above clearly demonstrate that religion is 
inseparable from identity in the minds of some. Although it appears to be a minority 
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view, there are some within the European Parliament for whom Christianity still forms 
an important component to identity, for Mara Bizzotto, European ‘unity depends, above 
all else, on the spirit of Christianity’.103 Miroslaw Piotrowski argues that ‘Christianity 
was, and still is, a fundamental value of the European Union. Based on this value, the 
European Union was built by Christian democrats’,104 while Simon Busuttil describes 
Europe as ‘the cradle of Christianity’.105 Although this viewpoint is clearly present 
within the European Parliament it appears to be a minority one, Victor Boştinaru urges 
the European Parliament ‘not to let our prejudgement based on religion, ethnicity and 
clichés to speak’106 while Richard Howitt goes further, stating of those who oppose 
Turkish membership of the EU that ‘many of you are motivated by religious intolerance 
against Islam and seeking your own political advantage by deliberately creating false 
fears about immigration. These arguments are loathsome and repellant and so are 
you’.107 This argument is echoed by a questionnaire respondent who talks of 
Islamophobia and suggests that Turkey has a very low chance of becoming a member of 
the EU due to prejudice against Muslims. While it is clear from these statements that a 
direct religious component of European identity is not a universally held view, it is 
undeniably present.  
 
An alternative viewpoint is suggested by Richard Corbett who argues that far from 
being a religious base to identity, it is pluralism of religion and the separation of religion 
from state which is important in European identity. Similarly, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram 
expresses her ‘shock’ at religious arguments being employed against Turkey, suggesting 
that ‘Members have called into question the fundamental rights of the European Union, 
including the right to freedom of religion and of expression’.108 From this viewpoint the 
fact that Turkey is a secular state would bring it towards European identity, but 
questions remain regarding Turkey’s commitment to religious pluralism. It is widely 
noted in the European Parliament that freedom of religion is restricted in Turkey and 
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that rights for the Christian minority are restricted.109 Tunne Kelam observes that ‘I 
could feel comfortable with Turkish accession when it is as easy to build a Christian 
church in Ankara as it is to erect a mosque in Brussels’.110 The importance of religion, 
religious practice and pluralism within the EU and European identity are keenly debated 
but it is clear that there is a role to play for religion in debates on identity and, at least 
for some, religious norms will have a role to play in decision making. 
 
Although the degree to which religion directly influences European identity is debated 
and highly contentious there is more widespread support for a historical and cultural 
influence of religion on European identity. It is argued that ‘the European values of 
solidarity, subsidiarity and freedom are unthinkable without a foundation in Christianity 
and in the Judaeo-Christian understanding of religion’,111 and that ‘Europeans today, as 
never before, need to draw on the traditions of our continent – Europe was built on 
Judaeo-Christian foundations, and these became, and were for centuries, the basis of the 
continent’s cultural strength’.112 Godfrey Bloom tentatively agrees with the description 
of the EU as a “Christian club” but relates it to ‘the Christian ethos’,113 and points to the 
importance of religion, but not ‘with a capital R’. For John Purvis ‘the Christian 
religion…is a very basic element of European identity. Even if you’re an atheist or a 
humanist you’re probably still basically Christian by culture’.114 This viewpoint of a 
religious basis to European culture and the founding ideology and values of the EU 
recurs throughout debates in the European Parliament, with the implication that the 
percentage of the population who actually practices irrelevant to the cultural legacy and 
inheritance of Christianity within the EU. In the 15th Century Europe became 
synonymous with Christendom,115 and for some that association has continued into 
viewing Europe as a modern Christendom. Although there has been a strong Jewish 
presence in Europe for a long time, and there are a large number of members of many 
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other faiths, including Islam, living in Europe, the association between Europe and 
Christianity is reflected strongly by respondents, and this is indicative of the continued 
importance of Christian norms. 
 
The religious element of European identity is not only comprised of these Christian 
norms, but has served to establish in the minds of some an “Other” on religious 
grounds. Throughout debates in the European Parliament are references to the 
distinction between European identity and the ‘Islamic world’, with Europe referred to 
as ‘Christendom’.116 Charles Tannock cites concern over ‘Turkey’s membership of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), where such common Western values as 
we all share in the European Union are not evident because the OIC cites Sharia law as 
a basis for human rights in the Islamic world’.117 For others this distinction appears to 
be subconscious, Lorenzo Fontana argues against Turkish membership of the EU on the 
grounds that ‘Turkey is becoming more and more Islamic and Ankara is actually a 
leading member of the largest international pan-Islamic organization, the OIC’,118 while 
Andrey Kovatchev recounts feeling ‘deeply uneasy about the risk of Turkey’s domestic 
and foreign policy taking an Islamic slant’.119 Although both these MEPs express 
concern relating to the Islamic nature of Turkey, neither explains how this undermines 
the Turkish application. The historical aspect of religion is once again emphasised, with 
references to a Judaeo-Christian basis for European values and identity, although it is 
acknowledged that this originated within the Middle East but has been ‘taken over by 
Europe’.120 It is interesting to note that when asked about the values which best 
represent the European Union, only 3% of the  public in member states chose religion, 
while 10% of the public polled in Turkey believed that religion represented the EU.121 
Although this will not influence decision making in the European Parliament it could 
perhaps be viewed as a perception in Turkey that it is seen as the “Other” by those in 
Europe. 
 
Carl Bildt, President-in-Office of the European Council at the time of the European 
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Parliament’s debate on the 2009 enlargement strategy summed up opposition to Turkey 
by paraphrasing its opponents: ‘Turkey is too large, too complicated and too Muslim’ 
before restating that Article 49 of the TEU has no religious criteria. He goes on to rebut 
the arguments of opponents on these grounds, saying: 
 
I listened to the moving words on the Christian heritage, and there is much truth in that. 
All the Catholics and Orthodox or Protestants and Anglicans might interpret that in very 
different ways, but I would caution against defining the Jewish heritage out of Europe. 
They are not Christians, but they are, with all of the problems in our history, also part of 
our Europe of the past, the present and the future. 
 
I would also argue that it would equally be a mistake to define citizens of Muslim faith, 
be they inside our existing Member States, be they in Bosnia, be they somewhere else 
or be they in Turkey.122 
 
This is a well reasoned and rational argument, but the results of my research point to the 
perception of a shared European history based on Christianity, or on occasion Judaeo-
Christianity, and very little mention of any other religions is made. Despite the sizeable 
and ever-growing population of Muslims within the EU, the perception appears to be of 
a European identity founded in Christianity. 
 
While there is broad agreement that a European identity exists and that issues of 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, peace and justice form an important basis of 
this identity, my research suggests that this is not the limit of European identity. For 
many MEPs, there is an unbreakable link between history, culture and these 
fundamental values, and this is supported by the evidence of my primary research. 
History and culture are intertwined with the founding ideology of the EU, and are 
important facets of European identity. Similarly religion is seen by many as inextricable 
from history, culture and the values of the European Union, irrespective of the reducing 
number of practicing Christians in Europe and the removal of church from state which 
abounds in Europe. Exactly how these norms are felt will vary from person to person, 
but there is a European identity based on values, culture and history in the broadest 
terms and this identity will influence the behaviour of those who experience it. 
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The Expression of Identity 
 
My research indicates that a European identity and European norms are present within 
the European Parliament, but there is little evidence that a European identity supersedes 
or replaces a national identity, or that European politicians “go native”. Mikołaj 
Dowgielewicz describes as ‘eurosceptic nonsense’ the idea that European integration 
and enlargement leads to the loss of national identity or ‘the end of values; the end of 
Christianity – all that nonsense’.123 Katarína Neveďalová argued that it was perfectly 
possible to ‘promote the common cultural heritage of the Member States while 
respecting national and regional diversity’.124 In a personal interview, Richard Corbett 
recounted how ‘When I was an MEP people would ask me “Do you feel British or 
European?” and I said “It’s not either/or, it’s both”’,125 and for those who expressed 
belief in a European identity this was always the case. Bill Newton Dunn explained ‘I 
suppose my identity is partly what we would call locally yellow-belly, that’s the term 
for somebody in Lincolnshire. I’m partly British, I’m partly European, I’m partly 
World’. For each respondent the degree to which each identity is felt and expressed is 
dependent upon context. Many reported feeling more European when in countries 
outside Europe or outside a ‘business-cultural Anglosphere’.126 This is due to the more 
pronounced and obvious differences of culture, and the similarities within European 
cultures and European identity, moving into the realm of the “Other”, us against them. 
Richard Corbett employs a sporting example, ‘I support England in football, Britain in 
the Olympic Games and Europe in golf when we play the Americans in the Ryder Cup. 
Those gut loyalties, they’re not contradictory, they’re just different dimensions’.127 
While the given examples relate to other differences, I believe that this is indicative of 
why the case of Turkish membership prompts MEPs to invoke and challenge identity, 
because differences are perceived between Turkish and European identity. Although a 
view of identities from different levels coexisting is expressed by an overwhelming 
majority of respondents, Stephen Hughes suggests that his party, the Labour Party, 
‘regarded [him] as going native many years ago’ and that there are ‘individuals who, 
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when it comes to the love of the idea of Europe would express very similar views to me, 
although they come from different political backgrounds’.128 He does concede that for 
some actors within the European Parliament multiple identities can exist, and suggests 
that there has been a blurring of his national identity with ‘regional, local [and] national 
ambiguities’,129 which could be viewed as the expression of norms from multiple bases 
within one identity, and he argues that the European Union has a role in clarifying this 
identity. 
 
In the same way, within the European Parliament itself norms of European identity 
interact with those of national identity in a complex way. There is broad agreement that 
the degree to which European identity is felt is based on context, as well as varying 
from individual to individual. 
 
I think I can be…Scottish, British, European, there’s probably a scale, everybody has 
their own scale. Possibly someone who is actually working in the European 
Commission or something actually feels more European than they do British or 
Scottish, someone in Scotland, working on a building site in Edinburgh probably thinks 
of themselves more Scottish than they do British or European. So it’s really a rather 
personal thing, but I think there’s an element in one’s total identity as being part 
European.130 
 
The indication from my research is that the behaviour and interests of those working 
together at a European level, such as in the European Parliament, are more greatly 
influenced by norms of European identity than those working at national level. Even the 
questionnaire respondent who answered that there was no European identity suggested 
that there was a commonality amongst MEPs’ researchers and advisors based on their 
work. The effects of the European Parliament itself will be discussed in more detail in a 
subsequent section but, as a social constructivist approach would anticipate, identity is 
perceived by those within it to be felt more strongly in the European Parliament than by 
the general public in EU member states. This is to be expected given the high degree of 
interaction with those from other nations amongst actors operating at the European level 
who will be subject to socialization within the institutions of the EU. This will be 
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examined in greater detail in the following chapters. 
 
As anticipated, the degree to which identity is felt within the European parliament varies 
depending on the competence and the issues under discussion. Although, as pointed out 
earlier, arguments of identity do permeate into debates within areas where it might not 
be anticipated, an analysis of debates within the European Parliament shows clearly that 
arguments of identity are raised more often within debates concerning, or requiring the 
generation of, a common European Parliament position. The issue of enlargement 
certainly fits this criterion, and arguments relating to identity are prevalent in debates in 
this area. Fiona Hall points to the level of cooperation in a particular policy area 
influencing the strength of identity in that area,131 and that is consistent with a social 
constructivist framework for identity. She suggests that ‘there will be some issues in 
which everybody is working together with a very strong sense of European identity’,132 
and issues which require a collective European position, such as climate change, dealing 
with international organised crime and terrorism, are regularly commented on as being 
areas in which identity is felt particularly strongly. It is also argued that this close 
cooperation and the need for a single, coherent European voice in the international 
system are driving forces to the construction and amplification of European identity 
throughout the European Union. John Bowis suggests that ‘increasingly with things like 
the Lisbon agenda I think it seems Europe has more of a common interest vis-à-vis the 
emerging nations, like India and China, as much as America and Australia’133 while Bill 
Newton Dunn stated that ‘we’re all tiny countries in Europe. Germany may have 70 
million [inhabitants] but that’s peanuts compared to the BRIC countries as they’re put, 
and the Americans. So hard-headed reality, Europeans have to work together’.134 While, 
as Mr. Newton Dunn points out, working together in Europe can be ‘hard-headed 
reality’, there is also a normative component, and the evidence of my research is that 
this cooperation strengthens European identity, as well as increasing the relative 
importance of European norms when compared to national norms. Mr. Newton Dunn 
goes on to assert that:  
 
I’d love to come back in 100 years time and I hope by then Europe will have its own 
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President…an Obama figure for Europe who will speak for Europe and say ‘we’re 500 
million people and you guys had better listen to us’ and it doesn’t matter if he’s a Turk 
or a Frenchman or a Brit.135 
 
Although analysis of European Parliament debates suggests that this comment is not 
representative of MEPs in general it is indicative of the presence of a European identity 
dictating the boundaries of who can cooperate and making even the thought of such 
cooperation a possibility. Without shared norms and identity working together would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, and the EU has served to highlight important norms 
which constitute identity and define which countries can cooperate based on the 
presence or absence of such norms. This will be an important factor when assessing the 
application of Turkey to join the EU. 
 
Another way in which European identity and norms are influenced by policy area is the 
degree to which identity is invoked and challenged. ‘[I]dentity is not fundamental to 
your consumer protection legislation or your environmental standards for instance, 
which accounts for a good chunk of EU legislation, but is perhaps more of an issue 
when you’re discussing home affairs issues, in particular immigration and asylum 
law…and arguably foreign policy from time to time’.136 Debates over issues of this 
nature draw heavily on norms of identity as there is challenge to the identity and the 
possibility of normative change, as can be seen from the debates over EU enlargement. 
In addition to explicit reference to European identity, MEPs often phrase arguments in 
such debates in terms of “values”, or with specific reference to the components of 
identity outlined above. In some cases there are areas of debate and decision making for 
which a novel normative consensus is required, and these areas will provide particularly 
dense normative environments, in accordance with the mechanisms outlined in the 
literature review chapter. 
 
European Parliament debates on the enlargement of the EU fulfil both the criteria above, 
a common position is required, and it is also a policy area in which identity is invoked 
and challenged. The degree to which norms of European identity influence actor 
preference and behaviour in the enlargement process will form a later section of my 
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analysis, but I believe enlargement is an area in which norms are strongly felt and 
expressed. Unanimity amongst member states, and a successful vote in the European 
Parliament are required for any country to become a member and, while a member state 
will have its own reasons for supporting or opposing a country’s accession a common 
position for the EU is required for the accession process to succeed.  For the challenge 
to identity of enlargement it is only necessary to look at previous enlargements. All the 
respondents who believed that there was a European identity agreed that the identity 
was dynamic. The most cited reason given for the identity change which has occurred 
was the accession of new member states. Even those countries which are most similar to 
the established European identity will influence it, and the view the EU has of itself 
changes with each enlargement. The perceived challenge to European identity will be 
felt particularly acutely in those countries which are furthest removed from the 
European identity as it stands, and so debate will be highly normatively charged in 
relation to these countries, especially in the areas of the greatest perceived difference. 
The Christian component of European identity has not been greatly discussed in the 
preparation for previous enlargements as this was not deemed to be under challenge, but 
it has greatly increased in prominence in the case of Turkey, a Muslim country. An 
example of this is found in this statement by Zoltán Balczó during the European 
Parliament debate on the 2009 progress report on Turkey: 
 
With regard to the accession of Turkey, there is a fundamental question to be clarified: 
what do we consider the European Union to be? Do we consider the values, the shared 
European values, important? These values are based on the teachings of Christianity, 
irrespective of the proportion of actively religious people. Do we deem the cultural 
heritage of Europe important as a cohesive force? If the answer is ‘yes’, Turkey has no 
place in the European Union.137 
 
This statement accords with other statements recounted earlier, and references to 
religion are much more prominent in European Parliament debates relating to Turkey 
than those concerning previous enlargements or other candidate countries. 
 
Having established that a European identity existed, at least in the eyes of some of those 
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involved in the European Parliament, I have looked at the way this identity is felt and 
expressed. I have found very little evidence for MEPs going native, or completely 
adopting a European identity at the cost of their own national identity, in the same way 
as a national identity does not replace a local identity. Each member of the European 
Parliament, as with everyone else, has multiple identities which coexist and are not 
themselves contradictory. Each identity has certain norms of appropriate behaviour 
associated with them which comprise the decisions, actions and interests of each 
individual actor. Where the individual norms are not the same, or indeed contradict each 
other, the strength of each norm and, therefore the outcome, will be dependent upon 
context, what has been termed a sliding scale of identity. Interactions within the 
European parliament go some way towards bringing European norms to the fore, but the 
strength of the European norms is based also on the policy area involved. The common 
action and challenge to identity of enlargement mean that it is an environment in which 
norms of European identity are likely to at their strongest and could influence the course 
of action which is seen as appropriate by actors within this field. 
 
Throughout this section I have looked at Turkish identity and how it is perceived to 
complement and contrast with European identity. There is disagreement amongst MEPs 
as to how compatible the identities are, and there appear to be two competing 
discourses. One discourse views Turkey as part of a separate civilisation, although this 
is not always used to its detriment, and the other views Turkey as part the ‘European 
family’.  
 
The first discourse owes much in its language to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
theory. Huntington argued that, in the wake of the end of the cold war, conflict in the 
world would be framed not in terms of ideology as the cold war had been, but in terms 
of ‘civilizations’ – ‘A civilization is...the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans 
from other species’.138 Although Huntington points to the cultural basis of civilization, 
he affords particular importance to religion, indeed in a later article he argues that ‘[i]n 
the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and 
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mobilizes people’.139 This is particularly pertinent in relation to Islam, with Huntington 
unequivocally asserting that ‘Islam has bloody borders’.140 Although Huntington’s 
analysis has gained notoriety, and the language is widely employed beyond the 
academic field,141 I exercise caution in employing it. 
 
Huntington produces a list of seven or eight major civilisations and, although he 
concedes that ‘the lines between them are seldom sharp’142 he does assert that ‘they are 
real’.143 I believe that a distinction between “western” and “Islamic” civilisations does 
not hold in the case of Turkey, a secular state with close ties to Europe and the Arabic 
world. Although Huntington briefly addresses the role of Turkey as a ‘torn country’,144 I 
do not believe that his model allows for the nuance necessary for an understanding of 
Turkish identity and its relation to European identity. Indeed more broadly, I believe that 
it is problematic to provide such clear cut boundaries between groups. Huntington’s 
definition of a civilisation as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest 
level of cultural identity people have’ does not take into account the context dependent 
nature of identity, in that this could bring together different civilisations concurrently 
given different stimuli. Indeed Kirkpatrick suggests that Huntington’s suggestion of 
civilisations is ‘a strange list’,145 while Said goes as far as to suggest that ‘the problem 
with unedifying labels like Islam and the West [is that] they mislead and confuse the 
mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality’.146 In a similar way 
Huntington does not directly address the issue of Muslims living within Europe, and the 
possible coexistence of conflicting civilisational identities. 
 
With Huntington’s argument of the growth in importance of civilisations comes the 
implication that the nation state will reduce in importance. This is countered by Ajami 
who states ‘let us be clear: civilizations do not control states, states control 
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civilisations’.147 I am cautious of both extremes of this argument. Although I am looking 
at the concept of European identity within the European Parliament, I do not argue that 
the nation state ceases to be important in International Relations, rather that social 
constructivist concepts have an important role to play within international institutions. 
 
Although I do not agree with Huntington’s analysis, and I believe that his treatment of 
Islam is unhelpful, he does bring an element of identity into his model. Indeed 
Huntington argues that the ‘European Community rests on the shared foundation of 
European culture and Western Christianity’148 and, although I believe this is again an 
over simplification of a complicated picture, Huntington has influenced the debate on 
Turkish membership of the EU. Through the construction of places outside Europe, 
particularly the Muslim world, as the “Other” there is a move towards the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ hypothesis, with the differences being emphasized, often with similarities 
downplayed and it is within this discourse that the vast majority of Turkey’s opponents 
subconsciously position themselves. References to a “European civilisation” can be 
found within European Parliament debates, particularly regarding enlargement149, and 
Jaroslav Paška stated in the European parliament ‘I believe that the process of 
convergence of civilisations will be complicated and lengthy and it will be simple 
neither for us nor for Turkish society’,150 although he did not rule out Turkish accession. 
For many others Turkey is a ‘non-European and Islamic state’.151 As well as the talk of a 
clash of civilisations between Europe and the Muslim world, the concepts of East and 
West are raised. In areas where Turkey moves away from Europe, it is described as ‘de-
Westernising Turkey’152 and European values are sometimes referred to as Western 
values.153 Before taking up his role as President of the European Council Herman van 
Rompuy argued that ‘Turkey is not part of Europe and will never be part of Europe’.154 
This discourse is not entirely negative towards Turkish accession however, as it is seen 
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by some as a way of bridging the gap between civilisations and avoiding the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ hypothesised by Huntington. ‘Turkey is the most Western of Eastern 
states and the most Eastern of Western states, so its unique role is not only European but 
global’,155 and Olli Rehn, former European Commissioner for Enlargement, argued that 
‘Turkey plays a key role in…the dialogue between civilisations’,156 a viewpoint shared 
by Enikő Győri.157 Although these viewpoints are backed up by similar norms, those 
positioning Turkey as the outsider, it is through the interaction of different norms that 
appropriate action is decided, and so similar norms can produce markedly different 
results in different actors. 
 
The alternative discourse sees Turkey as part of the European family, and this discourse 
downplays the differences between the Turkish identity and European identity. Although 
this is outlined less often than the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ discourse it appears to be 
tacitly accepted by a number of MEPs. There is broad agreement within the European 
Parliament that, subject to strict conditions, Turkey is eligible for membership of the 
EU. This discourse is obscured somewhat by a confusion of terminology, not least the 
use of Europe and European Union interchangeably by some MEPs. Marietta 
Giannakou claims that ‘It is a fact that Europe can and has the right to continue to 
enlarge’,158 when presumably she refers to the enlargement of the European Union and 
terms like ‘European family’ are used by some MEPs to mean the member states of the 
EU and by others in reference to all the ‘like minded’ countries of Europe. For some, 
accession marks entry into the European family,159 while for others membership of the 
EU is not a necessary condition of being in the family.160 Wojciech Michal Olejniczak 
talks of the fall of the iron curtain and the accession of Eastern European countries as 
the time when ‘the countries of Central and Eastern Europe came into the European 
family’,161 although it is not clear whether, for him, the joining of the family came at the 
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moment of enlargement or with the move away from Soviet values towards the 
European identity. In the same debate Rovana Plumb stated that she ‘support[s] the 
request made to Ankara to make more effort in the reform process so that it can join the 
European club’,162 and there is a similar ambiguity here. It is not clear from this 
statement whether membership of this European club comes directly through the reform 
process or if it is only achieved through accession. 
 
Perhaps the clearest statement of the latter discourse comes from Cristian Dan Preda 
who asserts unequivocally that ‘Turkey is clearly a member of the European family’, 
although he then goes on to say that it ‘is an important partner in the dialogue between 
civilisations’.163 The degree to which European identity corresponds with Turkish 
identity is debated within the European Parliament and this is reflected in different 
discourses on Turkey’s relationship with the EU. For a clear, common position to 
emerge will require the ongoing debate over these discourses and, ultimately, for one 
discourse to prevail. The effect of arguments of identity, and of these discourses, on 
attitudes towards the Turkish membership bid will be discussed in a later section, but it 
is clear that different individuals have different ideas as to how similar the identities are. 
This will to a large degree depend on the strength of European identity felt and the 
relative strength afforded to different norms. 
 
The analysis of European Parliament debates, supported by the primary research I have 
conducted, has indicated the presence of a European identity within the European 
Parliament which has widespread, but not universal, acknowledgement. Although 
European identity is not universally recognised it is sufficiently prevalent amongst 
MEPs to make it an important factor within the EP and, I believe, justifies an 
investigation of its scope and influence. Even if norms associated with European 
identity are not felt by all members of the European Parliament a significant number 
influenced by the norms will have an observable effect on actor interest and attitude. 
The fact that some members of the European Parliament do not recognise a European 
identity does not preclude the possibility of their actions being influenced by norms as 
well, social constructivist notions of identity and normative action afford the possibility 
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of norms working at a subconscious level and, as such, they would not necessarily be 
noticed by those influenced by them. I argue that ideas such as democracy and human 
rights which are, I assume, supported by all members of the European Parliament have a 
normative basis, so even those MEPs who do not believe in identity will be influenced 
by these norms. 
 
It is clear that although reference is made to a single European identity the actual 
expression of that identity varies from individual to individual. There are basic elements 
which comprise the identity, the founding ideology of the EU, the drive to enlargement, 
culture and religion but the norms associated with these factors vary in strength and so 
the ‘Logic of Appropriateness’ dictates that this would produce different behaviour and 
preferences in the actors. I have found no evidence that a European identity overrides all 
previously held norms from national or regional level, but that an actor can experience 
and be influenced by multiple levels of norms simultaneously and indeed can have 
multiple identities concurrently. In any given situation norms of regional, national and 
European identity will be present and the applicability and strength of the norms of each 
identity will vary depending on the situation. The strength of European identity and 
norms vary in relation to other identities by policy area, with European norms at their 
strongest in areas which challenge European identity, require a novel normative 
response or require the greatest cooperation and speaking with a single European voice. 
I believe that this justifies an investigation of European enlargement, which fulfils all of 
these criteria, and particularly the membership bid of Turkey where these factors will be 
at their strongest. 
 
I have found support amongst members of the institutions of the EU for a dynamic 
European identity and for one which is different now from the ‘founding ideology’ of 
the EU. For this reason I have attempted to get a ‘snapshot’ of identity as it stands now 
within the EU in the knowledge that this will not remain static, but will give me an 
indication of the influences on decision making at the present moment. The concept of a 
dynamic identity also justifies looking at the challenge of Turkish identity to European 
identity, how European identity might change with Turkish accession and how both 
European and Turkish identity change in the negotiation process. 
 
In his hearing before the European Parliament Commissioner-Designate Füle claimed 
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that in the field of enlargement ‘the time of zero-sum games is over, and that what we 
are looking for is a win-win situation for everyone’, and this reflection of social 
constructivist theory is indicative of the European identity expressed in the field. Hans-
Gert Pöttering explained that: 
 
The European dimension has always been an important component of identity-building 
processes in Europe especially since the beginning of the post 1945 integration process. 
We should nevertheless keep in mind that most of the national identities developed over 
centuries. Hence it is natural that this development is an equally continuous process on 
the European level and that it is, of course, not finalized after 60 years.164 
 
This is an eloquent explanation of European identity and the degree to which it is 
challenged within the European Parliament. Although European identity is built on 
relatively stable norms, after just 60 years of debate within the EP it can still be 
challenged and reformed as it is in the face of the negotiations for Turkish accession. 
Although the treaties of the EU do not speak specifically of a European identity, this 
statement by the European Commission describes the foundation, ambiguity and 
dynamic nature of European identity: ‘The term ‘European’ combines geographical, 
historical and cultural elements which all contribute to European identity…[which] is 
subject to review by each succeeding generation’.165 This is of particular relevance in 
the field of enlargement where membership is restricted to ‘European’ countries. 
 
It has become clear throughout my research that specificity is required when looking at 
identity in the European Union. Although I have highlighted issues of identity within 
the European Parliament, it is apparent that the terms ‘European identity’, ‘European 
Union identity’ and ‘European Parliament identity’ are not necessarily synonymous, 
despite the ambiguity of terms used by actors. While similarities certainly exist amongst 
these identities, indeed I believe that it is possible for one actor to express these 
different identities in different situations, they are not exactly the same. For this reason, 
and in accordance with social constructivist theory, it is very important to study the 
institutions themselves, in this case the European Parliament, when addressing the 
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identities of the actors which comprise them. Similarly, as indicated in the methodology 
section, it is problematic to attempt to quantify or measure identity. Identity and the 
influence of norms are personal things which will vary from individual to individual and 
they are also highly context dependent, so it is difficult to put into figures the strength of 
norms. It is therefore necessary for me to assess the relative strength of norms and the 
resulting identity in relation to interests, attitudes and outcomes, and this will be 
achieved through an analysis of the degree to which norms and interests influence the 
behaviour and preferences of actors in enlargement. To this end I will focus on the 
institution of the European Parliament and its influence on identity (the following 
chapter), and look at the issue of EU enlargement and Turkish accession (the 
penultimate chapter).  
 
This chapter has addressed the first two research questions set out earlier. The research 
has established the presence of European identity within the European Parliament and 
the nature of that identity. The European identity experienced by MEPs is dynamic and, 
although based in the founding ideology of the European Union, this is not a sufficient 
basis for understanding contemporary identity. An analysis of European Parliament 
debates, supported by interviews and correspondence, have indicated that identity is 
based in norms of democracy, human rights, rule of law and peace, but that culture, and 
religion also play an important role in identity. Crucially this chapter has also pointed to 
the role of European identity and norms as being experienced alongside other norms, 
highlighting the need to analyse the behaviour and attitudes of MEPs in order to 
understand the strength and applicability of different norms. 
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The European Parliament and Identity 
 
In the literature review chapter I indicated the importance attached to institutions within 
social constructivist theory, and a thorough understanding of identity within the 
European Parliament requires an investigation of the institution itself. In this chapter I 
will analyse the role of the European Parliament in the creation and spread of norms, 
and in actor identity. The European Parliament has a number of different but 
complimentary roles to play in the constitution of MEP identity, and it is important that 
these are stated and analysed in order fully to understand how norms influence the 
identity of actors within the European Parliament. The move away from viewing 
institutions as intervening variables means that, although I believe general theories can 
be established, there is a degree to which every institution is unique. This results in a 
specificity of normative frameworks and identity, which will be addressed through this 
analysis. 
 
Earlier in this thesis I established my definition of an institution as “rules, enforcement 
characteristics of rules and norms of behaviour which manifest as a relatively stable set 
or structure of identities and interests”,1 and this is the definition I intend to apply to the 
European Parliament and, more broadly, to the European Union as a whole. Although it 
appears tempting, and at first glance simpler, to demarcate the European Parliament 
based on what is set out in the Treaties of the European Union; it quickly becomes clear 
that within a social constructivist framework those boundaries are insufficient. The rules 
and regulative norms in the Treaties which govern the EU institutions form only one 
part of the normative rulebook, and it is in shedding light on the rest of these rules that 
social constructivism has value to add in study of the European Parliament and, 
ultimately, when studying institutions elsewhere in the international political sphere. 
While social constructivists do not dispute the presence of material facts relating to the 
European Union and its constituent bodies, it is the social facts surrounding them which 
give the institutions meaning.  The history of the EU has resulted in the creation of 
intersubjective meanings and the social generation of knowledge which form the 
broader, social constructivist image of EU institutions. ‘[T]he fairly elaborate 
development of the internal organization of the EP – which is entirely under the control 
of the MEPs themselves – helps to underscore the general point that this institution is 
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more than just a “talking shop”’.2 
 
Alongside, and inextricably linked to, the theoretical challenges social constructivism 
brings to looking at the institutions of the EU, I will be looking at the strength of 
identity within the European Parliament particularly. There is a widespread belief 
amongst my interviewees and questionnaire respondents that European identity is felt 
more strongly within the institutions of the European Union, and the European 
Parliament particularly,3 than in the population of EU member states as a whole, 
although whether this is a positive or negative is debated.4 Although this is, of course, 
something which is very difficult to assess through an analysis of European Parliament 
debates, there does seem to be a greater recourse to European identity in the EP than 
with the population at large. It would not be accurate to suggest that all MEPs subscribe 
to the idea of a European identity, but statements made during EP debates regularly refer 
to and invoke European identity, a 2010 Eurobarometer survey found that European 
identity meant ‘a lot’ to just 18% of those surveyed,5 while the European Union fairs 
worse, with Gerard Batten suggesting that ‘the European Union is becoming 
increasingly unpopular with citizens across the continent’.6 Through the employment of 
a social constructivist research framework I intend to ascertain why identity is felt more 
strongly within the institutions of the EU and this will lead on to an investigation of the 
effect of European norms on the identity and interests of actors. 
 
As I outlined above, social constructivists and rationalists have greatly different 
interpretations of international institutions. The “thin” view of institutions subscribed to 
by rational choice scholars affords institutions the role of arenas for bargaining and 
constraints on agent actions, a strategic context for rational choices. As Checkel puts it 
‘In this thin conception, institutions are a structure that actors run into, go ‘ouch’ and 
then recalculate how, in the presence of the structure, to achieve their interests; they are 
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an intervening variable’.7 Although a view of the European Parliament in these terms is 
largely refuted by my research, Martin Callanan MEP does see the Parliament in this 
way. For him, ‘people talk about the great European project and ploughing on and 
taking in more countries, but when it comes to the difficult decisions, they always err on 
the side of caution and look towards their national interests...when it comes down to the 
nitty-gritty of what these policies mean in terms of the individual member states 
everybody is fighting for their own country and their own interests and it always breaks 
down into nationalistic arguments’.8 Although this view is present, when he sees this 
attitude emerge, Ioan Mircea Paşcu feels the need to point out that ‘[a]lthough each 
country is free to pursue its national interest, let us not forget that there is no integration 
without a minimal solidarity and that the bad feelings accumulated today might burst 
out tomorrow’,9 suggesting not only that this behaviour is rare, but that it is ultimately 
counterproductive. Far better represented is the view expressed by Richard Corbett that 
‘the very interesting thing about the European Parliament is that of course it doesn’t sit 
in national delegations, it sits by political affinity, party political groups. That’s 
interesting because it means that the main way of looking at things is not necessarily, 
first and foremost, looking at the national interest, and trying to find the national 
angle...but to look at things more politically’,10 and this is more in line with a “thicker” 
view of institutions subscribed to by social constructivists. 
 
The “thick” view of institutions is at the other extreme of the spectrum from the rational 
choice understanding of institutions, affording institutions the power to constitute the 
participant actors, and are both composed of and provide intersubjective 
understandings. Where institutions are merely an intervening variable in the eyes of a 
rational choice scholar, to a social constructivist ‘as variables, institutions become 
independent – and strongly so’.11 The composition and function of the European 
Parliament is set out in the EU treaties, but under the definition of institutions which I 
am using, a social constructivist definition, the EP amounts to a great deal more than 
this. The social facts which comprise the reality of actors within the institutions are 
based on intersubjective knowledge and ideas, and the institutions themselves are 
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embedded social practices and routines which regulate the behaviour of actors and 
comprise the “rules of the game”. John Bowis OBE described the European Parliament 
as ‘a living organism’12 and throughout the majority of debates in the European 
Parliament MEPs use “we” to refer to the European Parliament, a sentiment echoed by 
interviewees. Practices have also changed and evolved within the European Parliament 
without a change in written, regulative norms. Although the right of legislative initiative 
was originally held by the Commission there has been a move towards the Commission 
responding to the European Parliament’s recommendations in this area, leading former 
President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering to suggest that the Parliament 
now has a de facto right of initiative.13  
 
Further evidence of these shared understandings is seen within the political parties of 
the European Parliament, ‘15 years ago, PES as an idea was a bit of a joke quite frankly 
because we would deliberate endlessly, not on policy formulation, but every 5 years on 
the formation of the manifesto. The process would take anywhere up to a year and at the 
end of the process practically every national delegation would have a whole list of 
footnotes, caveats, “everybody except us agrees...”. That’s not the case now. The last 
manifesto we all signed up to, the language was nuanced but the footnotes were gone, 
so it’s a lot better.’14 While there is a utilitarian advantage to having a coherent 
manifesto and policy base, this was also true 15 years ago, and I believe it is through 
shared understandings and socialisation within the institution that this has become 
possible.  Stephen Hughes agrees, going on to state that ‘even with the more reluctant 
national parties it’s a lot better, there’s a real willingness to try and work together and to 
pool our best ideas on the way we move forward’.15 During an EP debate concerning 
rules regarding the funding of European political parties it was argued that ‘when 
European elections take place, political parties are generally considered to pursue the 
interests of their national state and not the interests of Europe as a whole’,16 where 
actually ‘[p]olitical parties at the European level have...been in existence for a long time 
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now. They are not just federations of national parties. They have their own agenda, a 
European agenda, and they are an integral part of European political life’.17 Although 
this viewpoint does not gain universal support within the EP, notably from many of 
those opposed to European integration, it does form the majority viewpoint. 
 
Key to the social constructivist conception of institutions is the mutual constitution of 
agent and structure, taking the mantra “membership matters” to its extreme.  As an 
institution is formed by and comprised of the intersubjective understandings of its 
members, the form of the institutions, and its normative frameworks, are dependent 
upon the actors which comprise it. Similarly, however, the actors within an institution 
are subject to the normative pressures exerted by the institution and these norms and 
shared understandings constitute the interests and identities of the actors. In this way 
neither the actor nor the structure is ontologically primitive. Giddens claims that 
‘[a]nalysing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such 
systems, grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon 
rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in 
interaction’, and this leads to his claim that ‘the structural properties of social systems 
are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise’.18  This duality 
of structure forms the beginning of an explanation for why European identity is felt 
more strongly within the European Parliament than within the wider populace of 
Europe. The very institution in which the actors are situated is constituted by the shared 
understandings of Europe and the European identity and this in turn constituted the 
MEPs. Stephen Hughes speaks of ‘the love of the idea of Europe’ within the European 
Parliament, and suggests that ‘[i]nside the European Parliament it’s not surprising that 
that should be in the vanguard because...we are in the business of trying to build 
consensus that involves rich variation of historical traditions’.19 This constitutive power 
is also acknowledged by opponents of European Union, although it is spoken of in 
different terms, of a Eurocracy, removed from ordinary members of the European 
Union. Gawain Towler speaks of ‘third generation eurocrats’, born to parents of 
different nationalities in a third country, surrounded by other Eurocrats they are, quite 
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naturally “European”, he goes on to state that ‘I’m not saying they’re bad people but 
they’re so removed from the people in pubs in London or in any other member state 
there’s no way they can represent these people’,20 and this is a point echoed by Godfrey 
Bloom MEP. This rare point of agreement between two polarised positions could, 
perhaps, be seen as indicative of a widespread acknowledgement of the impact of norms 
within the European Parliament, if not of all actors, of a sizeable number. 
 
While the mutual constitution of agents and structures in the institutions of the 
European Union allows a more nuanced view of the European Parliament and MEP 
identities and interests, it is important to be aware that, as discussed with identity earlier, 
this means that a view of EU institutions can only represent a “snapshot”. Although 
social constructivist theory emphasises the relative stability of institutions, the 
normative basis affords the possibility of evolution and institutional change without 
treaty change, so to treat my findings concerning the institutions as definite and 
unchanging would be a mistake. 
 
Socialisation in the European Parliament 
 
Key to the social constructivist notion of identity change (and, by extension, interest 
change) is the concept of socialisation. Checkel defines socialisation as ‘a process of 
inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained 
compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community 
rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of 
consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is 
quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions’.21 
Although I broadly follow Checkel’s definition I do not believe, certainly in the case of 
socialization of European norms, that the socialisation results in a switch from a logic of 
consequences to a logic of appropriateness. The initial adherence to a logic of 
consequences implies that before the norms were socialised there were no pre-existing 
norms, or that they were not strong enough to influence actions. I believe that actors 
entering the EU institutions are already subject to norms, that is they are not a 
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“normative vacuum” and the European norms are socialised in addition to those norms. 
In this way MEPs are subject to different norms, and the “appropriate” action will be 
based on these norms. For those who have been strongly socialised with the European 
norms, the institution of the European Parliament will result in these norms dictating 
appropriate behaviour and European identity being expressed. Some interviewees speak 
openly and explicitly about socialisation in the European Parliament, Richard Corbett 
states that ‘within the institutions you do get, of course, quite naturally, a degree of 
socialisation. You’re working in a multi-cultural, multi-national environment, working 
together to make the system work to the benefit of its members and citizens’.22 
 
The idea of institutions socialising norms is now well established within social 
constructivism, but as Moravcsik points out, ‘without explicit theories of socialization, 
it is difficult for constructivists to develop, empirically confirm, or generalize any 
distinctive concrete claims about world politics’.23 Checkel’s response to this is to 
specify five propositions for conditions within which argumentative persuasion would 
be effective, and therefore socialisation and preference change would be likely.24  They 
are (1) ‘when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus 
cognitively motivated to analyse new information’; (2) ‘when the persuadee has few 
prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader’s message’; (3) ‘when 
the persuader is an authoritative  member of the in-group to which the persuadee 
belongs or wants to belong’; (4) ‘when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, 
instead, ‘acts out principles of serious deliberative argument’’25 and (5) ‘when the 
persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera 
settings’. I argue that to a large degree all of these factors are present within the 
European Parliament, and as such, in many cases, the possibility for identity change is 
strong. 
 
The European Union is unique in world politics, ‘Europe’s degree of integration, level 
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of political community, and pooling of sovereignty far outstrip those seen anywhere 
else’26 and, in the social constructivist understanding is an international institution itself 
comprised of institutions. For these reasons, the potential for the socialisation of norms 
within the EU is great, as outlined below. 
 
(1) ‘when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively 
motivated to analyse new information’ 
 
From their beginnings, the institutions of the EU have presented novel challenges to 
those involved in them, and it is often argued that the institutions of the EU are sui 
generis. On election as an MEP, an actor largely leaves national institutions behind and 
joins a strong, thick institution in the form of the European Parliament. As such the 
normative environment, as well as the physical environment, is different and novel 
situations must be faced and new, appropriate, actions must be decided upon. Within 
Wendt’s four-levelled description of identity,27 this shift can result in a change of “type” 
identity and “role” identity, each of which influence personal identity, which Wendt 
describes as a ‘site or platform for other identities’.28 Fiona Hall explained that ‘the 
work I’m doing day in day out, week in week out is very much that we’ve got a problem 
and we’re working together to find a solution and in that sense we do very much have a 
European identity’,29 and John Purvis suggests that ‘the bulk of the membership who 
are seriously, positively working in that organisation [the EP] think about 
themselves...representing a European identity of sorts’.30 These arguments are certainly 
supported by the evidence of European Parliament debates, where recourse to European 
identity is common, and reference is made to a collective Parliamentary voice31 and 
collective responsibility.32 Socialisation within the European Parliament has the ability 
to alter “collective” identity, altering concepts of self and other, hence the description of 
the European Parliament as ‘we’, although this leads to the question of who or what 
becomes the “Other”. 
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Alongside and concurrent with the move into the institution of the European Parliament 
is the move into European political parties. This again provides novelty and uncertainty 
to actors, and the level of interaction is high, as seating in the European Parliament is 
arranged by party rather than by nationality.  
 
I think politicians, when they first go into the European Parliament, have the usual 
political tribal mentality. “it’s my national delegation, then my political group”. That 
breaks down very quickly. Within six months even British politicians who are perhaps 
among the more confrontational and tribal in European politics take on more of a 
European identity. We will, in votes in the European Parliament, circulate separate 
whips now and again, but very infrequently. We usually take...the Social and Democrat 
group line, and that usually involves cross party debate, discussion and the negotiation 
of compromises. So there’s very much a European perspective rather than a national or 
even regional perspective. That certainly exists within the institutions...but it also exists 
increasingly in the party structures that underpin the operation of these institutions.33 
 
We have already seen the growing importance and improved functioning of European 
political parties perceived by MEPs, and as this importance increases, and with it the 
level of genuine cooperation, so will the degree of socialisation. This theme is taken up 
by Graham Watson who states that ‘within the European Parliament we sit by political 
groupings rather than national blocks. Many of us recognise that to tackle trans-national 
problems like the environment and international terrorism, we must work closely 
together’,34 and Richard Corbett agrees that this helps build European identity.35 
 
(2) ‘when the persuadee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
persuader’s message’. 
 
As I outlined earlier, I do not suggest that any member of the European Parliament 
enters the institution in a “normative vacuum”, many norms and beliefs would already 
be present and the actor would, of course, have had an existing identity. For this reason 
every actor entering the European Parliament would react slightly differently to the new 
norms, and this reaction would be based on these ‘prior, ingrained beliefs’. MEPs are 
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drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds, national political parties and political 
ideologies, and each would have a different normative framework and, indeed, attitude 
towards the European Parliament and European Union in general. Within the United 
Kingdom, an MEP from the Labour Party would have very different prior beliefs to a 
member of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Once within the European 
Parliament strength of European identity is seen to vary ‘by political ideology and party, 
perhaps even country’,36 so there is a clear suggestion that prior norms influence the 
adoption of new norms at the European level. Stephen Hughes says of MEPs ‘we all 
have a European perspective but we’re looking at it through different facets, we have 
different visions of where Europe should go’.37 
 
My research also indicates that different norms are socialised into actors within the 
European Parliament depending on pre-existing identities and norms. As I indicated 
above, MEPs join the overarching institution of the European Parliament but also the 
smaller institutions of political groupings and parties. These groupings will, to a large 
extent, be founded on the ‘prior, ingrained beliefs’ of the actors and shape identity. 
While members of UKIP and other, similar parties throughout Europe have ingrained 
beliefs against European integration and are thus much less likely to accept the 
socialised norms, their identities, particularly role identities are still shaped by 
interactions within the European Parliament. Stephen Hughes describes how ‘on any 
formal occasion the Ode to Joy will be played and we’ll all stand up and the European 
flag will be behind the President and it drives UKIP and the others apeshit, I mean they 
just go completely berserk, hooting and whistling’.38 I believe this role and these 
actions, which are deemed appropriate within the European Parliament would not be 
deemed such elsewhere, and are an indication of the socialisation of new norms at 
European level, even though they are not the norms which the majority of actors 
experience. 
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(3) ‘when the persuader is an authoritative  member of the in-group to which the 
persuadee belongs or wants to belong’ 
 
This factor is a difficult one to examine when studying norms, identities and interests 
within the European Parliament as a whole, as actors are members of the institution by 
the time they are a focus of study. The behaviour of members of UKIP outlined above 
could certainly result from the desire of new members to be accepted into an in-group, 
in this case of the euro-sceptics in the European Parliament, but this would have to be 
studied in more detail to provide definitive results. 
 
There is an indication from interviewees that longer standing members, who have been 
exposed to the socialising power of the European institutions for the longest display the 
greatest degree of European identity and the greatest adherence to EU norms. While 
experience does not necessarily lead to authority and power, these experienced members 
of the European parliament will often represent the ‘authoritative member of the in-
group’ and as such may promote socialisation in new and less experienced MEPs. The 
findings of my primary research are supported by Beauvallet and Michon, who point to 
a ‘Europeanization of the Parliamentary elite’,39 with leadership positions within the 
European Parliament requiring ‘the progressive acquisition of a real practical sense of 
Europe [which gives] individuals a fraction of this institutional charisma that is 
necessary for laying claim to the exercise of internal power’.40 This gives an idea of the 
presence of an authoritative in group, supporting the presence of a European identity 
and the socializing power this exerts in the Parliament. Although there is some 
indication of these facts in my research, there is insufficient evidence to conclusively 
support this point. It would, however, make for an interesting future research project. 
 
(4) ‘when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, ‘acts out principles of 
serious deliberative argument’’ 
 
The requirement for actors to engage in ‘serious deliberative argument’ is echoed by my 
interviewees, who point to strong European identity in areas where actors within the 
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European Parliament are not confrontational, but work together, and work to understand 
better each other’s point of view.41  
 
As in all areas of my research my data indicates that the degree to which this principal is 
followed varies greatly amongst my respondents and is closely linked to proposition (2), 
and the presence of prior norms. In a given situation where an actors’ identity is closely 
aligned with, and accepting of, European identity, and therefore there are few opposing 
norms, there appears to be a willingness to engage in serious deliberative argument. In 
these instances, language tends to be collectivist and encouraging.42 Conversely, where 
an actors’ existing identity is opposed to the European identity and European norms 
there is less willingness to search for compromise, language becomes more lecturing 
and demanding, often appearing fierce or aggressive towards those who display the 
European identity.43 Bowler and Farrell interpret these different understandings of 
appropriate behaviour, highlighted in their quantitative study of MEP attitudes, as an 
indicator that ‘in the EP we have found an example of a legislature that seems to 
function without norms’.44 Not only is this statement problematic within the definition 
of institutions I outlined earlier, I believe that it does not take into account the sub-
groups within the EP, whose differing views would cloud a quantitative study looking 
for unanimity of ‘norms of parliamentary courtesy’.45 This polarity of opinion will 
prove problematic for statistical analyses of this nature, but also for the creation of a 
consensus regarding behaviour. As the above points have shown, even if the persuader 
acts out principles of serious deliberative argument, if the persuadee disagrees with the 
principles which form the foundation of the argument the persuasion is unlikely to 
prove successful. 
 
(5) ‘when the persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more 
insulated, in-camera settings’ 
 
Although the focus of this chapter is the role of the European Parliament in European 
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identity formation, amplification and change, my data have indicated that it is not 
primarily in formal debates in the Parliament that normative factors are addressed, 
indeed the more euro-sceptic among my respondents argue that ‘there is no room for 
debate’ in the European Parliament.46 The suggestion being that the way debates are 
structured and the time divided results in MEPs having the opportunity to speak for ‘one 
and a half or two minutes, and there is no opportunity to respond or question’,47 
meaning there is little opportunity in plenary sessions for interaction which would allow 
persuasion and argument. As I have outlined earlier, however, I do not believe that the 
institution of the European Parliament begins and ends with plenary sessions and 
committee meetings, and my interviewees agree that it is largely in the ‘less politicized’ 
elements of the European Parliament that European norms are experienced and 
transmitted. 
 
Fiona Hall explains that ‘the Parliament is ahead of the people that the MEPs represent 
in terms of feeling a European identity because we work with other people from other 
countries, speaking different languages, coming from different cultures on a daily 
basis’, before going on to suggest that ‘many colleagues from other countries would 
never come into a room without shaking hands and greeting everybody who’s already 
there, you can see how you can get a reputation for standoffishness if you don’t pick up 
some of the cultural norms of other people. So in that sense, just because we’re exposed 
on a day-to-day basis to working with other people then we do develop more of a 
European identity’.48 Although this seems removed from argumentative persuasion it is 
clear that an identity based partially on cultural norms could be strengthened and spread 
in this way. This viewpoint is supported by John Purvis, who suggests that the people 
working within the European institutions will have a greater sense of European identity 
than people working exclusively within their own member state. 
 
Interaction in the European Parliament 
 
Having looked at the “specialness” of the European Parliament, it is clear that the level 
of interaction within the institutions, specifically the European Parliament, is of a very 
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dense nature. MEPs spend much of their working lives in close proximity in Brussels 
and Strasbourg, in formal and informal environments, and this density of interaction 
provides an arena for socialisation of European norms. Although it could be argued that 
this density of interaction could perhaps be matched by a national (or indeed regional) 
parliament, this density of interaction combines with an increased frequency of 
situations faced which require a new normative agreement. Along similar lines to 
Checkel’s work on argumentative persuasion is Risse’s proposed “logic of arguing”, in 
which identities and interests are challenged through their normative underpinning.  
Risse specifically identifies when norms are in conflict, ‘[t]he more the norms are 
contested, the less the logic of the situation can be captured by the statement “good 
people do X” than by “what does good mean in this situation?” or even “what is the 
right thing to do?” But how do actors adjudicate which norm applies? They argue’.49 As 
I outlined earlier, those entering the European Parliament would not be doing so in a 
state of normative vacuum, there would be many pre-existing norms. In addition to this 
it is very likely that there would be multiple competing norms at the European level. In 
situations which actors have not faced before, and there is no established role or 
“appropriate” behaviour for the given situation a precedent must be decided upon, and 
argument plays a major role in this decision-making process. In this way Risse’s logic 
of arguing is similar to Checkel’s argumentative persuasion, and the “ground rules” for 
the logic of arguing are similar to those outlined above. Where there is likely to be pre-
existing normative precedents in national parliaments this is less likely within the 
European Parliament, and debate will have the power to shape these normative 
understandings. 
 
Where Checkel argues that persuasion will be most likely to succeed when there are few 
contradictory prior norms, Risse approaches the problem from the other end. Risse 
draws on the work of Habermas to argue for the requirement of a “common lifeworld” 
for successful argumentative behaviour.50  This common lifeworld, ideally ‘provided by 
a high degree of international institutionalization in the respective issue-area’,51 allows a 
basis for argument drawing on pre-existing shared values, norms, experiences and 
identities. Within the international political arena there can be few areas where there is 
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such a strong common lifeworld as within the institutions of the European Union. 
Although, as we have seen, there are some differences between national identities, there 
is certainly a common lifeworld within Europe built upon the values of the European 
Union, the culture and history of European states and the norms of the European Union 
and constituent institutions. As such the European identity experienced within the 
institutions of the EU makes normative argumentation possible, and affords the 
possibility of normative change, refinement and amplification. In addition, recourse to 
shared norms is likely to reinforce and prioritise these norms, strengthening their 
influence. This is an example of how agent and structure can mutually constitute one 
another, and goes some way to explaining why European identity is felt significantly 
stronger within the European Parliament than within the populace of the EU at large. 
 
Risse joins Checkel in pointing to the importance of ‘dense interactions in informal, 
network-like setting’, and the ‘[u]ncertainty of interests and/or lack of knowledge about 
the situation among the actors’,52 but points to another crucial component if norms 
influencing attitudes and identities are to change, that at least one participant in the 
argument is genuinely willing to have that identity changed based on the better 
argument. ‘If everybody in a communicative situation engages in rhetoric – the speaker, 
the target and the audience – they can argue strategically until they’re blue in the face 
and still not change anyone’s mind’.53 One example of this informal, network-like 
setting which is not found in plenary, is in Parliamentary committees, and in the creation 
of reports. This is an area in which a high degree of interaction takes place, with the 
possibility of argument, persuasion and compromise.54 Different political groupings 
within the European Parliament are required to come together in committee to draw up 
reports, and this can be an arena for normative interaction. Corbett, Jacobs and 
Shackleton assert that within committee meetings ‘there is a greater informality than in 
plenary sessions’,55 while ‘assuming a central role in the establishment of the institution 
on the whole range of issues, legislative and non-legislative, that come before it’.56 
Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton go on to say say of committee meetings that ‘the 
relationship between Groups in the committees is marked by a subtle mixture of conflict 
                                                 
52
 Ibid., p.19. 
53
 Ibid, p.8. 
54
 Metin Kazak MEP, ‘Trade and economic relations with Turkey (debate)’, 20.09.2010.  
55
 Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. & Shackleton, M., 2011. The European Parliament (8th ed.). John Harper 
Publishing, London. p.153. 
56
 Ibid, p.170. 
 142 
 
and cooperation. Disagreements can be profound and can be expressed very forcibly but 
equally, there is often a strong esprit de corps which enables members to find a degree 
of consensus, particularly when the treaty provisions require absolute majorities in 
plenary that no Group alone can deliver.’57 Crucial to this understanding and esprit de 
corps developing is, they argue, ‘a degree of informality and openness within which 
relations of trust can develop that transcend political divisions’.58 This highlights not 
only the importance of informal interaction within the process of socialization in the 
European Parliament, but also the method of persuasion, building trust rather than 
demanding or lecturing. 
 
These claims of Risse and  Checkel, supported by evidence from within the European 
Parliament, that points and arguments are more likely to be persuasive if they are 
genuine normative arguments, indicates why Schimmelfennig’s ‘rhetorical action’ is 
incapable of effecting identity change. While rhetorical action is capable of influencing 
the behaviour of actors, for example by normatively entrapping them into performing 
certain actions, neither the persuader nor the persuadee within this scenario is willing to 
allow their normative framework to be influenced by the better argument. It is, of 
course, very difficult in practise to ascertain whether statements and claims made by 
MEPs within the environment of the European Parliament constitute them engaging in 
truth finding discourses, or whether they are merely employing rhetoric. From the 
evidence of European Parliament debates and personal contact with actors, I believe that 
it is quite possible that some of the claims relating to promises already made by the EU 
to Turkey backed up by references to the principal of pacta sunt servanda are instances 
of rhetorical action, but my data also demonstrate that for some members of the EU 
norms are brought to the table, debated, and compromises found. In this way I believe 
that the “logic of arguing” has a role to play in the formation and strengthening of 
European identity within the European Parliament. 
 
My data have supported the work of Checkel and Risse in suggesting that the density of 
interaction is important in socialization and norm change, but they also indicate that the 
quality of interaction is of great importance. My analysis of debate in the European 
Parliament has indicated that amongst the broad spectrum of policy competences 
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addressed, there are some areas in which debate is more likely to concern normative 
factors, values and identity, while others have little or no normative component. This 
view is supported by the MEPs interviewed. ‘I guess identity is not fundamental to your 
consumer protection legislation or your environmental standards for instance, which 
accounts for a good chunk of EU legislation, but is perhaps more of an issue when 
you’re discussing justice and home affairs issues, in particular immigration and asylum 
law, things like that, and arguably foreign policy from time to time’.59 My research 
indicates that there are two broad areas in which issues of identity come to the fore in 
the European Parliament, issues which require or are facilitated by collective action, and 
issues which challenge identity in some way. Fiona Hall states that ‘there will be some 
issues in which everybody is working together with a strong sense of European identity, 
of wanting Europe to take the lead on something, like on climate change’.60 In these 
policy areas the norms which dictate appropriate action appear to be primarily those 
housed within the EU institutions and concerning a European identity, at least for those 
who are receptive to European norms. As discussed earlier, there is likely to be a 
variation in the strength of European identity expressed, largely based on prior norms 
and political ideologies, but for many, European identity is felt strongly. Although 
debates in these areas in which identity is felt strongly are unlikely to produce great 
shifts in European norms, the search for consensus and compromise within such a dense 
normative environment will be capable of refining the norms, ‘an argumentative  
consensus has constitutive effects on actors’,61 and increasing their applicability in the 
wider context of the European Parliament. The need for unanimity amongst member 
states for a new country to accede to membership means that a single European voice is 
required within the institution of the EU in its broadest sense, and this filters down to 
the European Parliament, which is also required to vote in favour of a new member 
(although unanimity is not required). My research indicates the belief amongst MEPs 
that the European Parliament has the ability to shape the debate and discourse over 
Turkey’s accession negotiations, and that momentum can be built during the 
negotiations which would make it more difficult for member states to refuse entry to 
Turkey. In this way the European Parliament is seen to be taking a lead on the issue, and 
European identity becomes an important factor. During debates references are made to 
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the role of the EP in the promotion of European identity and values in the broader 
world62 as well as for citizens of the EU and candidate countries,63  and this is likely to 
heighten the perceived importance of finding a common European Parliament voice. 
 
The second area in which factors of identity become important in the European 
Parliament is where issues challenge existing identity in some way, whether national or 
European. Richard Corbett identifies immigration, asylum law and foreign policy as 
competences in which European identity is particularly important, and all challenge 
established norms and identity. Immigration and asylum policy, although perhaps 
affecting European identity, will primarily be seen to challenge national or even regional 
identity. The foreign policy debated within the European Parliament will be European 
foreign policy however, and, as such, will be of greatest challenge to European identity 
(although perceived loss of sovereignty could affect national identity). The role of the 
European Parliament in foreign policy is relatively small, but debates concerning 
enlargement fall within this bracket and, therefore, present a challenge to identity. 
Debates concerning enlargement are certainly a focus for identity and normative based 
arguments, although not always phrased in terms of the identity as a whole. It is of no 
surprise that arguments concerning religion and the disputed basis of European identity 
in Christianity are common within debates concerning Turkish accession, but much 
rarer when debating the progress of other candidate countries. Hans-Gert Pöttering 
argues that Turkish accession to EU membership would have ‘a profound effect’ on 
European identity,64 and this viewpoint is backed up by a questionnaire respondent who 
suggests that the effect would be great. Similarly Geoffrey Van Orden argues that ‘the 
European Union would be very different with a country like Turkey as a member’.65 
When there is a challenge, or potential challenge, to established norms and identity 
these norms are brought to the forefront, contested and debated, and there is scope for 
norm change. When this challenge to European identity is perceived the “rules of the 
game” result in a shift towards European norms and a “logic of appropriateness” based 
largely in what are appropriate roles and behaviour for “European” actors. 
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Although social constructivist scholars view institutions as more than mere arenas for 
constraining actors’ behaviour, it is important not to underestimate their importance as 
arenas for debate. It is through argument and persuasion, made possible by the 
institution of the European Parliament, that norms of European identity are socialised, 
and I believe that this is particularly true in the field of EU enlargement. The nature of 
enlargement as a policy area means that arguments based in identity are prevalent, and 
this combined with the density of interaction within the European Parliament results in 
strong socialisation of European norms in this area. 
 
We have seen that existing norms can gain in strength and breadth within the institutions 
of the EU through the process of socialisation, but the European Parliament also 
provides an arena for the creation and propagation of new norms. In line with the theory 
of mutual constitution of agent and structure, norms can be introduced by members of 
the institution and become part of the “rules of the game” governing the institution, 
before being socialised into existing and new members. 
 
One way in which norms can be introduced is when new members join the European 
Parliament, bringing their own norms into the institution. As no-one entering the 
institution will be in a state of normative vacuum they will already have normative 
frameworks underpinning the different components of their identity, and these will be 
expressed through argument and debate. Although these new actors will be subject to 
socialisation by norms of the institution along the lines outlined above, it will not be a 
one-way process, one of the foundations of argumentative persuasion being that the best 
argument will win the debate (although this is not the same as rational choice decision 
making as traditionally understood). This is one way in which the presence of Turkey 
within the EU could influence identity within the institutions. There is a perceived ‘duty 
to safeguard these [European] values, especially at a time of crisis when they are placed 
under pressure’,66 and this accords with the social constructivist theory outlined earlier. 
Zbigniew Ziobro suggests that ‘accepting Turkey into the European Union would 
appear to be completely unrealistic and illogical. It would be a disaster for such pillars 
of the Union as the protection of human rights’,67 while Peter van Dalen points to the 
‘dangerous cocktail of Turkish nationalism and the dark sides of Islam’ before asserting 
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that ‘Allowing Turkey into the EU would be a mistake of historic proportions’.68 It is 
clear that some MEPs perceive an acute pressure on European identity and harbour 
concerns of identity change in relation to Turkish membership. Respondents indicated 
their belief that Turkish accession would be unlikely to fundamentally change the values 
of the European Union, as these would need to be subscribed to by Turkey before 
membership would be possible, but that new norms would be introduced, and identity 
would be changed. One possible effect could be one of ‘underlin[ing] that European 
identity is pluralistic, it’s “unity in diversity” but it would also have a message that it’s 
not based on a culturally exclusive viewpoint. It’s accepting that European identity is 
indeed, not just politically, but also culturally and religiously pluralistic’.69 This effect 
highlighted by my research would mark a departure from European identity as I 
outlined it in the previous section, and demonstrates the socialising power of the 
institutions. 
 
Whether the new norms are brought into the institution by new members or ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’70 already within the institution, the European Parliament provides an 
arena for these new norms to be debated, and for the norm entrepreneur to attempt to 
convince members of the institution to subscribe to the new norm. Although the 
established normative environment of the European Parliament will make the 
establishing of new norms difficult, the process of argumentation and persuasion will 
follow the pattern established above and, if the arguments in support of the new 
European norm are strong enough, eventually a “tipping point” will be reached and 
European identity will be changed. It is through social learning and argumentative 
persuasion that Checkel theorises that élites, rather than the larger population, will 
internalise these norms.71 This certainly appears to be the case at European level, as 
density of interaction is significantly higher at the level of the élite, including amongst 
MEPs, with European identity perceived to be much stronger within the institutions of 
the EU than amongst ordinary citizens of member states, as indicated throughout my 
research. 
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While Checkel and Risse look primarily at how norms are spread, Adler addresses the 
question of why specific norms are spread. ‘Because interpretation is involved in the 
social construction of international reality, constructivist theory must be able to address 
the question of which interpretations and whose interpretations become social reality. In 
other words, why do certain ideas and concepts acquire epistemic, discursive and 
institutional authority?’72 To answer this question Adler proposes the concept of 
“cognitive evolution” which ‘means that at any point in time and place of a historical 
process, institutional or social facts may be constructed by collective understandings of 
the physical and the social world that are subject to authoritative (political) selection 
processes and thus to evolutionary change. Cognitive evolution is thus the process of 
innovation, domestic and international diffusion, political selection and effective 
institutionalization that creates the intersubjective understanding on which the interests, 
practices and behaviour of governments are based’.73 In practice this covers much of the 
same theoretical ground as the theories outlined above, although it attempts to draw 
together elements of norm creation, selection, spread and reification into a unified 
theory of identity change. Adler also points to the importance of interaction and 
socialisation for which the European Parliament provides such a good arena, but he 
goes on to suggest that institutions and norms which become internalised and reified are 
not necessarily those which are the best fit or the most efficient, but those ‘that prove 
most successful at imposing collective meaning and function on physical reality’.74 
Adler highlights the role of power in the selection of norms, as well as ‘political 
selection...driven by political leaders’ intersubjective expectations of progress’. For 
Adler, as with Risse, European identity as it stands is just one of the theoretically 
possible “European identities”, and changes which occur will be based on 
intersubjective selection pressure. In this way new members of the European Union will 
have a constitutive effect on European Union, but will not produce a causative change. 
An example of this within extant European identity can be seen within the association 
between Europe and the Christian faith. In the course of my research it was suggested to 
me that, although the majority of respondents associated Europe and the European 
Union with Christianity, or even modern Christendom, it could be argued that there is a 
Judaeo-Christian basis to European values, and that other religions, including Islam, had 
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a historical role in Europe. Bernd Posselt suggests that although the European 
Parliament ‘also support freedom of conscience and religion for Muslims and 
agnostics’, ‘Christians all over the world are being persecuted in a very specific way 
and Europe, as a primarily Christian continent, must be seen to be protecting Christians 
throughout the world in a very specific way...The specific target group of our human 
rights policy is Christians’.75 Although there is today a sizeable population of Muslims 
in the EU, this focus on Christianity led one of my questionnaire respondents to argue 
that Turkey was very unlikely to join the EU due to ‘prejudice against Muslims’ and 
suggest that some within the EU were Islamophobic. Although this claim is difficult to 
assess, and it is undoubtedly unfair to accuse most within the EP of this, some 
statements made debates certainly imply an association of negative factors with Islam. 
 
Despite the questionnaire respondent’s observations, if Turkey does become a member 
of the European Union it is partially due to this power to shape debate that worries over 
changes to European identity stem. Although Fiona Hall believes that ‘the European 
Parliament is a big place, there are many, many other people and no one country, even 
of that size, can dominate completely’,76 when asked whether Turkish membership of 
the EU would affect European identity John Bowis replied ‘because of its size it would 
have to, it couldn’t not’.77 Peter Van Dalen argues that ‘Turkey’s accession would have a 
detrimental effect on integration’ and that ‘[w]e would have to deal with millions of 
people who, unfortunately are not familiar with the Judaeo-Christian fundaments of 
Europe and who would want to change them’.78 If Turkey joined the EU as the largest 
country by population it would (barring special measures to prevent it) have the greatest 
number of MEPs. While this concerns respondents in terms of decision making power it 
would also afford them a degree of power over norm selection. 
 
Although the work of Adler indicates that European norms may not be exact 
transcriptions of the “brute facts”, the norms retain their power to shape identity and 
interest, and this effect could be felt in a broader context than simply within the 
institutions themselves. Accession negotiations with Turkey are conducted by the 
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institutions of the EU and not by member states. This puts the institutions of the EU into 
a position of power within the cognitive evolution of this area, and thus gives them 
power in norm selection and, ultimately, in relation to European identity concerning 
Turkey. By the conclusion of accession negotiations the institutions of the EU could 
have produced a marked shift in norms towards Turkish membership, significantly 
influencing identity in the European Parliament and beyond, as well as the outcome of 
Turkey’s membership bid. 
 
A competing hypothesis for identity within the context of the European institutions has 
been put forward in the form of social identity theory, which differs from the theories 
outlined thus far in that it posits a distinction between personal and social identity, and 
‘SIT is concerned with the latter and starts from the assumption that social identity is 
derived primarily from group memberships’.79 ‘[S]ocial identity is an individual’s 
attempt to categorize himself/herself as a member of a group that is different from 
others’.80 Curley attempts to clarify the difference between social identity theory and 
constructivist approaches, stating that ‘SIT assumes a “social identity” is an individual-
based understanding of the group, rather than the constructivist assumption that the 
group entirely defines the group self’,81 however I believe that this over simplifies the 
constructivist approach. Adler is keen to point out that ‘actors are far from being 
structural “idiots”’,82 and this is the point of the mutual constitution of agents and 
structures, that it is a two-way process. In keeping with this argument for the genesis of 
social identity, Curley ‘proposes that the development of a national identity in relation 
to Europe is the most significant contributing factor to a policy to support/oppose 
expanding the EU to include applicant countries’.83 Although my research has suggested 
that identity has a role to play to in enlargement, I do not believe that the formation of a 
national identity for Europe has occurred, rather that European norms are present 
alongside national norms, and the appropriate norms are selected in each situation. My 
data show that a separation into personal and group identity, with actors within the 
European Parliament demonstrating a group identity based on their membership of the 
Parliament, is too simple a model for a very nuanced normative environment. My data 
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suggest that many competing norms are present within each actor, the European 
Parliament does have a constitutive effect on the identity of actors within it, new norms 
will be socialised, and the institution will help actors to select the norms relating to 
appropriate behaviour in a European setting, but these norms would not have been 
socialised into a “normative vacuum”, rather they will be alongside the pre-existing 
norms. 
 
Despite my disagreement with some elements of social identity theory, I believe that 
some of the hypotheses Curley generates from SIT are worth examining in relation to 
my research. He states that ‘SIT’s main contribution to the issue of EU expansion  
policy lies in its ability to provide a framework for understanding which EU decision-
makers will likely support/oppose the inclusion of an applicant country and when 
rationality-/identity-based arguments will be used to highlight the various policies’.84 
Curley generalises this to a national level, and does not attempt to extrapolate his 
hypotheses to the European institutions, but I believe that this model does not cover the 
full spectrum of identity arguments which have been expressed within the European 
Parliament and explained to me during the course of my research. Curley argues that 
‘the stronger a decision-maker identifies with Europe, the stricter he/she will be when 
deciding which country should be allowed entrance into the EU’,85 however my 
research has suggested that a drive towards enlargement is in fact a component in the 
European identity, and the weight of norms associated with this must be balanced 
against any potential “ingroup bias”. As a result Curley makes little reference to identity 
arguments being used in support of potential members, and my research has indicated 
occasions on which identity arguments have overridden rational arguments in favour of 
candidate countries.86 Curley goes on to argue that ‘those decision-makers who have 
weaker European identities will be more supportive of including applicant countries into 
the EU because meeting the membership criteria of the group is sufficient for 
accession’.87 My research has indicated that this is not always the case with decision-
makers within the European Parliament, where those who do not subscribe to European 
identity still make identity judgements, or at least rational choice judgements, based at a 
national level rather than rational choice decisions taken at European level. Although 
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the importance of the Copenhagen Criteria for membership of the EU is emphasised 
during debate, within the same session MEPs suggest a number of important factors 
which go beyond these criteria which are also important in decision-making regarding 
enlargement. This is supported by interviewees and questionnaire respondents, all 
respondents indicated conditions other than the Copenhagen Criteria which also needed 
to be met, and these varied from respondent to respondent. For this reason I don’t 
believe that those who do not feel a European identity will necessarily be more 
supportive of Turkish membership than those who do. While this would hold within a 
perfect model of social identity theory I do not believe these hypotheses are valid for the 
views of MEPs with relation to EU expansion, specifically to Turkish membership. 
 
One area of social identity theory which I believe is supported by my data is some 
concept of “ingroup bias” and positive comparisons with outgroups, what is referred to 
in the broader literature as the creation of the “Other”. This is seen by many social 
constructivists as vital to the establishment of identity, and my research suggests that 
this effect is found within European identity. As European identity has evolved and 
challenges to the identity have changed, so too has the sense of other changed. 
Throughout the cold war European identity had an “Other” in the form of communist 
states in the East, and it has been suggested that it was easier for Eastern European 
states to join the European Union once they had moved away from communism for this 
reason. During my research I have found it difficult to establish a single, unified 
“Other”, not least because of the varying nature of European identity. For many the 
“we” of the European Parliament is established and phrased primarily on grounds of 
values, those outlined in the preceding chapter. For these actors, the “Other”, those 
which are seen to present the greatest threat to European identity, are undemocratic, 
repressive regimes.88 Where cultural heritage is seen to be of particular importance, the 
“Other” is likely to be constructed along these lines. 89 Similarly, where Christianity is 
of primary importance, countries which follow, or who have large populations which 
follow, other religions are likely to be constructed in this way.90 
 
Even this is of course a simplification of the real picture, where all of these factors are 
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likely to play a role to a greater or lesser degree. For some of those I spoke to Turkey is 
clearly seen as the “Other”, to Hans-Gert Pöttering ‘Turkey is not part of the European 
family’ and Turkish accession is undesirable ‘politically, culturally, financially as well 
as geographically’,91 while Barry Madlener bluntly states that ‘Europe does not want 
Turkey, and Europe does not want Islam’.92 As attitudes towards Turkey are not 
straightforward in this regard it is an area which will be intensely debated if and when 
Turkish membership of the EU gets closer to becoming a reality, and this debate will 
have a constitutive effect on European identity. If the norms which are selected and 
socialised are those which portray Turkey as the “Other”, presumably with identity 
heavily reliant on religion and culture, Turkey will find it almost impossible to join the 
EU. If, on the other hand, identity within the institutions of the EU evolves to a point 
where it is compatible with Turkish national identity and Turkey is not the “other” then 
it will become a simpler process for Turkey to accede to membership. This does not, 
however, mean that it would become straightforward as, although the identity within the 
European Parliament, and perhaps the EU institutions, would support Turkish 
membership, this does not mean that broader European identity would be in accordance 
and it would be necessary for the norms be transferred to transcend the EU institutions. 
 
The Parliament and broader European identity 
 
Having spoken about the creation and spread of norms within the institutions of the EU 
I asked my interviewees and questionnaire respondents whether they believed that the 
European Parliament embodied European identity. The response to this was, 
unsurprisingly, mixed. For the minority of respondents who do not believe in a 
European identity or believe that the identity is not related to the European Union the 
answer was no, although from some there was an acceptance that others within the 
institution did feel and express the European identity. Amongst respondents who were 
more accepting of a concept of European identity however, the European Parliament 
was seen to embody the identity to a greater or lesser extent. A questionnaire respondent 
argued that the European Parliament did indeed embody European identity, and that 
identity is ‘essential’ in the European Parliament, while Hans-Gert Pöttering suggests 
that ‘The European Parliament has been an important promoter of European values 
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since its very beginning. Its evolution towards a full legislator has strongly strengthened 
democracy in Europe. Furthermore, the European Parliament itself is a place of lived 
European identity: It mirrors European diversity through different view points and 
illustrates that cultural, geographical and linguistic differences are no barriers for mutual 
understanding’.93 In this statement Mr. Pöttering elucidates a vision of the European 
Parliament in social constructivist terms, one which has a normative basis constituted by 
those within it. Mr. Pöttering goes on to say that ‘the European Union can clearly be 
seen as an identity shaper’,94 indicating that the EU institutions in turn have a 
constitutive effect on the identities of their members. Echoing the importance of 
common action in identity, Libor Rouček argues that European identity is felt within the 
European Parliament ‘perhaps more than in any other institution because the European 
Parliament is an elected body of representatives of 27 countries so it’s...a body that to a 
large extent deals on a pan-European basis’.95 John Purvis suggests that there is the 
potential for the European Parliament to play the role of ‘custodian of the European 
identity’,96 drawing on its embodiment of the European identity, pointing out that ‘it’s 
about the only thing that could, because each individual parliament in each country 
can’t really aspire to the European identity’. While he does point to this potential role, 
he is also quick to point out that the Parliament ‘has a long way to go before it’s 
accepted by the population at large’ for the role of custodian, another example of 
identity being felt stronger within the institutions of the EU. Although he argues that the 
European Parliament does embody European identity, he points out that ‘it’s just an 
element, one dimension of it’. Due to the nature of this question, it is difficult to judge 
from European Parliament debates the mood of MEPs on this issue, however there is 
clearly a perceived role for the EP in broader identity in Europe. Acting as President-in-
Office of the Council and speaking during the debate over the Enlargement Report for 
Turkey, Nicolai Wammen chose to ‘emphasise the importance of the European 
Parliament in a broader political context. Debates like the one we have had today are 
crucial for engaging the citizens of both Turkey and the EU Member States and for 
ensuring the continued support for, and understanding of, our joint project. This is 
important work that we must not underestimate and that we should focus on to a greater 
extent. The European Parliament has an incredibly important role to play in this 
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regard.’97 Although the ability of the EP to engage with the citizens of Europe would 
undoubtedly be challenged by some actors within it, this perceived role is an interesting 
and important dynamic at play in matters of identity. During a debate concerning the 
European Intelligent Energy programme Janusz Lewandowski, a Member of the 
European Commission, speaks of the European Parliament in normative terms, albeit 
presumably unintentionally, by suggesting that ‘The role of the European Parliament is 
very clear in shaping the future by shaping the rules of the game’.98 
 
As John Purvis points out, it would be artificial to look at the European Parliament in 
isolation as the sole home and driving force behind a European identity. There is a large 
degree of interaction, debate and argument between the institutions of the EU on 
legislation, and this provides the opportunity for wider socialisation of norms and 
identity change. In areas where decisions are reached through the ordinary legislative 
procedure (formerly the co-decision procedure)  
 
we, the Parliament, and the Council sit down and try and thrash out agreement, two 
readings in Parliament, two readings in Council. If there’s a disagreement then we end 
up in negotiation with Council, in conciliation as it’s called, but at each key stage we 
need to muster the majorities inside the Parliament. At second reading stage we need to 
have an absolute majority, so half the members plus one, and given the fragmented 
nature of the political groupings inside the European Parliament that necessitates cross-
party consultation and communication and therefore...we’re more willing to empathise 
and take on board the perspectives of other political groupings which involve a mix of 
European perspectives.99  
 
These procedures allow argumentative persuasion within and between individual 
institutions and, by extension, the socialisation of norms. Although decisions can end up 
in conciliation, ‘early cases set a precedent for reaching agreement at first or second 
reading stage, even on sensitive issues’,100 and the important role of norms is further 
highlighted with the argument that ‘growth in inter-institutional negotiations led to the 
gradual emergence of a new practice...known as the trilogue’.101 The trilogue involves 
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interaction and negotiation between a European Parliament delegation, the Council 
Presidency and the appropriate Commissioner, and although ‘rules lay down the main 
framework for preparing, conducting and following up trilogies...much detail has been 
left to practice.’102 John Bowis echoes the importance of inter-institutional interaction, 
suggesting that although the formal procedures can produce identity change, it is again 
informal interaction which can be more effective. ‘In my ten years I got to know and 
work with people from the Commission. Certainly criticising them, berating them and 
being robust, but also by saying “this is where we want to go, why don’t we try 
something along these lines?”’.103 Interaction between the European Parliament and 
other institutions of the EU affords opportunities for socialisation of norms across the 
institutional divide and within the individual institutions. John Purvis highlights the 
importance of identity arguments in gaining agreement within the EP. ‘You’ve got to get 
375 people to vote the way you want to go, rather than 375 against it. It might only be 
you and me, your MEP, and I’ve got to get 374 to back me up’, and with there not being 
enough from a single country, ‘you have to get wider than that, broader than that’.104 
The norms developed within and as a result of inter-institutional interaction mean that 
this can be an important factor in identity change within the European Union. 
 
Although it lies beyond the scope of my research, my data suggest that there is the 
possibility of extending Wendt’s individual analogy, ‘states are people too’105 to an EU 
level, with EU institutions themselves becoming actors with identities and interests. The 
European Parliament undeniably has a material base, which Wendt describes as vital to 
a personal or corporate identity and as a ‘site or platform for other identities’.106 My 
research suggests agents within the European Parliament also see a role identity for their 
institution, as the democratically elected body within the European Union, the voice of 
the people, possibly even the custodian of European identity.107 This role only exists in 
relation to the other institutions and, I believe, gives the European Parliament a form of 
identity. The place of the European Parliament within the EU as a whole, and the 
European identity in general could result in the Parliament expressing collective identity 
with fellow institutions, particularly when presented with a greater or more relevant 
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“Other”. While I would not claim that this suggestion is irrefutable, or that a European 
Parliament identity is set in stone, the respondents in my research have spoken of the 
role of the European Parliament, and John Bowis refers to the European Parliament as a 
‘living organism’, suggesting that in interaction with other institutions ‘it certainly gets 
frustrated by certain things’.108 If the European Parliament were found to have identities 
and interests it could affect decision-making within the institution, as actors were aware 
of the interests of the Parliament and the role which it plays. This is an area which, I 
believe, warrants further research and could be an interesting and informative addition 
to theories of European integration. 
 
I believe that my research has shown that the rational choice “thin” view of institutions, 
as arenas for and constraints on actor behaviour and strategies, is not an accurate view 
of the institutions of the European Union as they are at present. The institution of the 
European Parliament amounts to a great deal more than what is outlined within the 
treaties of the EU, and is a complex picture of norms and identities. The European 
Parliament is both constituted by the actors within it and constitutes the identity of those 
actors and, as such, has a profound effect on actor identity. The European Parliament is 
a particularly good environment for the creation and socialisation of new norms for a 
number of reasons. When actors enter the European Parliament they are put into novel 
situations, for which they have no defined appropriate behaviour. To settle upon an 
appropriate course of action actors engage in discussion, argument and persuasion. The 
European Parliament provides an arena for normative debate of a nature and density 
which result in many actors socialising and expressing European norms, thus shifting 
identities. As Gawain Towler, who expressed his disagreement with the concept of 
European identity relating to the EU, put it ‘many of those who are in the parliament are 
from the eurocracy, most of those who don’t [sic] are indoctrinated into it’.109 Even 
when not phrased in normative terms, this socialising effect is observed by the vast 
majority of respondents.  
 
The normative debate occurs in areas of greatest co-operation within the European 
Parliament, or between institutions, as well as in areas which challenge existing norms 
and identity. One area for which all of these criteria are strongly met is the area of 
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enlargement, particularly the accession negotiations with Turkey. For this reason an 
understanding of the European Parliament’s role in identity is important when 
considering the Turkish application for membership, but the reverse is also true. Identity 
within the institutions of the EU is changeable, and the debate over Turkish membership 
will affect this identity. 
 
The official role of the European Parliament in decision-making on EU enlargement is 
relatively small, limited to a largely symbolic vote once a country has already been 
accepted by all member states, but this view of the institutions of the EU involving 
merely regulative norms is once again insufficient. My research has demonstrated that 
the strength of European identity within the European Parliament exceeds that of the 
population of the EU as a whole, and MEPs suggest that there is a role for the 
Parliament to propagate European identity outside its own boundaries. Through 
interactions between the European Parliament and other institutions norms can be 
socialised further afield, and European identity can change. The institutions of the EU 
also have a far stronger role than member states’ governments during the negotiations 
and this process has the potential to alter how Turkey, and Turkish membership of the 
EU is viewed. If negotiations are concluded and Turkey is no longer viewed as the 
“other” and is seen to have a broadly similar identity it is more likely to be granted 
membership of the EU. 
 
My research has also highlighted areas in which future research could be conducted. 
Although I believe that a “thick” view of institutions provides a more accurate picture of 
their nature and workings, this means that EU institutions are also subject to change 
without recourse to treaty change. For this reason my research only provides a snapshot 
of the current state of the institutions. The strength of identity, and the nature of 
normative arguments involved, also varies between competences, and further study 
could fruitfully be carried out into the effect of identity in other policy areas. In order to 
achieve depth and richness of data, my research has focussed on the European 
Parliament but I believe that a study of identity within the other institutions and a 
greater emphasis on the interactions between institutions could elucidate the strength 
and nature of identity within EU as a whole, as well as the Commission and European 
Parliament individually. Finally an interesting avenue of research could be pursued 
investigating the applicability of the individual analogy to EU institutions and the effect 
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this might have on decision-making. 
 
In accordance with social constructivist theory, this chapter has demonstrated that the 
European Parliament amounts to a great deal more than the intervening variable 
hypothesised by rationalist scholars, that institutions have an important role to play in 
the socialisation of norms and that the European Parliament is a key factor in 
constituting the identity of MEPs. This is a vital facet in understanding the role of norms 
and identity within the EU, and the influence these factors have on actor interest and 
behaviour. The findings of this chapter, that the European Parliament itself plays an 
important role in the identity of its constituent actors, show that an analysis of identity 
which failed to take this into account would be flawed. The European Parliament 
provides a normatively rich and dense environment in which actors interact, debate and 
argue. I have shown that the conditions necessary for normative influence and change 
are present within the European Parliament, and the degree to which normative factors 
are invoked and challenged varies by policy area. The nature of Turkey as ‘the ‘thorny 
issue’ or ‘hot potato’ topic of EU enlargement policy’,110 particularly in areas of identity, 
norms and values, means that identity will have a particular impact in Turkish 
accession, but also that Turkish accession has the potential to impact on identity within 
the European Parliament. 
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The influence of Identity on the Interests and Behaviour of Actors 
within the European Parliament with regards to Turkish Accession 
 
I have demonstrated with my research that actors within the European Parliament are 
exposed to a “European identity” based on norms from the European level, alongside 
other norms and identities, and the important role played by the European Parliament in 
this identity formation. This is not enough, however, to address all of my research 
questions, or to have a rounded view of identity within the European Parliament. To 
gain a more complete understanding of identity, it is also necessary for me to examine 
the interests and behaviour of actors within the EP. Although I have shown that there is 
a role for identity founded in European norms this does not logically mean that actor 
behaviour is influenced by this identity. Although social constructivists assert that 
identity and interest are inextricably linked, the evidence of the preceding chapters is 
that European identity is not experienced to the exclusion of national and regional 
identity. The social constructivist argument I have outlined argues that behaviour is 
based on a wide array of norms which are exerting influence concurrently and through 
different mechanisms. For this reason, it is possible that, although norms of European 
identity are experienced within the European Parliament, it is not these norms which 
influence the interests and behaviour of actors. For this reason, this chapter will 
examine the influence of norms of European identity on the behaviour and interests of 
actors, and assess the impact of these norms in relation to more “rational” factors. This 
chapter will not attempt to provide definitive answers to questions of decision making 
regarding Turkish accession, but the case study will be used to examine the nature and 
strength of European identity within the European Parliament. 
 
As I have indicated throughout this thesis, it is not my intention to replace one theory 
concerning the European institutions and actor identity which I believe to be inadequate, 
with another theory which ignores the important strong points of the existing theory. 
The issues of identities, interests and decision making processes remain complex 
problems within the European Parliament, and the European Union generally.  Although 
it is my assertion that issues of identity, norms and logics of appropriateness have a role 
to play in the interests of MEPs, I do not claim that they are important to the exclusion 
of more traditional, “rationalist” factors such as power and national interest.  Instead I 
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aim to investigate the relative importance of what might be termed “rationalist” and 
“social constructivist” factors and how these issues interplay and interact, and this will 
be the key to establishing a more nuanced understanding of identity within the European 
Parliament. In keeping with my earlier research I will remain conscious of the fact that 
my research is context dependent, that is that norms of European identity will be felt in 
varying strengths by different individuals and in different policy areas, and it is possible 
that different logics of action will be followed by different individuals. I intend to 
achieve this by problematising the identities of actors within the European Parliament, 
rather than accepting them as given as if often the case in EU scholarship. 
 
The importance of historical context in understanding norms and identity, as indicated 
in earlier chapters, renders an understanding of the historic relations between the EU 
and Turkey equally important. Norms regarding Turkish membership and attitudes 
towards Turkey will have developed over the course of negotiations, and indeed longer, 
and there will be a two way relationship between norms and the negotiations. Identity 
and normative issues will have influenced the process and the progress of negotiations, 
and these will also have played a constitutive role in identity formation. For this reason 
an understanding of the normative background of Turkey-EU relations plays an 
important role in understanding norms relating to Turkish accession at play in the 
current European Parliament. 
 
Turkey-EU relations 
 
The case of Turkey has long been a complex and special one within the EU. While other 
countries have acceded to membership of the Union relatively quickly and easily, 
Turkey has a history with the EU dating back to 1959. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
affairs asserts that ‘Turkey chose to begin close cooperation with the fledgling EEC in 
1959’,1 and the Ankara Agreement, granting Turkey associate membership, was signed 
on the 12th of September 1963.2 Turkey applied for full membership of the EU (then the 
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EEC) on the 14th April 19873 and, although the 1990s are described by the EU as ‘a 
Europe without frontiers’,4 accession negotiations were not opened until 2005 and are 
still ongoing. When the EU turned down Turkey’s initial application for membership in 
1989, the Commission’s opinion highlighted political and economic issues relating to 
Turkey, as well as pointing to ‘the negative effects’ of ‘the situation in Cyprus’.5 Despite 
these concerns, and the initial refusal to open accession negotiations, the Luxembourg 
European Council held in December 1997 confirmed ‘Turkey’s eligibility for accession 
to the European Union’.6 
 
In 1998 the European Commission published the inaugural ‘Regular Report from the 
Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession’, and these annual documents 
contain the European Commission’s position on the progress made by Turkey towards 
the requirements for membership of the European Union, which have been codified in 
the form of the Copenhagen Criteria. In accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria, the 
analysis is divided into three sections, political criteria, economic criteria and ability to 
assume the obligations of membership. Throughout the span of the annual progress 
reports, 1998 to 2005 (when negotiations were opened), the ‘ability to assume the 
obligations of membership’ section comprises a technical list of areas of the Acquis 
Communautaire, and relates the degree to which Turkish law has been brought into line 
with that of the EU. The ‘economic criteria’ section is similarly filled with rational 
choice concerns of the functioning of the market economy in Turkey, ensuring that were 
Turkey to join the EU it would have an economy commensurate with those already in 
the Union. In the progress report from 1998 the ‘political criteria’ section is also full of 
points which have a clear rational choice basis, such as the role of the army in Turkish 
politics. ‘The lack of civilian control of the army gives cause for concern’, exacerbated 
by ‘the major role played by the army in political life through the National Security 
Council’.7 This perhaps reflects the European Commission’s memories of the military 
coup carried out in Turkey in September 1980, the third in 20 years, as well as the 
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‘February 28 process’, action carried out by the Turkish military in 1997 and 
subsequently described as a ‘post-modern coup’.8  This instability would clearly weaken 
the EU if Turkey were allowed to join in the state described and, as such, there is a clear 
rational choice argument for demanding these changes in a potential member state. 
Similarly, the 1998 progress report argues that ‘Turkey must make a constructive 
contribution to the settlement of all disputes with various neighbouring countries by 
peaceful means in accordance with international law’. This statement, primarily relating 
to the dispute over Cyprus, once again has a strong rational basis. Although peace is a 
key component of European identity and thus has a normative component, as I 
highlighted earlier in my research, it is clear that the European Union could not admit a 
new member who was in dispute with another country unless all existing members were 
already in dispute with the third country. If it were a third party then the EU would be 
drawn into the dispute, but even more of a problem would be presented if the dispute 
were with an existing member of the EU, as in the case of Cyprus. 
 
The issue of human rights also falls within the ‘political criteria’ section of the progress 
report, and in this instance I believe that it is less clear that the basis for these arguments 
are primarily rational choice in nature.  In the inaugural progress report from 1998 the 
issue of human rights warrants only a small percentage of the larger analysis,9 
overshadowed by the concerns outlined above. As time goes on, however, human rights 
concerns come to dominate the evaluation of political criteria. Although rational choice 
concerns such as corruption and the role of the army do not disappear completely, the 
2004 progress report suggests that ‘the [Turkish] government has increasingly asserted 
its control over the military...nevertheless, the armed forces in Turkey continue to 
exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms’,10 the focus noticeably 
shifts towards other factors. The 2002 report states that ‘The adoption of these 
[constitutional] reforms is an important signal of the determination of the majority of 
Turkey’s political leaders to move towards further alignment with the values and 
standards of the European Union’,11 and I believe that this is symptomatic of a shift 
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from rational choice decision making on Turkish progress towards a more normatively 
based one, albeit not one which is explicitly set out in normative terms. By the time the 
2005 report was published it was accepted that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Criteria,12 and the section of analysis on issues of fundamental freedoms, 
women’s rights and minority rights outweighs sections relating to the role of the 
military and the Cyprus issue.  Interestingly the report also refers to the ‘consensus on 
the need to address the...cultural and social development of the Southeast’.13 I believe 
the important role afforded to Human Rights issues within the European Commission’s 
opinions on the progress of Turkey towards accession indicates the importance of 
normative factors in the decision making process, and that elements of European 
identity are so accepted that they have become “taken for granted”. In this way actors do 
not make decisions based on a feeling of national identity, however norms play a role in 
constraining the parameters of the decision, limiting imagination. As I suggested in my 
earlier examination of European identity, I believe that norms of human rights are an 
integral part of European identity, to such an extent that they are seen to transcend that 
identity.  
 
The issue of Turkey’s record on human rights was rated as a “vital” issue to be 
addressed in Turkey’s EU membership bid by both of the questionnaire respondents 
who answered that they believe there to be a European identity, both of whom rated 
human rights as a “vital” component of European identity. Interestingly the 
questionnaire respondent who does not believe in the concept of European identity 
(rating human rights as “irrelevant” to European identity, but ‘highly relevant to human 
dignity across the world’) still answered that issues of human rights were “important” in 
Turkey’s membership bid. This is another example of the taken for granted nature of 
human rights norms. Bill Newton Dunn rates human rights as a basic criterion, stating 
that ‘we don’t say to the Turks...or anybody “do you like classical music?”...we say “do 
you have equal rights, democracy, rule of law, separation of powers?”, the basic 
criteria’.14 Stephen Hughes also argues that the issue of human rights remains 
                                                 
12
 Turkey: the Commission recommends opening accession negotiations. European Commission, Brussels, 
6.10.04. [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/e50015_en.htm] 
accessed 28.04.2010. 
13
 Turkey: 2005 Progress Report. European Commission, Brussels, 9.11.2005. p.42. 
14
 Newton Dunn, Bill. Personal interview (9th March 2010). 
 164 
 
‘absolutely vital’15 and, even though Turkey was found to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria, for many in the European Parliament ‘[w]ith regard to Turkey, there remain 
many concerns over human rights, the ongoing blockade of Armenia [and] religious 
freedoms’,16 and Nikolaos Chountis MEP took the opportunity of a 2009 debate in the 
European Parliament on enlargement strategy to ‘remind the House that there are still 
problems with respect for democratic rights and trade union freedoms in Turkey’.17 
Indeed the issue of human rights is a common theme in European Parliament debates 
relating to enlargement, with rights issues raised in recent debates over the potential 
accession of Montenegro,18 Serbia,19 Macedonia,20 Bosnia and Herzegovina21 and 
Iceland22 (although in the case of Iceland it was commended for its record). Debates 
concerning potential Turkish accession are certainly no exception, indeed these 
arguments are used with greater frequency in relation to Turkey than when looking at 
other candidate countries. Despite this concern from MEPs, the EU has accepted the 
progress made by Turkey by opening accession negotiations, and it is acknowledged 
that human rights ‘were issues for Greece as well, and Spain’,23 as well as the countries 
which joined the EU in 2004, but that these issues are not insuperable. Although two 
interview respondents describe the problems perceived in the Turkish membership bid 
based in the issue of human rights as ‘just one huge red herring’24 and an excuse, a hoop 
for Turkey to jump through,25 and Martin Callanan argues that ‘[t]here are clearly some 
human rights concerns in Turkey but, you know, human rights concerns don’t stop the 
EU from having good relations with lots of other odious regimes across the world, they 
are quite happy to ignore human rights concerns where it suits them’,26 the opinion of 
the majority of MEPs, including those spoken to during primary research, clearly 
contradicts this. Dr. Libor Rouček stated that ‘it’s one of the preconditions in the 
negotiations that Turkey has to do all the reforms in order to implement the changes and 
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respect the human and civic rights’,27 a sentiment echoed by Fiona Hall, who argues that 
if respect for human rights ‘was not the thinking of Turkish people, Turkish politicians, 
Turkish government then they wouldn’t be allowed in’.28  
 
Although I believe they are in the minority, the viewpoints of Godfrey Bloom and 
Martin Callanan do raise interesting questions concerning European identity. Godfrey 
Bloom argues that existing member state Bulgaria ‘is simply run by gangsters’29 and, 
while this is certainly an extreme view, MEP Sophia in ‘t Veld argued in the European 
Parliament that ‘if we ask Turkey to comply with EU standards, we must make sure to 
meet these standards ourselves...homophobia, compulsory religious education and 
restrictions of freedom of the press must equally be fought in the current member 
states’.30 These arguments raise questions as to why nations like Bulgaria were allowed 
to accede to membership of the EU while Turkey, which ‘isn’t a badly run country at all 
in comparison’31 is held back on these grounds. One possible answer to this question 
lies in the more widespread acceptance of other states on grounds of identity. Stephen 
Hughes accepts that there was an identity argument in recent enlargements which, to a 
degree overrode rational concerns. He stated that ‘I think that political imperative 
involved a number of considerations, and one was “let’s re-establish the greater 
Europe”. These countries are historically part of Europe, it’s absolutely important that 
we get them back in to begin the process of building democracy, pluralist societies and 
respect all these rights, and the best way to do that is to bring them into the family’,32 
before going on to suggest that similar arguments could be used against Turkey. 
Although it is difficult to assess the relative severity of human rights abuses in different 
countries, it is possible that this identity argument is also behind the frequent references 
during debates to human rights issues in Turkey while other candidate countries which 
have similar difficulties have significantly fewer arguments made against them on these 
grounds. 
 
Alongside, and intertwined with, issues of human rights stands another of the founding 
principles of the EU, democracy. Although the demand for candidate countries to have a 
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functioning democracy has clear rationalist reasoning, providing stability and 
governmental commensurability and interoperability, my research suggests that 
arguments for democracy have other components as well. Gerard Batten argues that 
‘Turkey holds elections but it is not a democracy in the accepted Western sense’,33 for 
him this is largely due to human rights abuses, but he also points to the ideology of 
Islam. Norms of “Western democracy” and human rights are very closely associated 
with those of personal freedom, and one strongly contested contemporary debate 
concerns the wearing of Islamic dress. In recent years there have been calls in many 
countries in Europe to ban the burqa or niqab on grounds of female rights, with a 
German Liberal MEP referring to the burqa as ‘as enormous attack on the rights of 
women. It is a mobile prison’.34 She goes on to state, despite her argument being based 
in human rights and freedom, that ‘Freedom can not go so far as to take away the public 
faces of humans. At least not in Europe’.35 The association of the burqa with norms 
which are not part of the European identity is confirmed by Ms. Koch-Mehrin, who 
stated that the burqa represents ‘values we in Europe do not share’.36 These norms are 
indicative of the complex situation Turkey is in. The full veil is banned in civic and 
government buildings within the secular state of Turkey, unlike most of Europe, but the 
veil is still common amongst the people of Turkey. This association of democracy in 
Turkey with different norms appears to be inextricably tied to the attitudes of MEPs in 
this regard. Where MEPs point towards the role European integration played in 
‘consolidating’ democracy in ‘countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece...countries that 
have lived through dictatorships’,37and argue that ‘a young European democracy has to 
have strong and unstinting backing from Europe’,38 the support for Turkey in this regard 
is not so strong. Andreas Mölzer argues that Turkey’s ‘disregard for democratic principles 
alone is, in my opinion, reason enough to suspend accession negotiations’,39 and this is perhaps 
indicative of the fact Turkish democracy is not viewed in the same way  as ‘European’ 
democracy, a distinction based in identity. 
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Arguments of identity in European Parliament decision making 
 
As the above examples have demonstrated, there are elements of normative factors and 
identity which clearly influence actor interests and behaviour within the EU. When 
asked to assess the importance of the degree to which Turkish identity corresponds with 
European identity, responses to the questionnaire were mixed. One questionnaire 
respondent rated this factor as “important” in the membership bid, and argued that there 
were significant cultural differences. The other questionnaire respondent who believes 
in European identity suggested that this cultural correspondence was “not very 
important” (although not “irrelevant”), despite stating that issues of identity and its 
promotion were vital in debates concerning enlargement. The final questionnaire 
respondent, who does not believe in European identity also rated correspondence of 
identity as “not very important”, although he suggests that the deciding factor in 
Turkey’s membership bid will be based in religious factors.  
 
Amongst interviewees there is widespread, although not unanimous, acknowledgment 
that identity will play a role in the debate over Turkish accession. When asked whether 
identity was a salient point in the Turkish membership bid, John Purvis answered that it 
was ‘very much so. I’m sure it’s almost all that’,40 and Libor Rouček agreed that it had 
an important role to play. Stephen Hughes, meanwhile, agreed that identity arguments 
were used in opposition to Turkey, although ‘it’s not used openly, it’s there’.41 Bill 
Newton Dunn conceded that issues of identity would be important in the membership 
bid, but not directly within the institutions of the European Union.  He suggested that 
issues of culture and religion would be important in the minds of the population of 
Europe when voting in any potential referenda on the issue, as well as the national 
governments representing those people. He also suggested that ‘Churches in Europe 
will probably be...campaigning furiously against Turkey’.42 Although Mr. Newton Dunn 
suggests that decisions taken within the institutions of the EU in the area of enlargement 
are the result of cost-benefit analysis, he demonstrates that there are normative 
preconditions to membership of ‘our particular family’43 and concedes that the idea of 
bringing Turkey into a notional “Christendom” ‘won’t be considered, but will be in 
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peoples’ minds’.44 In contrast to the majority of respondents is the view expressed by 
Martin Callanan and Godfrey Bloom, that the decision over Turkish accession will be 
taken on grounds of national self-interest and cost-benefit analyses. 
 
Despite Stephen Hughes’ assertion that the majority of identity arguments are not used 
openly against Turkey, rather just colouring and informing viewpoints on the matter, 
examples of the arguments can certainly be found within the institutions of the 
European Union. Comments made in the Belgian parliament in 2004 by Herman van 
Rompuy, now President of the European Council, were widely quoted after his election 
in 2009. He stated that ‘Turkey is not part of Europe and will never be part of Europe’ 
and that ‘fundamental values’ of Europe would be undermined by the admittance of 
Turkey.45 A similar point is put forward by Zoltán Balzcό MEP who argues that ‘[w]ith 
regard to the accession of Turkey, there is a fundamental question to be clarified: what 
do we consider the European Union to be? Do we still consider the values, the shared 
European values important?...Do we deem the cultural heritage of Europe important as a 
cohesive force? If the answer is ‘yes’, Turkey has no place in the European Union’.46 
The importance of explicit arguments of European identity, and their relative weight in 
relation to rational factors is alluded to by Lorenzo Fontana, who suggests that Turkey is 
a country which ‘is no doubt strategic for Europe and with whom we can no doubt 
enjoy good trade relations. However, EU membership would surely also lead to 
imbalances in our very foundations and our core values’.47 The degree to which factors 
in the accession negotiations are intertwined are emphasised by Adrian Severin MEP 
who argues that conditionality for candidate countries should be ‘linked directly to their 
capacity to be interoperable with us from a legal, institutional, political and cultural 
point of view’.48 This viewpoint is echoed by other MEPs in various debates concerning 
Turkish accession, who give rational reasons opposing or supporting Turkish accession, 
before seeming to use identity factors as a rationale for their decision. These views on 
Turkish culture and identity are important in light of the references to article 49 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, that ‘any European state which respects our values and is committed to 
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promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union’.49 Although this is a 
clear indication of the importance of European values, less clarity is provided as to what 
those values are. 
 
The prevailing view of a Turkish culture and history differing from, and not 
interoperable with, European culture is not ubiquitous however, and a competing 
discourse exists. Pavel Poc MEP asserts that ‘[a]rguments against accession based on 
the pattern ‘European countries’ versus ‘Islamic countries’ are incorrect and wrong. 
Turkey’s historic affiliation with Europe is undeniable’,50 and this argument is taken up 
by Rumelili, who suggests that ‘[f]ollowing the failed siege of Vienna in 1683, a 
fundamental change occurred in the Ottoman outlook toward Europeans. Thereafter, the 
Ottomans implemented Europeanizing reforms in the military, in education, 
administration, dress, as well as political and civil rights’.51 Although MEPs do not refer 
this far back, perhaps because reference to the siege of Vienna would be counter-
productive, Geoffrey Van Orden MEP ‘support[s] the idea of Turkey as a secular and 
united country that, for over 80 years, has looked to the West’.52 ‘[T]his Muslim country 
is unique in that it took the first steps to adopting European values almost 100 years ago 
and, despite the various historical winds, it did not go off the road’.53 This alternative 
dialogue on Turkish and European history and culture is picked up by the Republic of 
Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA statement on ‘Relations Between 
Turkey and the European Union’ is filled with references to the efforts to westernise 
Turkey and the great importance Turkey places on its relations with European countries. 
It goes further, however, arguing that ‘[h]istorically, Turkish culture has had a profound 
impact over much of Eastern and Southern Europe’ before going on to point out that 
‘[d]uring the Cold War, Turkey was a part of the Western alliance, defending freedom, 
democracy and human rights’.54 These statements indicate the importance the Turkish 
government places on norms of identity and the degree to which Turkish and European 
identities correspond. This belief can be easily understood when it is suggested that 
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Croatia, ‘because of its geopolitical situation and historical relations, should 
unquestionably accede to the European Union as quickly as possible’.55  
 
At the present time Turkey and its supporters do not appear to have persuaded the 
majority of the European Parliament that Turkey is part of the “European family” of 
shared history and culture, with doubts expressed about the true outlook and direction of 
Turkey56 and her policies, as well as the true extent of the concordance of identity – 
‘[a]lthough Istanbul has an enlightened, Europe-orientated, educated population...[it is] 
not, unfortunately, representative of the country as a whole’.57 With the views expressed 
within the European Parliament and the comments made by Stephen Hughes regarding 
the unofficial fast-tracking of candidate countries on identity grounds, however, altering 
the discourse on Turkey’s place in the cultural history of Europe appears to be a vital 
stage towards the successful outcome of accession negotiations. When asked whether 
arguments of culture and history are a problem for the Turkish bid Richard Corbett 
answered that  
 
objectively it is because a lot of people say that. Whether or not it stands up to scrutiny 
is of course debatable. Turkey’s been part of European history for 400 years or so, a 
large part of Southeastern Europe was part of Turkey, Istanbul is still Europe’s largest 
city. It’s been integrated into the European context from the Council of Europe to its 
charter on human rights which is a set of common values as much as a legal document. 
It’s been part of UEFA and European football tournaments and other things, the 
Eurovision Song Contest for decades. We’ve accepted in a whole range of contexts that 
Turkey counts as a European country.58  
 
Despite this acceptance, it is clear that for some actors and elements within the 
European Parliament a ‘Western’ Turkey with a ‘European’ outlook and values is far 
from a given. 
 
The importance of perceived cultural differences was highlighted by the European 
Commission when it suggested the opening of accession negotiations. It stated that the 
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third pillar within its three pillared negotiations ‘entails enhanced political and cultural 
dialogue between the people of the EU member states and Turkey. This includes a 
dialogue on cultural differences, religion, migration issues and concerns about minority 
rights and terrorism’.59 This statement also serves to highlight another area of perceived 
discordance between European and Turkish identity. As I explained earlier in this thesis, 
religion is perceived by many within the European Parliament as a key factor in 
European identity. While the current religious practices are important for some, for 
many more the cultural religious inheritance in Europe is seen as a vital factor in 
European identity.  Some actors talk of a modern concept of Christendom, while 
references to Christianity as an important progenitor in shared European values are 
found throughout European Parliament debates,60 particularly those relating to Turkey. 
Hannu Takkula argues that ‘Middle Eastern culture is based on different values. We in 
Europe have been brought up in a world of Judaeo-Christian values, whilst theirs come 
from Islamic thinking. In both, people are treated differently, and the notion of a human 
being is different’.61 Fiona Hall suggests that ‘there is a right wing Christian tradition 
that has problems with the Muslim identity and says it’s not Europe’62 and, while this 
viewpoint is partially supported by evidence from the European Parliament, it appears 
too narrow to consign it solely to the ‘right wing’. Echoing his thoughts on culture, 
when asked about religion Richard Corbett responded that ‘I know a lot of people point 
to that. I’m not saying I agree with them. What I’m saying is that it is a fact that a lot of 
people see that it’s culturally difficult, it’s Islamic’.63 Indeed two respondents went so 
far as to say that within dealings with Turkey there were elements of Islamophobia.64 It 
is certainly clear from an analysis of discourse within the European Parliament that 
there is widespread support for the comments of Herman Van Rompuy, that ‘[t]he 
universal values which are in force in Europe , and which are also fundamental values 
of Christianity, will lose vigour with the entry of a large Islamic country such as 
Turkey’.65  
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Turkey goes some way towards addressing this issue by emphasising the secular nature 
of Turkish government, the opening line of the MFA statement points out that ‘Turkey is 
the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem world and has always attached great 
importance to developing its relations with other European countries’,66 but the broader 
issue is a greater challenge for Turkey. My research has indicated that Christianity is 
seen as an important facet of European identity, and this is an area where differences 
between Turkey and the EU are pronounced. Philip Claeys MEP argued during the 2009 
enlargement strategy debate in the European Parliament that ‘[u]nder the leadership of 
Mr. Erdogan and President Gül, Turkey is becoming more Islamist in nature...we do 
have some members here, and I am one of them, who are in favour of the idea of a 
European Europe’. Questionnaire respondents back up the view that religion will be a 
major factor in the outcome of Turkey’s membership bid, with one respondent rating the 
issue as “vital” to the outcome of the negotiations, and the other two rating it 
“important”.  
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of the idea of European identity founded in 
Christianity and Christian ideals, there is an alternative viewpoint, albeit much less 
frequently expressed, that this idea ignores the presence of Jews and Muslims in the EU 
at the moment. Stephen Hughes argues for the need for ‘a far more mature debate about 
how Islam and Christianity meet...and live and work together. We talk a great deal about 
the need to integrate migrants into the economic life of the European Union but in 
reality we continue to create ghettos in all sorts of parts of the European Union and, 
with it, increasing tensions’.67 Despite these comments, the prevailing opinion appears 
to be that European identity contains an important Christian component, and this would 
produce a clash between European and Turkish identities. Boguslaw Sonik MEP argues 
that Turkey ‘continues to be separated from Europe by a broad divide, because Europe 
stands in defence of fundamental values. This difference is a serious obstacle in building 
a common identity’.68 This dichotomy of views plays an important role in debates 
concerning Turkey,  
 
Alongside concerns about the clash of European and Turkish identities is the idea that 
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Turkish membership of the EU would change European identity. For some proponents 
of Turkish accession this is viewed as a positive move, for Turkey’s opponents, 
however, this is a source of worry and fear. This is of course linked to the degree to 
which the identities correspond but, as outlined earlier, social constructivists view 
identity as dynamic and the accession of Turkey has the potential to alter EU norms and 
change what is perceived as “appropriate” courses of action. Questionnaire respondents 
were asked to rate the degree to which they believed Turkish membership of the EU 
would influence European identity,69 and the two respondents who subscribe to the idea 
of European identity both suggested that the effect would be large.70 Interestingly the 
respondent who professed not to believe in European identity also suggested that there 
would be a slight effect.71 Despite this agreement on the effect Turkish membership 
would have on European identity, the impact this would have on the accession process 
is more debated. The respondent for whom Turkish membership is seen to have the 
greatest effect view this as “important” in the negotiating process, while both the other 
questionnaire respondents view the effect as “not very important”. 
 
Like respondents to the questionnaire, those I interviewed also had mixed views about 
the degree to which Turkish accession would impact on European identity. Opinion is 
divided about the degree to which identity would change with one respondent asserting 
that ‘I don’t think it would actually matter that much’, although the Turks’ attributes, 
‘strong, tough, resilient, militarily brave and courageous people’, would provide ‘a shot 
in the arm for Europe’.72 This view is supported by Fiona Hall, who argues that a 
European identity based in the founding principles of the EU would de facto remain 
strong as adherence to that identity would be a prerequisite to accession.73 ‘[T]hose are 
the basic principles, the Copenhagen Criteria...and they are not changeable’.74 Štefan 
Füle takes up this argument, suggesting that ‘The accession process is not there to 
compromise on our values. The accession process is for Turkey to embrace the values 
the European Union is so firmly based on’.75 This resistance to the constructivist notion 
of dynamism is interesting, and for those who view the European identity as having 
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cultural or religious components the potential for change is likely to be seen as more 
acute. Richard Corbett asserts that Turkish membership ‘would underline that European 
identity is pluralistic, its “unity with diversity”, but it would also have a message that 
it’s not based on a culturally exclusive viewpoint. It’s accepting that European identity 
is indeed, not just politically, but also culturally and religiously pluralistic’.76 This is 
viewed as a positive by those for whom religion should not play a role and pluralism is 
to be encouraged. ‘Ultimately it would strengthen the European Union and thereby help 
the development of a strong identity...We argue that need for more pluralism, it would 
be a challenge to us to make the European Union and the idea of Europe more pluralist 
as well, and that would not be a bad thing. I don’t think it’s healthy that we have this 
Christian basis to the whole thing...It’s not what Europe’s about’.77 ‘We must defend 
religious pluralism, tolerance and mutual understanding both here in Europe and 
everywhere in the world.’78 Evidence from the European Parliament suggests that there 
is a prevalent viewpoint which conflicts with this one, however, and those for whom 
religion and culture are important facets of European identity view a change in 
European identity in this direction and occurring in this way negatively, and as a move 
away from the “European family”. Rumelili picks up on this dichotomy, arguing that 
‘[t]hose who hold a principled objection to Turkey’s accession express the concern that 
its inclusion would dilute the particularistic norms of European society rooted in Judeo-
Christian heritage. In response, those who support Turkey’s accession argue that 
rejection would challenge the multicultural and universalistic foundations of European 
norms and identity’ before, tellingly, going on to state that ‘[e]ven when such 
constitutive questions are not explicitly addressed, discussions on the state of Turkey’s 
fulfilment of membership conditions in many ways remain derivative of these polarized 
positions’.79 
 
Despite the different views exhibited by actors within the European Parliament, it is 
clear that worries over the impact of Turkey on European identity influence the interests 
of some of those within the European Parliament.  The view of Mr. Van Rompuy that 
Turkey’s accession to the EU would result in a loss of “vigour” of Christian values and 
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European identity is echoed in the European Parliament,80 and it is pointed out that 
‘Turkish accession would inevitably change the nature of the EU project’.81 It is further 
argued that during accession negotiations ‘we are not only responsible for the accession 
candidate. Our primary responsibility is to the European Union’.82 These concerns have 
led some MEPs to reach the ‘unshakable conviction that it is not right for Turkey to 
enter a Europe whose unity depends, above all else, on the spirit of Christianity’.83 
These concerns have even led some proponents of Turkish accession to point out that ‘it 
is the integration of Turkey into the European Union that we support, not the integration 
of the European Union into Turkey’.84 Concerns over the potential change of European 
identity which would be associated with Turkish accession have produced some of the 
strongest overt arguments of identity, and this is consistent with the social constructivist 
assertion that an area in which identity is challenged is likely to produce a strong feeling 
of identity and will result in actors turning to identity arguments. 
 
The social constructivist notion of dynamic identities does not only give rise to the 
possibility of European identity change, it also affords the possibility of a change in 
Turkish identity. Earlier in my analysis I pointed to the presence of a drive towards 
enlargement as a factor in European identity, and my research indicates that some MEPs 
view EU enlargement and accession negotiations as a method for propagating European 
values and identity,85 and this appears to be the case with the Turkish membership bid. 
Indeed Metin Kazak explicitly calls for support of the Turkish application on this basis, 
suggesting that ‘if we really want the European perspective to continue to act as a 
catalyst for the political reforms in Turkey and to be a factor in discussing issues such as 
freedom of speech and the media, the Member States that are still opposed to this 
opening must reconsider their position’.86 It is suggested that ‘the European Union can 
play a role in the democratisation of Turkey by demanding full application of the 
European acquis without derogations, without self-seeking calculation and without 
applying a policy of double standards’.87 This application of pacta sunt servanda, an 
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element of European identity detailed earlier, is seen as vital to identity change. ‘After 
all, the basis of European integration is the saying pacta sunt servanda’88 and, it is 
argued, if Turkey feels she cannot trust the words of MEPs and other European actors, 
efforts in working towards accession, and the resulting identity change, will be 
compromised. ‘If Turkey’s membership prospects continue to weaken, [the] sceptics 
will wean their support from the reform process and begin to contest the necessity of 
targeting the highest standards in democracy and human rights. Although this will not 
reverse the progress that has been made, Turkey will nonetheless appear increasingly 
reluctant to comply with EU norms and values.’89 Godfrey Bloom suggests that ‘the 
dangling of the so-called carrot...of membership of the European Union is actually more 
likely to drive it into an Islamic fundamentalist state than not. We’re doing active harm 
with the dishonesty of our negotiating position. Everyone at senior level in the 
European Union knows that Turkey will never join. Much better to be honest about it’.90 
While this is certainly not a majority view, Godfrey Bloom is not alone in suggesting it, 
and it is indicative of the perceived need to operate fair and open conditionality. 
Andreas Mölzer agrees that ‘A greater degree of honesty needs to be brought into the 
negotiations with Turkey and the way prepared for a privileged partnership’,91 while 
Monika Flašíková Beňová suggests that ‘in order to be honest, and if we affirm that 
Turkey is gradually fulfilling the criteria, then we must not talk in advance about a 
privileged partnership. It would be better to tell Turkey directly that, despite fulfilling 
all the criteria, it will not achieve full EU membership. In my opinion, that would be 
honest on our part’.92 John Purvis suggests that for Turkish membership to become a 
reality ‘Turkey will probably change more that the EU will change...It’s one of the 
reasons I think it would be a good thing; they should join. Like all the other countries 
that have joined, it’ll become tied into the morés of Europe, a European identity’.93 
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt argues for the need to continue pushing for change in Turkish 
identity without worry about the potential change in Europe and European identity, ‘The 
European perspective is a driving force for democratic reforms...EU policy should never 
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be driven by fear’.94 It is very difficult to extricate the desire to expand and reinforce 
European identity from the desire to create stability throughout the European Union and 
its neighbours, not least because stability can be seen to occur with an accordance of 
identity and normative factors, but I believe that I have demonstrated that there is a 
normative drive behind enlargement. 
 
Rational arguments and normative factors 
 
Throughout this thesis I have indicated that it is not my intention to ignore or attempt to 
downplay the importance of the traditionally accepted, rationalist factors which are at 
play in the accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey as I believe 
that they are inseparable from factors of identity. Instead I aim to explore the normative 
underpinning which dictates the appropriate course of action, and the dominant 
discourse in particular areas, taking Stephen Hughes’ comment that arguments of 
identity are often not used openly. The focus of this thesis is identity in the European 
Parliament and the role of norms on actor interest and behaviour, an analysis of decision 
making with regards to Turkish accession is beyond the scope of this research. For this 
reason I do not intend to provide a thorough and exhaustive examination of these 
factors, as these analyses can be found elsewhere95. Instead I will look at these factors 
briefly, before examining the interplay between normative factors and these issues 
which are not normally deemed to have a normative element. 
 
One factor in the accession negotiations which is seen to cause a number of problems is 
the size of Turkey and its population. By the time there is a possibility of Turkish 
accession it is projected to have a population larger than any other single country within 
the European Union. This would mean that, if current rules were still in place and no 
special measures were brought in, it would have the largest number of MEPs and a great 
deal of influence. This is viewed within the European Parliament as a potentially large 
problem, especially for Germany which is currently the largest member state, ‘It’s long 
been the tag...that the French have always regarded the European Union as a German 
                                                 
94Anna Maria Corazza Bildt MEP, ‘Democratisation in Turkey (debate)’. 
95
 See, for example, Arikan, H., Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? 
Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006; Flam, H., ‘Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession’ 
CESifo Working Paper 893. 
 178 
 
horse with a French jockey, and that is certainly true’,96 and this is perceived to be under 
threat by Turkish accession. The impact Turkish membership would have on the 
institutions of the EU was ranked as vital by one questionnaire respondent, important by 
one and not very important by the third. There are other problems associated with the 
size of the Turkish population, it is an issue ‘in terms of the EU rules on free circulation 
of EU citizens, the right of abode etc. in other EU countries. After the enlargement to 
Eastern Europe there’s a growing realisation that that could potentially mean a large 
number of migrants from Turkey’.97 This is again undoubtedly a problem for some 
actors, particularly in France and Germany. ‘It’s a bigger issue for Turkey because of its 
size irrespective of the cultural things or identity issues...but, of course, the combination 
of the two means that Turkish accession is more controversial than, say, Croatian or 
Icelandic accession’.98 
 
The evidence of my research suggests that issues of immigration and shifts in the 
balance of power in the institutions of the EU would be problematic irrespective of the 
candidate country, but these problems are undoubtedly exacerbated by the identity 
issues discussed throughout this thesis. For some within Europe, and the European 
Parliament, the difference between European identity and Turkish identity is great, some 
even perceiving Turkey in some ways as the “Other” which European identity is set up 
in opposition to, as discussed earlier. As demonstrated throughout this research, ‘[t]he 
perception of Europe as a geographical, religious and cultural space that does not 
include Turkey is strongly entrenched. Turkey and the Turks have been viewed as 
constituting the central “Other” to Europe and the Europeans, and references reaching 
back to the Crusades can be made.’99 This means that allowing Turkey a major say in 
EU politics and allowing large numbers of Turks to reside throughout Europe would be 
problematic. My research indicates that size and identity are inextricably linked in the 
Turkish accession bid, with the suggestion that it would probably not be a major 
problem for the EU to allow a country with a different identity, including a Muslim 
country, to join. The issue for Turkey appears to be twofold, that it is perceived to have 
an identity significantly different from European identity, and that if it were allowed to 
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accede it would be large enough to impact on European identity. ‘Admitting a very 
large...member state, predominantly poor, Muslim country would clearly change the 
nature of the EU. They would become the big power brokers then. They would have the 
most seats in the European Parliament, the most votes in the Council of Ministers. It 
would profoundly change the terms of the debate’.100 Although this view appears 
repeatedly throughout my research, it is not unanimously held. Fiona Hall argues that 
‘the European Parliament is a big place, there are many, many other people and no one 
country, even of that size, can dominate completely...the Germans do not rule the roost 
in the EP, it’s very much a pluralistic set-up and I think that Turkey would simply 
become part of that pluralistic set-up’.101 
 
As indicated by the comments of Martin Callanan above, the issue of money and the 
cost of Turkish membership to the existing EU member states is closely related to its 
size, and is at the forefront of many of my respondents’ minds. One questionnaire 
respondent ranked the impact Turkish membership will have on the budget and funds of 
the EU as a vital issue in accession negotiations, while one ranked it as important and 
the last as not very important. This level of disagreement was also evident amongst 
interviewees, some argue that cost is an area which is relevant to every accession and 
nothing which hasn’t been addressed before. For others the expense involved in 
bringing Turkey into the EU is a great stumbling block, Godfrey Bloom argues that 
money will be the biggest deciding factor in accession negotiations, and that ‘the golden 
rule is follow the money’.102 There is certainly a view amongst some actors in the 
European Parliament that ‘Turkey wants to join the European Union because they will 
have their hands out in the hope of having them filled with lots of European taxpayers’ 
money in subsidies, and they see the opportunity of offloading millions of their poor 
and unemployed excess population by exporting them to Western countries’.103 The 
economic arguments are also inseparable from arguments of identity, however, and 
respondents suggested that the figures involved are not the only reason it is difficult to 
give money to Turkey. Libor Rouček suggested to me that, even if the money was 
currently available, there was not the political will in the EU to give Turkey the amount 
of money it would be entitled to if it joined the Union. When asked whether this was 
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tied to European identity and how ‘European’ Turkey is Dr. Rouček replied ‘I think 
that’s the case. I think if you look at the current state of Greece I think people are 
willing to show some solidarity’.104 Although the solidarity with Greece might have 
subsequently reduced, the importance of identity is only likely to heighten in times of 
economic uncertainty, with limited resources made available to those viewed as sharing 
identity and withheld from those viewed as the “Other”. Bill Newton Dunn echoes the 
comments of Dr. Rouček, that ‘it is true for every member state that joins...that they 
usually join because they’re short of cash’ and that the EU are happy to oblige in the 
cases of the Balkan states, ‘they are European, there’s no question...Turkey not being 
geographically so obviously Europe is more difficult’.105 
 
One of the areas which is seen almost universally as a major problem for Turkey in their 
membership bid is the issue of Cyprus. Two questionnaire respondents rated ongoing 
problems concerning Turkey’s continued involvement in Cyprus as vital, while the third 
ranked it as important. Similarly interviewees overwhelmingly suggested that the 
problems in Cyprus would have to be resolved before Turkey could accede to 
membership. Interestingly Libor Rouček, Vice-President of the European Parliament, 
did not go that far, arguing only that ‘in an ideal case...there should be a solution before 
that’.106 It seems very unlikely, however, that Turkey would get the required unanimous 
support of member states if a resolution were not reached. The accepted and prevailing 
viewpoint within the EU is that Turkey ‘is illegally occupying 40% of the Republic of 
Cyprus and scuppering every solution to the problem’.107 Arguments relating to Cyprus 
are not beyond the realm of normative influence, with suggestion that ‘the aggressive 
and unfair behaviour of [Turkey] is out of line with the system of principles and values 
which we are obliged and have undertaken to defend.’108 Indeed there is some 
suggestion that the prevailing attitude regarding Turkey is as widespread as it is within 
the EU because it has become established that is the appropriate behaviour for a 
member of the European Union. Geoffrey Van Orden argued in the European Parliament 
that ‘in relation to Cyprus...a distorted version of recent history has unfortunately 
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become the accepted wisdom’,109 before going on to argue that Turkish Northern 
Cyprus had made efforts to resolve the issue which were rejected by the Republic of 
Cyprus. John Purvis went as far as to suggest that the concern expressed over Cyprus 
was ‘another excuse issue’.110 Although the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus and 
the effect this will have on accession negotiations is beyond contention, it does 
demonstrate that there are normative components to all the ‘rational’ arguments which 
face Turkey. 
 
The nature of the debate over Turkey is such that rationalist arguments are deployed in 
favour of Turkish accession as well as in opposition. Proponents of Turkish accession 
argue for ‘the strategic importance of full EU membership for Turkey’,111 and that ‘we 
need Turkey in the European Union for many reasons’.112 One of the most cited reasons 
in favour of Turkish membership is the stabilising effect it would have on the region and 
the EU’s neighbours. It is believed that allowing Turkey to accede will reduce tensions 
in the region and allow more friendly relations between member states of the EU and 
nations in the Middle East. Once again, there is an undoubted rationalist basis to these 
arguments, but I do not believe that they can be completely removed from identity 
factors. As I suggested earlier in my analysis, there is a competing discourse in relation 
to Turkey which is less common but is often cited by actors who point to strategic 
reasons in support of accession. In contrast with the ‘Clash of Civilisations’113 discourse 
which tends to dominate thinking in relation to Turkey, is an “Alliance of Civilisations” 
discourse114. This view positions Turkey as between Europe and the Middle East, or the 
“Western” and “Islamic” civilisations, with its unique identity as a democratic, Western 
looking Muslim state. This discourse views the EU as having ‘a historic opportunity to 
influence Turkey’s development-...building a sturdy bridge between Europe and the 
Muslim world’115. 
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Alongside the security role which Turkey is seen as potentially playing within the EU, 
another rational factor seen as working in Turkey’s favour is energy and energy security. 
Actors within the EU point to the key geopolitical role of Turkey as an energy hub, 
situated near major oil and gas reserves, and a key stage in the journey these resources 
go on before arriving in EU member states. This is, of course, linked to the Alliance of 
Civilisations hypothesis, as it is suggested that membership of the EU for Turkey would 
improve relations between EU member states and energy rich countries in the Middle 
East, marking a move away from the Clash of Civilisations. The importance of energy 
security was highlighted by Geoffrey Van Orden in the European Parliament when he 
rhetorically asked ‘[a]t a time when, in all our countries, we have serious concerns about 
energy security and Turkey is in such a key geographical position in providing the 
routes for pipelines from the Caspian, why is the energy chapter [of accession 
negotiations] not open?’.116 Perhaps the answer to this question is that the opening of 
chapters of accession negotiations are not supposed to be linked to factors such as this, 
but it does highlight that this issue is in the minds of actors in the European Parliament.  
 
Although there appears to be a normative component to these reasons for favouring 
Turkish accession, for some they appear to be separate from arguments of identity, and 
indeed reinforce the use of identity arguments against Turkey. ‘There is an identity issue 
I’m sure, because the positive arguments are nothing to do with it. They’re usually to do 
with trying to make a bridge to the Middle East, defending us from Russia, energy 
security, pipelines, all those...more hard, practical issues rather than emotional 
issues’.117 This is supported by Franz Obermayr who argues that ‘it would be possible to 
resolve numerous non-European conflicts following Turkey’s accession. However, 
despite Turkey’s participation in the Eurovision song contest, [Europe] is built on three 
hills: on the acropolis for Greek humanism, on the Capitol in Rome for the concept of 
the European state and on Golgotha for the Christian Western world’.118 Clearly this is 
not a universally held view however, Olli Rehn, then European Commissioner for 
enlargement, points to Turkey’s ‘key role in energy security and in the dialogue between 
civilisations’.119  
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It is clear that in the minds of MEPs issues of identity and rational factors are not 
separable, and neither provides a single determining factor in actor interest in relation to 
Turkey. This is highlighted by two MEPs with contrasting views on Turkish accession. 
Pino Arlacchi favours ‘full EU membership for Turkey’ on the grounds that: 
 
I have heard many objections to this process and I believe many of them are well 
grounded, but I believe also that these objections are overshadowed by three facts... 
First, the contribution of Turkey to the stability of the world economy.... The second 
fact is the strengthening of global peace generated by Turkey’s democratisation process 
and its related problem-free foreign policy. There has been a huge change of course of 
Turkish foreign policy in the right direction, which is positively affecting all East-West 
relationships. The third is the quality of Turkish social policies.120 
 
In contrast, Elmar Brok argues that:  
 
Turkey is strategically important to us, but not at any price. Firstly, we cannot abolish 
the conditions for accession, including freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, 
rights for minorities and freedom of religion... Secondly, we must not put the integration 
capacity of the European Union at risk... Thirdly, it is Turkey’s responsibility to ensure 
that this process is not obstructed and, at last, to keep the promises that it has made in 
the context of the Ankara Protocol.121 
 
It is clear from these two contrasting viewpoints that addressing the issue of Turkish 
accession in terms of either rational or normative factors does not adequately cover the 
complex forces which influence actor interest and behaviour. 
 
The exact impact of European identity on the decisions made within the European 
Parliament on the Turkish membership bid is difficult to gauge, and this could perhaps 
form the basis of future research. What is clear is that factors which are traditionally 
viewed as rational and normative factors are inextricably linked. As I demonstrated in 
an earlier chapter, the concept of European identity is one which is widely subscribed to 
within the European Parliament. This European identity is dynamic, but in its current 
form is comprised of norms of the founding ideology of the European Union 
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(democracy, rule of law, human rights etc.); a drive towards enlargement of the EU; 
European culture and history and Christian religion and heritage. Although I have 
spoken of a single European identity this is, as with all identities, an over simplification 
of the normative environment. My research has shown that different norms are 
experienced to different degrees by different actors within the European Parliament and 
the Logic of Appropriateness dictates that this produces different attitudes and interests 
in the different actors.  
 
For a large number of MEPs there appear to be concerns relating to the degree to which 
European and Turkish identities do not correspond or indeed are in conflict. This can be 
broadly tied to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ hypothesis, and fears stem from the 
opposing concerns of the difficulty in building a common identity and the degree to 
which Turkish membership of the EU would change European identity. These problems 
both stem from the belief that a common identity is a strong cohesive force in the EU 
and important for it to continue functioning. This viewpoint appears to be strongly 
related to the belief that there is a Christian basis to European identity and that Christian 
heritage is a factor which unifies member states. This is not exclusively true however, 
and there were other areas of difference referred to in the European Parliament, such as 
culture and the nature of norms of democracy and rights. Associated with this view is 
the depiction of Turkey as the “Other” which European identity is set up in opposition 
to. This view is also closely related to an opposition between a modern Christendom 
and the Muslim world, but in parts of Europe has a more directly historical basis. 
Respondents in my research suggested that for some the image of “Turks at the gates” 
and the memory of the Battle of Vienna are still a very real and powerful, and it is 
certainly raised in the European Parliament.122 This image, and this view of Turkey, is in 
direct opposition to the norm for peace in the EU and very much positions Turkey as a 
threat to European identity. 
 
An alternative viewpoint exists within the European Parliament, although it does appear 
to be a less commonly held view. This contrasting attitude views changes to European 
identity associated with Turkish membership as a positive force. This viewpoint 
primarily appears to be held by those who do not view a strong link between religion 
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and European values, although this does not necessarily mean they are not religious. 
One respondent pointed out that they are themselves Christian, but that they did not 
believe that religion and politics should mix, and that there is no religious basis to the 
European Union.123 Turkish membership is perceived by these actors as moving 
European identity towards a more religiously and culturally pluralistic identity and this 
is viewed as a positive. The key difference for these actors compared to those 
subscribing to the previous viewpoint is that this pluralism would not come at the cost 
of the values of the European Union, rather it would strengthen them. Allied to this view 
of positive change to European identity is the ‘Alliance of Civilisations’ model, which 
argues that Turkish membership of the EU would bring improved relations with the 
Middle East and the EU’s near neighbours. While those who propound the Alliance of 
Civilisations model do not speak in terms of identity change, it is precisely this change 
in identity, from a Christian based identity (or at least an identity which is perceived as 
based in Christianity to those outside the EU) to a more pluralistic and open identity. 
 
There is, of course, a third group of MEPs for whom identity is not perceived to play a 
large role, and this can be further subdivided into two categories. I have found evidence 
of a small number of actors within the European Parliament, who believe that there is 
not a large difference between European and Turkish identity, or that by the time Turkey 
would join the Union the identities would greatly correspond. This viewpoint appears to 
be associated with the small number of actors who subscribe to a European identity 
which is based almost exclusively in the values of the EU set out in the founding 
treaties. As these values are enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria they are seen to be a 
prerequisite of membership, so any difference in identity would be negligible upon 
accession. The second group who do not believe that Turkish membership would 
influence European identity are those who do not believe such a thing exists. These 
actors generally have a strong component of national identity and interest informing 
their behaviour and dictating appropriate action and are not concerned with identity at a 
European level. Despite this, many of these actors concede that considerations of 
European identity are important in many actors at EU level. 
 
I have indicated throughout this thesis that European identity is widespread in the 
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European Parliament and this is borne out by my documentary research, supported by 
interviews and questionnaire data. I believe that the European Parliament is likely to 
attract those wishing to be members who are from the extremes of the spectrum 
concerning European identity rather than those who are ambivalent to it, although that is 
an area I am not able to address here. As I demonstrated in the last chapter however, 
there is a socialising effect of the European Parliament, and the European Union as a 
whole, and, as would be expected, my research has indicated this group of MEPs to be 
relatively small. The nature of the European Parliament as an arena for normative 
argument and debate suggested that European identity would be felt strongly within it, 
and this has certainly been supported by my research. Evidence has suggested that 
European identity is felt to some degree by a majority of MEPs, and the nature of the 
debate over Turkey amplifies that feeling.  Debates within the EP emphasise European 
norms, strengthening European identity in relation to other elements of identity (such as 
national and regional identities) and influencing decisions made. This is especially true 
in the competence of enlargement, and particularly in the case of Turkey, where identity 
is regularly and robustly invoked and challenged. 
 
Although within debates in the European Parliament there are direct references to 
identity arguments I do not believe that such arguments are the full impact of norms and 
identity arguments. Multiple respondents pointed to the degree to which identity 
influences decision making without being directly cited. Much of the debate within the 
European Parliament in relation to Turkish accession refers to the need for Turkey to 
meet the Copenhagen Criteria in relation to democracy, rule of law and human rights. 
Interestingly, the other requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria are discussed less 
often, perhaps because it is assumed that they will be met, or perhaps because they are 
deemed to be less important. Although there are clear reasons of defence and security 
for demanding these reforms from Turkey, I believe the normative arguments relating to 
the “fundamental values” of the EU have become sufficiently taken for granted that they 
are no longer actively considered, MEPs are unable to conceive of the possibility of a 
member not reaching these normative standards. Other factors which are normally 
considered purely in terms of cost benefit analyses are also inextricably bound up with 
normative factors. Throughout European Parliament debates on Turkish accession issues 
such as Turkey’s size and relative poverty and the problems in Cyprus are often 
mentioned, as are concerns over energy security and military alliance, but the nature, 
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shape and direction of European Parliament debates have demonstrated that rational and 
identity factors are inseparable. Indeed Rumelili goes as far as arguing that ‘when EU-
Turkey relations are being debated, the EU politicians are not debating Turkey per se, 
but how “Europe” writ large is being constituted through its relations with Turkey’.124 
European Parliament debates also highlight the power norms have in setting actor 
priorities in relation to these issues, with MEPs acknowledging that there are gains and 
losses involved in Turkish membership but giving different emphases to different 
factors. Although there will be some variation in the applicability of each of these 
factors throughout the EU, and each will be felt differently in various member states, 
there does not appear to be a direct correlation between geographical location and 
attitude towards Turkey. Within the UK, the primary locus of my study, there is a 
marked variation in attitudes towards Turkish accession, and I believe that the nature 
and extent of European identity is one of the factors which explain this phenomenon.  
 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a strong association between the European 
identity as understood and experienced by the actor and their attitude towards Turkey. 
Although norms of European identity do not consciously influence the interests of all 
MEPs, I believe that these norms dictate what constitutes appropriate behaviour for the 
actor, and which factors are the most important in the Turkish membership bid. I also 
believe, however, that rational choice factors retain strength and it is possible that there 
are those for whom identity and norms are employed in a rhetorical way (mirroring 
Schimmelfennig’s “rhetorical action”). In this way decisions which are based in cost 
benefit analyses are phrased in terms of identity to provide them with extra influence. 
This does, however, still indicate that identity influences some actors within the EP. 
Although my research has demonstrated the importance of identity and norms in the 
decision making process over Turkish accession, further research could perhaps be 
conducted into identifying occurrences of this “rhetorical action”. 
 
In the preceding chapters I have demonstrated that, within the European Parliament, 
there is a widespread European identity which is based in the fundamental, founding 
principles of the EU (which for some is linked to a Christian heritage), culture, religion 
and a drive towards enlargement. I then showed that the Parliament is an arena in which 
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this identity is displayed, strengthened and refined. This identity can have a profound 
impact on the attitudes and interests of actors within the European Parliament in relation 
to the accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. Although it is 
semantically convenient to talk of ‘rational’ factors and their impact on actor interest 
and behaviour, within a social constructivist framework such as the one I have 
employed, interests can never be entirely removed from norms and identity. As I 
explored earlier, norms have the power to affect actor behaviour through a variety of 
mechanisms. Although different scholars afford these mechanisms different names - 
Reus-Smit talks of norms influencing imagination, communication and constraining 
actors,125 while Wendt talks of coercion and consent126 - it is clear that to talk of any 
interests without considering normative factors would be to provide an incomplete 
picture. Actor interest and behaviour is to a large part governed by internalised norms, 
courses of action are not open to them which lie beyond the normatively imposed scope 
of their imagination. In addition to this actors can be coerced or constrained by norms, 
and interest will not be governed by ‘rational’ factors. Although it is difficult to assess 
the relative strength of ‘normative’ and ‘rational’ factors, it is clear that interest cannot 
be understood in isolation from identity, nor identity in isolation from interest. The role 
of norms in limiting actors imaginations, in constraining behaviour and in dictating 
appropriate action must be considered before drawing any conclusions regarding actor 
interest. 
 
The strength of identity within the European Parliament and the degree to which that 
identity is invoked when debating the issue of Turkish accession mean that an analysis 
of interests which exclude these factors would be insufficient and any predictions made 
using a rationalist framework inaccurate. Although I believe that a social constructivist 
framework allows a better analysis of interest and decision-making in relation to 
Turkish membership of the EU, this will not necessarily result in specific predictions as 
to the future course of relations between Turkey and the EU. The different norms and 
competing discourses, in combination with a lack of stability in relations will impact on 
the ability to make detailed predictions for the future. Although this research has not 
directly addressed questions of decision making with regards to Turkish membership, 
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the employment of a social constructivist framework has drawn attention to issues 
which have, thus far, prevented accurate predictions as to the course of future 
negotiations being made, and have laid the groundwork for future research in this area. 
The social constructivist outlook, supported by the findings of this research, have also 
highlighted the possibility for changes of norms, identities and interests in the future 
which could have a profound impact on the accession negotiations. 
 
While the preceding chapters have established that there is a “European identity” in the 
European Parliament and the important role played by the institution itself in the nature 
and strength of this identity, it was not a logical necessity from this that European 
identity influenced actor interest in the European Parliament. Instead it was necessary to 
produce a clear mechanism through which normative factors influenced the attitudes of 
actors and the decisions reached. In this chapter I have shown that an understanding of 
interest in the European Parliament requires an understanding of identity and norms 
within the institution. Although decisions are generally seen to rely on rational factors, 
these factors cannot be understood in isolation from the influence of norms. Perhaps 
more importantly, this chapter has demonstrated that not only are European level norms 
present within the European Parliament, European identity is felt strongly by MEPs. 
European level norms and European identity are not simply discarded when difficult 
and sensitive issues, with interests and appropriate action constituted by national norms. 
The case study of Turkey was chosen because the social constructivist scholarship 
suggested that it would be an area in which European identity would be expressed and 
challenged. This research has substantiated that assertion but goes further, showing that 
European identity runs deeper than a superficial justification for rational arguments. 
This chapter has provided an important exploration of the strength and impact of 
European identity on MEPs, as well as further clarifying the nature of that identity. The 
conclusion which can be strongly drawn is that European identity plays an important 
role in the life and activity of the European Parliament. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the nature of identity within the European 
Parliament, how identity is experienced and expressed and the relative strength of this 
identity in actor interest. To highlight and investigate these issues I chose the topic of 
Turkish accession to membership of the EU as a case study. In order to perform a structured 
and delimited analysis I formulated research questions (stated earlier) and these questions 
will each be addressed in turn. 
 
Is there a “European identity” within the European Parliament? If so, on what norms is 
this identity based? 
 
Although the treaties and documents of the European Union avoid specific reference to a 
European or European Union identity, they do speak of shared European values, and there 
is a widespread acceptance that there are normative factors which tie member states of the 
EU together. Despite this acceptance, scholars have questioned whether this amounts to a 
European identity, often suggesting that these are merely common factors of separate 
identities, and that European norms and identity are absent from the institutions of the 
European Union. Indeed Risse suggests that, in contrast to earlier neo-functionalist theory, 
‘[u]p to the early 1990s, the conventional wisdom simply held that European integration 
was somehow marching along without any noticeable transfers of loyalty from the nation-
states to the European level’.1 In this way the conception of the European Parliament, and 
the institutions of the European Union generally, is logically limited to that of an 
intervening variable, an arena for intergovernmental, or at least inter-state, bargaining.2 For 
this reason, the presence of European norms and identity are key to the “thicker” view of 
the institutions of the EU which I advance. 
 
The choice to focus this research on the European Parliament and the identity of MEPs 
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raised a number of issues many, although not all, of which formed the basis for the 
selection of the European Parliament. The concept of the European Parliament as 
intervening variable is perhaps strengthened by the composition of the institution, with 
MEPs directly elected by an electorate within their home nation. This factor was important, 
however in understanding the interaction of different identities and norms from different 
levels within individual actors. While the expression of European identity, or at the least 
European interest, is explicitly within the remit of actors within the European Commission, 
for example, this is not the case with the European Parliament. The relatively short term of 
office of MEPs and the degree to which European elections are influenced by national 
politics have also been cited as reasons for the importance of national identity relative to 
European norms. The European Parliament was in large part chosen as the focus of study 
precisely because of this multi-focal basis to identity. 
 
I decided early in the research process that focussing on a single institution would allow me 
greater focus and specificity than looking at multiple European institutions, and the nature 
of the European Parliament means that identity and normative complexity are high. I 
established at an early stage of my research the need for specificity of study and 
terminology and, although I was studying “European identity”, and this label remains 
useful, the focus of my study was norms and identity within the élite of the European 
Parliament rather than a broad European identity experienced by the population of member 
states. 
 
This research project was founded on the social constructivist contention that there would 
be a discernable presence of European norms with the European Parliament, leading to 
what I describe as “European identity”, alongside the more established norms associated 
with national identity. On this fundamental point the research conducted supported this 
assertion. A documentary analysis, primarily focussing on European Parliament debates and 
statements by MEPS, indicated the presence of European identity, and this view was 
supported by the evidence of interviewees and questionnaire respondents. Although this 
identity was found to be present, it is not universally expressed, and there was not 
unanimity amongst respondents. Although I would argue that the norms are present 
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throughout the institution, the social constructivist framework employed does not require 
European identity to be expressed by all MEPs to demonstrate the presence of European 
level norms. The theories relating to the effect of norms, outlined earlier in the thesis, show 
that there is scope for norms simply to be ignored by actors, or for appropriate action to be 
governed by other, perhaps national, norms. My research has demonstrated that European 
identity exists within the institution of the European Parliament and that, although not 
universally experienced, European norms play an important role in constituting actor 
identity. 
 
My previous research had highlighted the importance of what I refer to as the “founding 
ideology” of the European Union - norms of democracy, peace, rule of law, justice and 
human rights - in European identity. For this reason these values, explicitly referred to in 
the treaties of the EU, formed a natural starting point for my research concerning European 
identity. It is clear from my research that norms concerning the “founding ideology” play 
an integral role in the formation of European identity, and I found evidence for this 
founding ideology as taken for granted norms. Alongside these norms I investigated the 
influence on European identity of cultural, historical and religious factors, which are not 
explicitly stated and have previously proved more contentious. These factors are regularly 
referred to and debated within the European Parliament and, particularly during 
enlargement debates, much is made of arguments based in culture and religion. This 
evidence is supported by data from primary research - while some respondents argue that 
each of these factors should not be components of European identity, other respondents 
argue that they unequivocally are. My research shows that cultural, historical and religious 
norms have a role to play in the constitution of European identity experienced within the 
European Parliament. 
 
Although I initially spoke of the presence of a European identity, the reality of the identity 
complex within the European Parliament is that norms generated and strengthened at the 
European level influence different actors to differing degrees. While it has been possible to 
highlight these norms and investigate European identity, it would be to over-simplify the 
situation considerably to speak of a single, unified European identity. It is clear from my 
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research that these norms and factors influence actors within the European Parliament, but 
the influence of each varies from actor to actor and from situation to situation. The identity 
of each actor varies, but my research has allowed me to identify the common factors and 
norms of actor identities. To assess the degree to which European norms influence actors, 
constituting their identity, it was necessary for me to investigate the interests of MEPs, 
employing the case study of Turkish membership, and this is discussed later. 
 
A further facet of European identity highlighted by my research is the specificity of identity 
within the European Parliament. Although a significant proportion of my research was into 
the effect of the institution of the European Parliament on identity, and I argued that 
European identity would be felt more strongly within the EP than amongst the population 
of Europe as a whole, I did not initially explicitly address the unique nature of identity 
within the EP. Amongst my respondents could be found the point of view that the particular 
form of European identity found within the European Parliament was substantively 
different from European identity experienced elsewhere in the European Union. While this 
does to a degree limit the broader applicability of my research within the EU, it also serves 
to emphasise the role played by the institution itself. This presents an interesting possibility 
for future research, investigating similar phenomena to those I studied but in a different 
setting, for example within the European Commission, and I believe that my research has 
outlined a framework within which this future research could be carried out. These findings 
could then be compared to the results of my research to analyse how identity varies 
between European Union institutions. 
 
Another area of identity within the European Parliament which emerged during the course 
of the research is the presence of identity within the political groupings of the European 
Parliament. Although MEPs sit by political group in the Parliament, little research effort 
has been dedicated to investigating identity in these groupings. Although I anticipated that 
there would be preference and policy similarities between members of a group, irrespective 
of nationality, my research suggested that in some cases these similarities went beyond 
tactical, utilitarian associations and included an identity component. Although I did not 
explicitly investigate this phenomenon, and it could perhaps be an avenue for fruitful future 
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research, I believe this can be seen as further proof of the socialising power of the European 
Parliament. 
 
How strong is this identity, and how does it interact with pre-existing identities? 
 
There have traditionally been two contrasting, and indeed contradictory, views of the 
strength of European identity for MEPs, the view that there was no discernible impact of 
European identity on actor preferences or decisions,3 and the view that MEPs “go native”, 
abandoning national identity entirely. The view of members of the institutions of the EU 
“going native” draws on the work of Haas, who suggested that ‘[p]olitical integration is the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift 
their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre’.4 This language of 
“going native” is often used in a derogatory way, in part because this implies a removal 
from, and perhaps a disregard for, the electorate.  
 
My contention from the beginning of this research process was that this polarised view of 
actor identity was incomplete and unhelpful, that European identity did not replace national 
identity, instead I argued that these identities could co-exist. For this reason it was 
necessary for me to create a framework within which norms of identity are experienced and 
followed. As such, I moved away from talk of strength of European identity, towards 
talking more of the degree to which European norms influence actors in relation to the 
influence of national norms. My research indicates that norms based at the European level 
play a greater role in the identity of MEPs than in the population at large, although there is 
little indication that MEPs “go native”. There was a suggestion in my research, however, 
that MEPs had to a greater or lesser degree become removed from the identity of those who 
elected them. 
 
In place of a model where one identity is replaced wholesale with another identity, or where 
loyalties shift, I propose a complex picture of norms present at the national level and the 
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European level where the appropriate norms are selected on a case by case basis. This does 
not imply that norms and identities are unstable, although they are dynamic, instead it 
indicates the presence of multiple stable norms and the coexistence of multiple identities. 
Alongside these levels of norms my research found repeated reference to the importance of 
other normative levels, including a level below the national level. Respondents particularly 
highlighted the importance of regional identity, and this was not an area I had anticipated 
being represented at the European level. Despite the presence of these unexpected norms, I 
do not believe they significantly affected the outcome of my research. I was aware at the 
outset that other norms would be present and that they would often be in competition with 
norms from the European level, indeed this was a key factor in the research. As such, the 
point of origin of these competing norms and the extant identity of actors does not greatly 
influence their relevance at a European level. I acknowledge throughout my thesis that 
actors do not enter the European Parliament in a state of normative vacuum, instead 
investigating the effect of European norms on existing actor identity. 
 
My research suggested the presence of a sliding scale of identity, with actors influenced by 
their regional, national and European identities, but to different degrees dependent upon the 
situation. While there was little evidence for a complete adoption of European identity at 
the expense of other identities, analysis of European Parliament debate data did suggest that 
European norms and identity were expressed strongly in areas of European decision 
making, areas where consensus was required at European level, and areas where a high 
level of common action and cooperation exists. This analysis is supported by the primary 
research conducted; interview data suggests that European identity is felt more strongly in 
these areas than those which do not fulfil the above criteria. These findings were in line 
with the social constructivist theory which formed the basis for my selection of Turkey as 
the case study for the research. Debates concerning Turkish accession are hotbeds for 
normative arguments and those based in identity, and the actors I spoke to in my research 
largely agreed that the case of Turkey’s potential accession to membership of the European 
Union was one in which European identity was felt strongly. That is, one where the strength 
of European norms was high in relation to other norms. The role played by the European 
Parliament itself will be discussed in more detail below. 
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What effect does the institution of the European Parliament have on the identity of actors 
within it? 
 
In keeping with the social constructivist understanding of institutions, I investigated the 
potential role of the European Parliament as a “thick institution”, acting as more than an 
arena for actor bargaining. A social constructivist approach argues that the European 
Parliament is constituted by the actors within it and, in turn, constitutes those actors, and I 
believe that the findings of my research support this assertion. There was both explicit and 
implicit support for the idea of the European Parliament socialising actors with norms. 
 
In line with social constructivist theorising, my research established that the European 
Parliament amounts to more than the rules which govern its function, the regulative norms, 
which are set out in the treaties of the EU. Instead, the Parliament is a dynamic institution 
with the ability to change and evolve independent of treaty change. This change is 
normative based, and is a result of the Parliament being constituted by its members. My 
research supports the idea of the European Parliament as a thick institution, indeed I view 
the institution not in terms of the formal rules which govern it, instead I look at the 
intersubjective understandings and shared meanings which comprise it. As a result of these 
factors, the institution itself gains an important role in the identity of those within it. 
 
I found evidence supporting the action of Checkel’s “socialization” and “argumentative 
persuasion”,5 as well as Risse’s “Logic of Arguing”,6 and these concepts offer an idea of 
why the European Parliament offers a good environment for the socialisation and selection 
of European norms. The key to the effectiveness of the EP in this regard lies in the 
interactions between its constituent actors. There is a high interaction density within the 
Parliament, actors encounter one another on a day-to-day basis, but the nature of these 
interactions is also important. The nature of debate within the plenary sessions of the 
European Parliament means that argumentative persuasion is unlikely to have the greatest 
effect in this rigidly organised, formal setting. Instead interactions within the institution in 
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its broader context gain importance, the informal discussions and interactions between 
actors. In this way, in addition to the socialising effect of the European Parliament, it also 
retains importance as an arena for interaction. 
 
The meeting of MEPs, primarily in an informal context, allows norms to be debated and 
contested, and it is through these debates that the beginning of normative consensus arises. 
The Parliament itself serves to facilitate these debates and provide a locus for the 
dissemination of norms, understandings and consensuses. There is an important role for the 
Parliament in the selection of norms and arguments, as the location helps to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the norms and encourages actors to turn to European norms. Another key 
requirement for the socialisation of norms is shared common understandings, a “common 
lifeworld” 7 to which actors can refer. This is in part provided by the European Parliament, 
which is an institution comprised of shared understandings, and which plays an important 
role in constituting the actors within it. In this way the Parliament performs a positive 
feedback function, as the greater the amount of common ground shared the greater degree 
to which socialisation can take place. This in turn increases the degree to which a “common 
lifeworld” exists. Despite this loop, shared understandings of actors do not come solely 
from their place within the institution, I established that a European identity existed in 
actors prior to entering the institution of the European Union and this provided shared 
normative understandings. In this way European identity is key to the functioning of the 
European Parliament in its current form, but the institution itself is in turn key to the 
identities of the actors within it. The lifeworlds are constituted by language and culture8 and 
provide a basis within which truth claims can be anchored during normative argument, so 
the role of the European Parliament in the generation and continuation of a “common 
lifeworld” for MEPs is an important one. 
 
Important to the concepts of socialisation and the logic of arguing are the degree to which 
interactions are based on genuine normative arguments, and the level to which actors are 
willing to be persuaded by opposing normative arguments. For this reason I found that 
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interaction within the European Parliament did not greatly influence the identities and 
normative frameworks of those actors who did not engage in debate involving norms from 
the European level.9 Although many of these MEPs do concede there to be some degree of 
shared understanding within Europe and between member states of the EU, they argue that 
this is removed from the action of the European Union and individual institutions. These 
actors display prior, ingrained beliefs which are contrary to some European norms, and are 
thus significantly less receptive to those norms. Despite this, there is some evidence of 
norm and identity formation within this group in the European Parliament, although along 
very different lines to the majority of MEPs, and this would be an interesting avenue of 
future research alongside the identity of other political groupings in the EP. 
 
A further role in identity formation and strengthening played by the European Parliament is 
in its treatment of the “Other”. While within domestic politics it might be possible to assert 
ones identity in relation to other countries within Europe, perhaps in Britain in contrast to 
Euro-zone countries, this is more problematic within the EP. With interactions within the 
EP emphasising and drawing on a “common lifeworld” which is pan-European or pan-EU, 
it is difficult for the resulting identity to be set up in opposition to some European identity. 
This has the potential to cause MEPs to look further afield in search of the “Other”, moving 
it beyond Europe. As I found European identity to have a strong basis in culture and 
religion, this is potentially problematic for Turkey, which is perceived to differ from Europe 
in both of these respects. This has the potential to constitute a lifeworld which is common 
to MEPs and members of other institutions of the EU but crucially not to Turkish 
politicians or the Turkish population. The lack of a common lifeworld between Turkey and 
the EU would prevent Turkey from engaging in the argumentative discourse, meaning that 
not only would European identity not correspond with Turkish identity, but a major weapon 
of norm and identity change would be removed from Turkey. For those MEPs who view 
Turkey as the “Other” it is likely that their lifeworld would not be in common with a 
Turkish lifeworld, and the acceptance of a lifeworld within the EU which includes Turkey 
would be an important step on the road to possible Turkish membership. 
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A final area of interest in relation to the role of the European Parliament concerned the 
transmission of norms from the EP to the population of Europe as a whole. It has been 
suggested that there is a role for the EP as a locus of European identity, and the strong 
identity within the institution would then “filter down” in some way, and I suggested that 
this effect might be present. While there is some support from respondents for this, the 
opposite view was also forcibly expressed and, although it was not the focus of my 
research, I did not find any evidence of a mechanism through which this effect could take 
place. The important role of the European Parliament and the unique nature of the identity 
within the Parliament also provide difficulties in the potential transfer of norms. 
 
Through this investigation I have established the factors which make the European 
Parliament an important element in the creation and propagation of norms and identity, and 
I believe that this can research model could be extrapolated to the other institutions of the 
EU. Although there are important differences between the institutions this model could 
form a basis for research into other institutions, although the researcher would have to be 
mindful of the areas of difference. 
 
What is the role of identity within the European Parliament? 
 
Having established that European identity is present in the European Parliament, that it is 
felt more strongly by MEPs than by the population at large, and that European identity 
within the EP is slightly different from the broader conception of European identity, I 
focussed my research on discerning the role played by identity within the EP. 
 
The analysis conducted of European Parliament debates and other documents suggests that 
there is a clear role for identity within debates and arguments amongst MEPs, as suggested 
by the findings of my previous research question, and this is strongly supported by those I 
interviewed. The basis of persuasion is indeed primarily based on European norms, values 
and understandings. The effect of persuasion based in national arguments and norms is, 
after all, unlikely to have great influence over actors from different nations, and MEPs 
emphasise the need for multi-national agreement for decisions to be made. To reach even an 
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absolute majority requires far beyond the support possible from any single nation. Despite 
this assertion of the importance of norms and normative arguments, I did not find this form 
of persuasion to the exclusion of all other forms. Respondents suggested that there was still 
a place for rational choice bargaining, although this was primarily, but not exclusively, 
associated with those for whom European norms and identity were not felt strongly. I also 
suggested the possible presence of persuasion based in Schimmelfennig’s “rhetorical 
action” but, while this was mentioned in my primary research, it did not get widespread 
support. Instead the suggestion appeared to be levelled by those who did not acknowledge 
European level norms against those who were debating them in earnest. 
 
My review of social constructivist literature led me to suggest that the strength of European 
identity within the Parliament would vary by competence and policy area, and this was 
supported by my research. My choice to study identity in relation to Turkish accession was, 
in large part, due to my belief that identity would be felt particularly keenly in this area. My 
findings in this regard further support the existence of the logic of arguing and 
socialization, as it was suggested by interview data that European identity was felt most 
strongly in policy areas which require the creation of a common EU, or common EP, 
position, and those areas which present a challenge to European norms and identity, and 
this was certainly seen to be true in EP debates. Policy areas which require the adoption of 
a common position, often areas where the EU or EP want to take the lead, also require the 
greatest degree of interaction and compromise, and the institution of the European 
Parliament encourages recourse to European norms and the lifeworld common to 
participants. For these reasons these policy areas also have the greatest effect in terms of 
the refinement and evolution of European identity. European identity was similarly 
experienced strongly in policy areas which were seen to challenge the existing identity, as 
normative arguments and those based in European identity are used explicitly. This again 
serves to refine and change European identity, and policy areas of this nature will have a 
disproportionately large impact on identity within the European Parliament. 
 
As I indicated earlier in this conclusion, the exact expression of European identity by actors 
within the European Parliament varies on an individual basis, and I also found this to be 
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true when examining variation by policy areas. As the application of European level norms 
varies from individual to individual it is a logical corollary that the actor’s reaction to 
particular situations will vary. As European identity varies, the view of what challenges that 
identity will also vary, as, potentially, will what requires common action. Despite this, 
having pointed to the common factors and norms which underpin European identity, it is 
possible to point to areas which are likely to be perceived as identity challenging. One area 
for which this certainly appears to be true is the case of Turkish accession. Turkish 
accession is widely viewed by those who believe in an identity to present a real identity 
challenge, and there is also the view that before the conclusion of accession negotiations 
there must be agreement and consensus. This vindicates the choice of Turkish accession as 
the case study for this research, and indicates that important role that debates over Turkish 
membership can play in the understanding of European identity. 
 
Is European identity observable in the interests and behaviour of actors in the European 
Parliament? 
 
As I have indicated from the outset of my research, the prevailing wisdom in relation to the 
European Parliament affords little role for factors of identity in decision-making. The 
common view of the EP sees it as a locus for rational choice decision-making and an arena 
for bargaining and compromise, but only compromise to maximise national utility. I have 
argued, however, that to take seriously talk of European identity, European norms must 
have a real and observable effect on the interests and behaviour of actors in the European 
Parliament. Social constructivist theory allows room for norms to exist which are ignored, 
but I believe that to talk credibly of a European identity it is not sufficient to point to norms 
if they have no impact on actors. 
 
My research highlighted the importance of the logic of appropriateness in actor behaviour, 
which is often set up in opposition to the logic of consequences associated with rational 
choice decision making.10 The predominant role afforded to European level norms by the 
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function of the European Parliament affords European identity an important role in 
deciding what qualifies as appropriate action in a given situation and, by extension, 
influences observable behaviour. As with all the areas on which my research has focussed, 
there is a high degree of individual variation and variation by policy area. The appropriate 
action for each individual in a given situation will be determined by argument and debate, 
and the cornerstone of this debate for individuals who are receptive to European identity 
will be European level norms. As I anticipated, I did not find evidence that norms of 
European identity influence the actions of every individual within the European Parliament, 
but I had not anticipated the degree to which “appropriate action” could vary. Just as I 
found that the nature of European identity is variable, with different elements emphasised 
by different individuals, this produced a similar effect when looking at interests and 
arguments. Although the different variations of European identity experienced within the 
Parliament share the same basic principles, in practise this can produce vastly different 
preferences and actions when applied to different competences. 
 
As I outlined in the preceding section, the nature of the policy area addressed in the 
European Parliament is key to an understanding of the strength of that identity, illuminated 
through an analysis of arguments and interest. As areas which are not perceived to present a 
challenge to existing European identity and those which do not require common action do 
not illicit as strong feelings of European identity, it follows that in these areas European 
identity has little or no effect. Where identity is felt strongly, however, it can play a 
significant role in actor behaviour. The difficulty in this regard is presented by the nature of 
the challenge to identity, as the different emphasis placed on different European level 
norms will affect how, and indeed whether, that challenge is perceived. In the case of 
Turkey, there is clear evidence that some actors within the European Parliament have 
concerns regarding Turkish accession based on religious and/or cultural grounds, yet for 
those who consider that religion and culture form little or no part of European identity these 
factors are likely to present little challenge to European identity. Despite these concerns, I 
believe that my research provides evidence that European identity is felt strongly within the 
European Parliament, producing an observable impact on interests and behaviour, and that 
the issue of Turkish accession is one area where this effect is felt particularly strongly. 
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Important in understanding the role of norms in the interests and resulting arguments of 
actors, is an appreciation of the interconnected nature of normative factors and so-called 
“rational” issues. Although issues like the size of Turkey and the financial cost of 
membership are undoubtedly important, they cannot be understood in isolation from 
concerns of identity. My data show that the issue of size, for example, gains in importance 
when the identity of the candidate country is not perceived to match European identity, 
more so when the candidate country is perceived as the “Other”. For this reason it is not 
enough merely to say that arguments for or against potential members are not made on the 
grounds of culture or religion, norms play an important, and often subconscious, role in 
assessing rational factors and setting priorities. 
 
Although my research has shown that European identity is felt strongly enough to impact 
on MEP interests and behaviour, and this was my primary aim, it is not possible for me to 
quantify this effect. For the reasons outlined earlier in this thesis I chose a qualitative 
approach to my research, and I believe that this was the correct approach to investigate the 
concepts I have studied. This approach has, however, left me unable to quantify the effect 
produced by European identity, merely able to demonstrate that there is an important role 
for the study of European identity and that norms should play an important role in future 
research  into the European Parliament’s decision making process. For this reason, any 
approach to studying the decision making processes within the European Parliament which 
dismisses norms and identity will provide a blinkered and distorted view of those 
processes. 
 
I believe that this approach can and should be applied in research regarding European 
Parliament decision making, as well as other institutions of the European Union, within the 
framework I have outlined. The focus of this research was identity in the European 
Parliament, and so it was beyond the scope of this project to investigate in any detail the 
future process of accession negotiations with Turkey, but I believe that this thesis has 
demonstrated that an approach along these lines would be productive and informative. This 
will allow for a more nuanced view of decision making and a greater ability to predict 
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attitudes and outcomes. 
 
What are the implications for Turkish membership? 
 
The nature of European identity uncovered by my research is key to understanding the 
impact it will have on the Turkish membership bid although, as stated above, this is not the 
primary purpose for this research question. An analysis of discourses relating to the 
possible accession of Turkey, as well as the anticipated course of the ongoing negotiations, 
has provided greater insight into the nature and strength of European identity in the EP. 
 
As well as a strong basis in the stated values of the European Union, the founding ideology, 
I found there to be a strong presence of norms based in religion, culture and a drive towards 
enlargement of the Union. Although the values of the European Union have been discussed 
in relation to Turkey, especially Turkey’s history of human rights, less explicit discussion 
has historically been afforded to the other bases of identity. 
 
There was undeniably found to be some opposition to Turkey on grounds of Turkish and 
European identity, and this was expressed both explicitly and more implicitly. Arguments 
are made within the European Parliament opposing Turkish membership of the EU on 
grounds of culture and religion, but there was also the suggestion that identity influenced 
preferences concerning Turkish accession in more subtle ways. Arguments against Turkish 
accession based in identity fell into two separate, but interrelated, categories. The first 
concerned the degree to which European and Turkish identity differed and were, perhaps, 
incompatible; the second, conversely focussed on the degree to which European identity 
would be changed by Turkish membership. Clearly both of these positions foresee a 
challenge to existing identity, hence identity arguments are brought to the fore, and the 
focus of the challenge along cultural and religious lines further emphasises the importance 
of these factors. The involvement of the European Parliament within the accession 
negotiations also requires, or is at least facilitated by, broad agreement amongst its 
members, causing them to draw on their common lifeworld and construct arguments 
focussed in European level norms. I also found evidence that European identity was 
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influencing actors within the European Parliament on a more sub-conscious level, affecting 
the way factors generally seen as rational choice are perceived, and the priorities of actors. 
 
Although there was strong evidence of negative attitudes towards Turkey based in 
European identity, I also found there to be an alternative, positive view of Turkish 
membership on identity grounds, albeit a less prevalent one. In contrast to the “clash of 
civilisations” view expressed by many MEPs, an “alliance of civilisations” position was put 
forward by some. This view highlighted certain similarities of identity, generally a 
similarity of Turkish views to European ones on the founding ideology, while suggesting 
differences in other areas, primarily religion, could, in fact, prove advantageous. By 
admitting a democratic, peaceful nation which respects human rights, but also has a 
predominantly Muslim population, the EU can demonstrate that the identities of European 
nations are based in the founding ideology and are not incompatible with identities of 
Muslim nations. In this way the “Other” is seen to be undemocratic countries, and those 
who do not respect human rights or the rule of law, rather than those which differ culturally 
and religiously as it is in the opposing viewpoint. Turkish accession is also supported by 
those who argue that European identity is, or should be, based on religious and cultural 
pluralism, rather than being a “Christian club”. 
 
These two separate viewpoints or discourses both have strong bases in European norms and 
identity, but reach different conclusions. In this way the same norms, looked at through the 
lens of the Turkish membership bid and within the institution of the European Parliament, 
create what could amount to two separate European identities. It is certainly clear that 
through argument and debate at least two distinct answers have been generated as to what 
the appropriate preference is for an actor in this situation. The answer subscribed to by an 
individual actor is likely to depend on many factors. As I have argued throughout, national 
and regional norms remain important in the identity of actors within the European 
Parliament and this is likely to affect which logic of appropriateness is subscribed to. 
Similarly my research has suggested that the nature of interactions within the EP, such as 
within political groupings, will exert an influence. My research has suggested that identity 
arguments are used more often in opposition to Turkish membership than in support, 
 207 
 
however the challenge to identity and the resulting arguments are ongoing, and identity is 
dynamic. 
 
The inextricable link between ‘rational’ and ‘normative’ factors in European decision-
making renders it impossible for consensus to be reached over Turkish membership as long 
as no such consensus can be reached regarding European identity and interest. The creation 
of a consensus, or single European identity, is hindered by the nature of the subject under 
discussion. Social constructivists assert that stable practice is key to the generation and 
transformation of actor identity,11 so although Turkish membership of the EU is an area in 
which identity is invoked, lack of stability may hinder the creation of a normative 
consensus on the issue. Relations between “the West” and “Islam”12 provide little stability, 
particularly since the events of 9/11, so the platform for socialisation will be weak. 
Although the European Parliament provides stability and a strong socialising force in a 
number of areas, as indicated earlier, broader instability makes identity change in the sphere 
of religion particularly problematic. For this reason, instability in these relations will impact 
on the ability of the European Parliament, and the EU more generally, to provide an answer 
to the divergence of discourses concerning Turkish accession. This instability will only 
serve to increase the difficulty of making predictions concerning the Turkish membership 
bid. 
 
Within my research, concerns were expressed as to the effect Turkish membership of the 
EU would have on European identity, but my research suggests that major changes in the 
identity of the European Parliament would be unlikely to take place after the accession of 
Turkey. Instead it appears that a significant shift would be required in identity within the 
European Parliament before accession would be a realistic possibility. It is hard to conceive 
of the European Parliament, a key element of the negotiating process, supporting Turkish 
accession when serious questions remain as to the “Europeanness” of Turkey. Due to the 
degree of separation between identity within the European Parliament and the European 
                                                 
11
 Wendt, A., 1992. 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics' in Der 
Derian, J., 9ed.) International Theory – Critical Investigations. MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995. p.149. 
12
 I once again use the language of Huntington, as this is the language in which interview responses were 
typically phrased. 
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identity of the population of Europe as a whole (if such a thing exists), it is possible to 
envisage Turkish accession producing a substantial change in the latter. I would not suggest 
that identity would not change were Turkey to become a member, instead that identity 
would continue to evolve with the new composition of the EP and the mutual constitution 
of agents and structures. 
 
The negotiations over the possible accession of Turkey have the possibility to play a vital 
role in the future nature of European institutional identity. The continued challenge to 
identity and the resulting normative interactions within the European Parliament will result 
in the evolution of the identity. It is difficult to foresee the future path of this evolution, but 
this refining force has the potential to bring forward a more unified European identity, with 
more broadly shared common understandings of norms and appropriate action. If broader 
agreement on the nature of European identity does occur and it focuses on the founding 
ideology and religious and cultural pluralism this will benefit the Turkish membership bid. 
If, however, there is a focus on Christianity and the associated culture this will undoubtedly 
prove detrimental to Turkey’s hopes of acceding. 
 
An illustration of the difficulty of predicting how these factors will play out is provided by 
the great variety of responses to the question of if and when Turkey will accede to 
membership of the EU. Most respondents were reluctant to comment on whether Turkey’s 
membership bid would be successful, and when pressed there was little uniformity in the 
answers. There was a view expressed, by both supporters and opponents of Turkish 
membership, that Turkey would never accede, or at least not in the lifetime of the 
respondents. At the other extreme was the suggestion that the process would be relatively 
rapid, if not simple. When presented with the original earliest possible date, 2015, Fiona 
Hall suggested that ‘I think that 2015 is too soon, I think it would be more likely to be 
2020’.13 Stephen Hughes suggests the ‘mid 2020s’14 before Turkey could join, while John 
Bowis argues that accession is not close, ’20 years [is] perfectly possible’.15 John Purvis, on 
the other hand, believes that Turkey will ultimately join the EU but warns that ‘It’s going to 
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 Hall, Fiona. Personal interview (16th October 2009). 
14
 Hughes, Stephen. Personal interview (21st May 2010). 
15
 Bowis, John. Personal interview (2nd September 2009). 
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be a long time I’m afraid’.16 Bill Newton-Dunn is more pessimistic, only offering ‘probably 
30-35% of them actually joining in the end’,17 while Martin Callanan stated that, despite 
being in favour of Turkish accession ‘we shouldn’t kid ourselves that it’s ever going to 
happen in our lifetime. I’d be staggered if it did’.18 Opinion expressed within the European 
Parliament is similarly split, with arguments ranging from wanting to ‘stop these senseless 
negotiations!’ in favour of privileged partnership,19 to suggesting that those in support of 
Turkey must ‘say so again and again. The shrill voice of the rejectionist must not be 
allowed to drown us out’.20 As well as highlighting the difficulty of making predictions, I 
believe this vast array of answers also point to the role of identity in actor’s arguments and 
interests. When asked to assess Turkey’s chance of acceding, Hans-Gert Pöttering answered 
that Turkey should not become a member, and that the EU, which for him has a strong 
identity basis, ‘must have borders somewhere. It cannot be boundless. And Turkey is not 
within these borders. However, a “privileged partnership” is desirable between the 
European Union and Turkey. This partnership should be built on the mutual recognition that 
Turkey and the EU have durable joint interests that require a close relationship’.21 This 
viewpoint broadly fits into a traditional institutional theoretical outlook of interests, as well 
as a liberal intergovernmental approach to European integration. The complex nature of the 
identity is further complicated by other respondents who view the concept of pacta sunt 
servanda as integral to European identity arguing that only offering Turkey privileged 
partnership would be to ignore this principle. 
 
The variety of opinions regarding the prospect of Turkish accession is indicative of the 
different discourses and bases of identity which are found in the European Parliament with 
regards to the Turkish accession bid. Although a rationalist viewpoint would highlight 
national interest as the key deciding factor in the decision making process, within a social 
constructivist framework other factors come into play. The interrelated nature of ‘rational’ 
and ‘normative’ factors, the competing discourses of Turkey’s association with Europe, and 
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 Newton Dunn, Bill. Personal interview (9th March 2010). 
18
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the relative instability of the relations between Turkey and the EU make predicting the 
future course of negotiations problematic, and setting a timeframe for Turkish membership 
controversial. 
 
What are the limitations of the research? 
 
From the starting point of my project it was necessary for me to modify the nature and 
scope of my research due to practical and logistical constraints and, although I took steps to 
ameliorate these weaknesses, these changes will have impacted upon my findings. 
 
My research was, unfortunately, limited by practical considerations, including fairly severe 
financial limitations. I had originally envisaged my research having a strong and broad base 
in primary data gained through qualitative interviews with MEPs, supported by 
questionnaire responses, and these data sources would stand alongside the analysis of 
debates and other documentation originating from the European Parliament and the broader 
EU. While my research does draw from these sources of data and, I believe is stronger 
because of it, it was necessary for me to re-evaluate the balance of sources due to practical 
considerations. Financial restrictions and difficulties accessing interviewees meant that I 
could not implement a programme of interviews of the scope and breadth that I had initially 
conceived. In practice the number of interviews I managed to conduct was a significant 
reduction on the planned interviews, although I did succeed in conducting some important 
interviews with MEPs, including members of AFET, and former MEPs and these provided 
me with valuable data. Good depth was achieved in these interviews, but the breadth of 
data was undeniably lacking. Similarly the responses to my questionnaire were 
disappointingly limited. Although I had a number of positive responses when initially 
approached about answering an anonymous questionnaire, I received few completed 
questionnaires. Once again, the questionnaires proved to be a valuable source of data, but 
the utility of the data in isolation is reduced by the small sample size. The reduced quantity 
of data received from interviews and questionnaires in relation to my plan outlined in my 
methodology shifted some of the emphasis from these sources onto other data collection 
techniques. To ameliorate the weaknesses created by these issues I leant more heavily on 
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transcripts of debates from the European Parliament which also present directly the words 
of actors. The positive side to these sources is it is possible to gain an understanding of the 
arguments employed and gain a greater feel for the role in norms in context, unfortunately 
they do not afford the possibility to follow up and investigate particular areas of interest. 
Although it was not possible to use interview data to fully support the findings of the 
research, the interviews played a key role in identifying important issues and factors which 
could then be more fully analysed with recourse to debate transcripts. These debate 
transcripts provided an invaluable source of data in the absence of the breadth of interview 
and questionnaire data desired, and I used the three sources of data together in an attempt to 
understand the identities and interests of actors. Alongside these sources I employed other 
secondary data (such as speeches by MEPs and press releases) as well as official documents 
of the European Union (like treaties and progress reports) as I had envisioned in my 
methodology, to triangulate my data, and ensure the accuracy and breadth of my findings. 
Although I would ideally have conducted a more concerted programme of interviews, I 
believe that the weaknesses a lack of interviews presented to my research were ameliorated 
by the use of other data.  
 
Due to financial restraints and difficulties of travel, it was not possible for me to conduct all 
my interviews face to face, those which were not conducted in person were conducted by 
telephone. Although I would ideally have conducted all my interviews face to face, as this 
would allow me to build a more personal relationship with the interviewee, interviews by 
telephone still allowed me to receive answers to the questions I posed through conversation 
with the actors themselves, pursuing important lines of questioning and requesting 
clarification where necessary.. 
 
Another result of logistical restrictions was that the majority, although not all, of those I did 
succeed in interviewing were MEPs representing UK constituencies. With this 
predominance of primary data coming from UK MEPs there was a danger of my analysis 
becoming blinkered and addressing only UK attitudes towards Turkish membership. This 
weakness in my data was again addressed through the use of other data sources. I did 
conduct one interview with a non-UK MEP, as well as receiving correspondence from 
 212 
 
another, and the transcripts of Parliament debates contain the views of MEPs from 
throughout the European Union. In this way, although the focus of the primary research was 
on UK MEPs this was not to the exclusion of all other MEPs. One positive point of this 
focus on the identities and interests of actors from one country provides a demonstration 
that there is not a single national identity which is followed by all UK MEPs, and my 
research strongly suggests this to be true of all other EU member states. In this way the 
effect of other norms is emphasised and allows me to conclude that European norms do 
indeed influence the identity and interests of those within the European Parliament.  
 
As I have outlined earlier in the thesis, the complex of identity in the European Parliament 
presented an interesting problem to me, with the direct attachment of MEPs to their 
national, and in some cases local, electorates serving to highlight the interconnected nature 
of norms and identity, and the way pre-existing norms and identity interact with European 
level norms. One perceived weakness of focussing my research on the European Parliament 
is the degree to which membership of the Parliament can change through elections, and the 
degree to which those elections can be influenced by national political factors. While this is 
a factor to be considered, and the latest round of European elections in the UK does bear 
this out to a degree, there is also a significant degree of stability. Due to the electoral 
system employed there is a high degree of continuity between Parliaments, with many of 
those I spoke to having been in the European Parliament for more than 10 years, and some 
for more than 20 years. The make-up of the Parliament is, of course, very important as the 
actors constituted the institution, but equally important is the constitutive effect of the 
institution on the actors. Although a charge of inconsistency is levelled at the European 
Parliament, John Bowis argued that where national governments must ‘bend’ and change 
their principled views, ‘Europe is a bit more rigid in its output’ because ‘we’re not changing 
governments and we don’t get marks out of ten for if we’ve completed our manifesto or 
indeed how we’ve dealt with interim problems’, ‘we’re quite conscious [that] we’re not 
going to complete the job in this parliament probably the next parliament, probably not in 
our political lifetime. It doesn’t matter, we’re moving forward’22. Although there is an 
impact of national politics on the European Parliament it is not as pronounced as sometimes 
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suggested, and indeed the perception within the EP is of continuity and insulation from 
outside factors. 
 
Another accusation which could perhaps be levelled at my research is that the case study of 
Turkey is such a special one that it is difficult or impossible to draw conclusions from my 
analysis which have any relevance beyond this specific example, but I do not believe this 
charge to be fair. It is certainly true that Turkey does present a unique challenge to 
European identity, although this is true of every application for membership, but it was 
pointed out to me in the course of my research that the factors which comprise the 
challenge of Turkish membership are not themselves unique to Turkey. It was suggested to 
me that all the problems which will be encountered with Turkey have been encountered 
before, but the combination of factors presents a strong challenge to European identity. 
Issues of size have been addressed before by the EU, and the unbalancing effect of the size 
of a reunified Germany on EU institutions required careful attention before a united 
Germany gained membership. Similarly, differences of culture were considered in relation 
to the accession of Eastern European countries, and religious difference is debated in 
relation to Balkan countries. It is certainly true that the combination of factors in the case of 
Turkey present a particularly great challenge to identity, and it is for this reason that Turkey 
was chosen as my case study, but I do not believe the specificity of the case study limits the 
usefulness of my conclusions in other areas. The case study also allowed me to shed light 
on the effect of the institution of the European Parliament on identity, and this will have a 
profound effect in other areas. 
 
One area I did initially experience a weakness in my method was my use of the word 
“identity”.  In some instances early in my research semantic difficulties caused some 
confusion when I was not sufficiently clear of the meaning of identity I was using, or the 
form of identity I was referring to. This was due to a lack of understanding on my part, 
using academic language without sufficient explanation, and without a clear enough view 
of the mechanics of identity in the European Parliament. As these moments of confusion 
happened I was able to clarify my meanings to respondents, and I was able to eliminate 
these difficulties through the course of my research. As I was able to clarify the meanings 
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of responses I do not believe this adversely affected my data or analysis. 
 
Although there were weaknesses in my research, and areas where criticism could be 
levelled at it, I believe that my answers to the research questions I set out to investigate are 
valid and strong. Having conceded that my research does not have the breadth of primary 
data I had originally envisaged for it, with fewer MEPs interviewed than hoped, I do not 
believe that this has detracted from my assertion that European identity is experienced 
within the European Parliament; that it is felt more strongly than in the population at large, 
and experienced slightly differently from those not within the Parliament. As the phrasing 
of my research questions indicate, it was not my intention to quantify the effect of 
European identity, or the number of MEPs who are greatly influenced it. Instead my 
research allowed me to identify that European norms did exert an influence on the identities 
of, at least some, MEPs, and to identify the effect these norms exert on interest and 
behaviour. Similarly my research allowed me to formulate a normative framework, a model 
for the interactions of norms and identities within MEPs, as well as to begin to understand 
the role of the European Parliament on the creation, refinement and spread of European 
identity. Although the course of the research presented problems to be addressed, I do not 
believe that any of the issues highlighted above damage the integrity or validity of the 
conclusions I have reached. 
 
My research has allowed me to investigate areas which have been neglected in previous 
work, and present a more nuanced view of identity within the European Parliament. Where 
the institutions of the EU are generally presented as “thin” institutions, my analysis has 
helped to elaborate on a “thicker” view, where there is a mutual constitutive process 
involving actors and institutions. The normative framework I have elucidated provides a 
mechanism through which norms generated at European, national and regional level 
interact and influence the identity expressed by actors, and the decisions they take. Beyond 
this I have also highlighted the importance of the European Parliament and the nature of 
interactions within it, which amount to a great deal more than the strategic bargains allowed 
for in rational choice, “thin” views of the EP. Through these mechanisms I have suggested a 
refinement to the way we understand the identity of actors in the European Parliament and 
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by extension their interests and behaviour. This approach emphasises the importance of 
normative and identity arguments at the European level, while at the same time remaining 
cognisant of the role played by national identity and rational choice factors. 
 
I have demonstrated the affect of European identity on the interests and attitudes of MEPs 
towards the possible membership of Turkey, but the implications of this new understanding 
of decision making processes extend into many other areas of European Parliament activity. 
Drawing on the work of Checkel and Risse, I have identified the factors which will 
influence the degree to which identity arguments are employed in given policy areas, and 
this new model of identity influenced decision making is likely to provide an improvement 
to understanding of how decisions are reached in areas where identity is invoked strongly. 
This model will prove useful in examining other cases of enlargement of the European 
Union, as well as other areas which challenge existing identity or require close co-operation 
at a European level. 
 
Through an analysis of the data I have gathered, and by employing the theoretical 
understanding I have gained through my research, I have identified an interesting new 
dynamic in the potential accession of Turkey to membership of the EU. Identity factors 
concerning Turkish accession are often ignored amongst the population of Europe at large, 
perhaps because such identity is perceived to be so weak, and this perception spills over 
into investigating the European Parliament’s dealings with Turkey. In contrast to this I have 
found a complex picture of identities in support and opposition to Turkish membership 
within the EP which, although broadly based in the same norms, dictate vastly different 
“appropriate” behaviours. It appears that at the present moment the predominant view is in 
opposition to Turkish membership on grounds of culture and identity, but this is not a 
universally held view. It is my belief that, as European identity stands, the prospect of 
Turkish accession is slim, but that this identity is dynamic and the European Parliament 
provides an ideal environment for identity refinement and evolution. For this reason, I 
believe, any discussion of the Turkish membership bid which ignores factors of identity and 
the role of the European Parliament itself is incomplete. Through the use of the Turkish 
case study I have teased out the different strands to European identity, the different norms 
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which are present and the ways in which they are interpreted. This is important in the 
understanding of identity within the European Parliament generally, and so these arguments 
concerning identity shed light well beyond merely looking at the potential accession of 
Turkey. 
 
Throughout my research I have drawn on the work of social constructivist scholars, with 
particular emphasis on the work of Wendt, Adler, Risse, March and Olsen and Finnemore 
and Sikkink, and this has shed light on the identity and interests of MEPs, but I believe that 
this process has also worked in reverse. Through studying the European Parliament, I have 
put forward a new and unique social constructivist theoretical framework which draws on 
the strengths of these scholars while attempting to address the weaknesses of existing 
theory highlighted by this study. I have assimilated the concept and nature of norms, 
particularly that espoused by Adler23, but I have found that the scope and transmission of 
norms within the European Parliament does not completely agree with the propositions of 
previous social constructivist theory. 
 
Although the nature of institutions as arenas of socialisation is an important focus of social 
constructivist theory, I do not believe that this area has yet been adequately explored in 
relation to the European Union. As I suggested at the beginning of this thesis there is a high 
degree of social constructivist interest in the European Union due to the sui generis nature 
of the institutions and the level of political cooperation, as Checkel puts it ‘Is Europe 
different? For many theorists, policy analysts, and politicians, the answer is obvious: “Of 
course!” Europe’s degree of integration, level of political community, and pooling of 
sovereignty far outstrip those seen anywhere else’24, although Checkel does go on to 
caution that in his opinion this ‘headline stor[y], which emphasizes Europe’s sui generis 
nature, is overstated’25. I find it all the more surprising, therefore, that little research has 
been conducted which addresses the specific nature of European Union institutions. Much 
research in the area is conducted into general social constructivist themes, although the 
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focus is often implicitly based on a state centred model containing institutions within states 
and between state actors. This results in conclusions being drawn which are applicable to 
the forms of institutions studied, but untested on institutions such as those within the 
European Union. Despite this, these models are often applied directly to EU institutions, 
and I believe that this is a deficiency within existing social constructivist theory in relation 
to the European Union. This can be seen in the work of Wendt, whose research is focused 
on the state level, for example his suggestions that ‘States are people too’26, and that 
‘anarchy is what states make of it’27, in which he talks of the nature of institutions, stating 
that ‘anarchy and the distribution of power only have meaning for state action in virtue of 
the understandings and expectations that constitute institutional identities and interest’28. 
This conception of institutions is an important one, and it is, of course, vital to his research, 
but that does not mean that a social constructivist understanding of inter-state institutions 
and interactions generated in this way can be applied directly to institutions such as those 
found within the EU. Checkel concedes that European integration in recent years has 
moved away from ‘anarchy and the Westphalian system that have so fascinated theorists of 
international politics over the centuries’29. It is within this theoretical background that I 
have applied social constructivist theory to the understanding of identity within the 
European Parliament. 
 
Despite my caution regarding the applicability of certain elements of established social 
constructivist theory, I would not advocate a move back towards what might be considered 
more traditional theories of European integration. I believe that I have demonstrated in this 
thesis that identity and interest should not and cannot be treated as exogenously given 
within the European Parliament, and that the EP is a centre of normative activity which 
alters plays a role in constituting the identity of its constituent actors. For this reason an 
understanding of identity and interest are vital to understanding the behaviour of MEPs and 
decisions reached within the Parliament. In short, I believe that a thin view of institutions is 
not an adequate framework for analysing the European Union. In this way theories such as 
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liberal intergovernmentalism must be rejected. Although liberal intergovernmentalism 
allows for national identities which are not fixed, the view of the institutions of the EU is 
that they constrain and limit actor choices and play no constitutive role. I believe that my 
research has demonstrated that a view of the European Parliament in these terms cannot be 
supported. I also found that my research did not support the application of Social Identity 
Theory to studies of the institutions of the EU. 
 
I believe that the novel contribution to scholarship of my research lies in two areas, the 
nature and strength of identity in the European Parliament, and the role the EP itself plays 
in the creation and propagation of European identity. Throughout this research I have 
advanced a new model for actor identity within the institutions. I have shown that European 
level norms are present within the European Parliament, norms associated with the 
“founding ideology”, as well as norms relating to enlargement of the European Union, 
culture and religion. Actors within the institutions of the European Union are exposed to a 
unique density of normatively charged interactions beyond the state level, and this has a 
profound effect on their identity and interests. I have demonstrated that actors experience 
and are socialised with a wide variety of norms from different levels which may not 
coexist, and can even be in opposition. This led to my investigation of different strands of 
European identity, based on different conceptions of appropriate action and, although this 
was highlighted using the case study of Turkey, this approach has provided a novel 
contribution to the understanding of identity within the European Parliament. Through an 
investigation of the behaviour and interests of MEPs in relation to Turkey, and the 
interlinked nature of apparently rational and normative factors, my research has 
demonstrated a tangible effect of European norms on the identity and interests of MEPs. 
 
The second area in which my research affords a novel contribution to knowledge is in 
showing the role the European Parliament has in the selection of norms and the reaching of 
consensus on appropriate behaviour and highlighting the characteristics of the European 
Parliament which allow and encourage this. My research has highlighted the lack of 
application of constructivist theory to the European Parliament, and has suggested how the 
Parliament can be understood in this light. I do not advocate a revolution in the approach to 
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the understanding of institutions, but I have suggested a novel approach to the application 
of existing social constructivist theory to the European Parliament which is specific to that 
institution. Although social constructivists accept what appears to be a very broad definition 
of institutions, based in shared understandings rather than physical bodies there are still 
shortcomings in the social constructivist approach to institutions when applied to the 
European Union.  
 
My research has highlighted the importance of a number of factors which are vital to an 
accurate understanding of the nature of institutions and the identities and interests of their 
constituent actors. The composition of the institution is vital. Although the mutual 
constitution of structure and agent means that the actors within an institution are important, 
I believe that the nature of actors within the European Union institutions as non-state actors 
is important. An appreciation of the different ‘levels’ of identity experienced by actors is 
important in understanding interest and behaviour. The nature and density of interactions 
within the institutions is also key, and my research has highlighted the importance of the 
institutions as an arena for normative interaction. Further novelty of the EU institutions is 
provided by their multi-layered nature. Within the definition I am using the European 
Union as a whole is viewed as an institution, as are the European Parliament, the European 
Commission and many others individually. For this reason there is a greater density of 
norms, and the possibility of more competing norms which should be analysed. The 
interaction between EU institutions is another important factor in preference formation 
which social constructivist study is yet to address in detail.  My research has allowed me to 
utilise key elements of social constructivist theory to produce a novel contribution to the 
understanding of the European Parliament as a “thick” institution.  
 
Checkel asserts that there are many ‘big questions’ which remain unanswered in social 
constructivist theory, that ‘Europe is...our laboratory for getting at some big issues 
concerning the relation of institutions, states, and individuals. When do international 
institutions create sense of community and belonging? If and when this happens, what does 
it mean for individual and state allegiances, interests, and identities? What processes 
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underlie such transformative dynamics?’30 My research does not answer all of these 
questions, but it provides a significant contribution to our understanding of the area.  
 
Although my research has suggested a new view of European identity and institutions, 
many questions remain unanswered, and many more questions are suggested by my 
research. No definitive answer is given, or can be given at this stage, to the path accession 
negotiations between the EU and Turkey will take, or the way European identity will 
evolve in response to the challenges presented by Turkish membership. For this reason it 
would pay dividends to pay close attention to these matters in the coming years. Not only 
will this allow more accurate monitoring of the progression of Turkey towards possible 
membership, it will also allow a more current picture of how identity is influencing other 
areas of European Parliament decision making. This research could not address in great 
detail the accession prospects of Turkey, this example was instead used to highlight issues 
of identity, and a research project focussing on this area could be informative and 
interesting. 
 
Although my research is based in the case study of Turkish accession, the broader 
implications of my findings warrant further research. I believe that an investigation of the 
strength of identity in various policy areas and competences would prove a fruitful avenue 
of research. The types of policy areas which might be good centres of future research are 
indicated by my findings, and could prove a powerful insight into decision making in a 
broad spectrum of areas in the European Parliament. An obvious starting point for these 
future studies is other applications for membership which are ongoing at the present time, 
and any applications which are considered in the future. 
 
Similarly a broader investigation of identity in the EP, examining policy areas without the 
same degree of identity challenge, could perhaps help provide clarity as to the extent of the 
influence on identity of European norms in other areas, although it is still important to 
remain aware that any identity is a snap shot of an evolving concept. Having established 
that identity exerts an impact, it might also be possible to design a research programme 
                                                 
30
 Checkel, ‘International institutions and Socialization in Europe’ p.802. 
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with a quantitative based methodology, perhaps looking at voting patterns in order to 
measure the degree to which identity influences decisions made. Having explored the 
complex nature of identity and the contrasting influences European norms can exert on 
actors, this would have to be designed with great care. 
 
As I indicated earlier in this thesis, I believe that it is possible to extend Wendt’s individual 
analogy to make the argument for the European Parliament itself expressing identity, 
particularly in relation to the other institutions of the EU. While this is a potentially 
interesting and important avenue of thought and investigation, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. If a European Parliament identity were found to exist it could potentially have a 
profound effect on the way decisions taken within the EU as a whole are understood, as 
well as providing new insight into the interactions between institutions. 
 
The decision to study the European Parliament was taken at an early stage of this research, 
and I believe that the reasons given for this choice have been vindicated through the course 
of the research. I believe, however, that the European Commission would make for a useful 
and fascinating focus of further study. The specificity of identity to institution reduces the 
degree to which the findings of my research are transferrable from the Parliament to the 
Commission, although I believe that the model of identity interaction has applications 
beyond the EP, and research into identity in the European Commission would improve 
understanding of identity within the European Union, interactions between the institutions 
and the role of identity in EU decision making. A research project designed along the same 
lines, and employing the same method, as this project would pay dividends in 
understanding identity within the Commission and within the EU as a whole. Given the 
important role of the European Commission in negotiating with candidate countries, it 
could also improve modelling of the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey. 
 
One area of interest raised by the social constructivist theory studied that I was not able to 
fully address is the possibility of norm transfer from the European Parliament to other 
levels, particularly to the national level and into the population as a whole. Interviewees 
suggested that there is a role for the European Parliament in shaping and strengthening 
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European identity in the population of Europe, but I was not able to discover a mechanism 
through which this norm transfer would take place. This would prove an interesting and 
informative avenue of research which would have implications for the broader conception 
of European identity. Similarly a programme of research focussing explicitly on the 
interactions between EU institutions would provide a clearer indication of how these 
interactions shape identity within the Parliament and beyond, as well as the potential to 
shape institutional identity as discussed earlier. 
 
Through an analysis of European Parliament debates, supported by data generated through 
interviews with, and questionnaire responses from, the actors in question, I have proposed a 
new understanding of identity in the European Parliament and the way norms from the 
European level interact with those originating elsewhere. Through an investigation of the 
views and arguments of MEPs I have demonstrated that European level norms are present, 
and that they have a real, discernible effect on the identity and interest of the actors within 
the European Parliament. Alongside, and allied to, this I have demonstrated the important 
effect the Parliament has on the identity of the actors which comprise it, and the role MEPs 
have in constituting the institution. This has raised many questions which could 
productively be answered in future work, but I believe that the findings of my research are 
novel, interesting and important. 
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Appendix A - Interview Guide1 
 
How do you view the idea of a European identity? 
 If there is no European identity, is there any commonality of European identities? 
 Is there a European component to a larger identity? How do the components interact? 
 
Treaties and documents of the EU identify the importance of democracy, human rights, civil 
liberties, peace and justice within the EU and its member states. Does this provide an adequate 
framework for a European identity? If not, how could this be modified? 
 Is there a historical aspect/cultural? Greco/Roman basis, renaissance etc. 
 More controversially, is there a religious aspect? Even cultural religious 
 
Is European identity linked to the EU?  
 Is the EU cause or effect of European identity (or both)? 
 Is identity felt strongly in the EP? 
 How does identity influence behaviour and argument? 
o How does European identity interact with national identity (and others)? 
 Does the European Parliament embody the European identity or spirit? 
 Does identity or strength of identity vary by competence or policy area? 
o If so, why? 
o Is the interaction of identities different? 
 
Is European identity dynamic or static?  
 Has/Did it change(d) noticeably in your time? 
 How has this change been expressed? 
 What effect have the new members had? 
 
If it is dynamic, what role does the European Parliament play in the shaping of identity? 
 
In debates concerning enlargement, how important are issues of identity and its promotion? 
 
Turkey's record on human rights, the role of the military in Turkish politics, the Islamic faith of 
the majority of the Turkish populace, the correspondence between EU and Turkish identity, the 
potential impact on EU institutions and funds, Cyprus and the effect Turkish membership would 
have on European identity have all been suggested as issues to be addressed in Turkey's 
membership bid. How important do you believe each of these factors to be in determining the 
outcome of Turkey's membership bid? Are there other important factors? 
 
How do you rate Turkey’s chances of acceding, and on what is this assessment based? 
 
What effect would you anticipate Turkish membership of the EU having on European identity? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Questions phrased for use to aid interviewer, not to be asked as phrased. 
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Appendix B - Questionnaire 
 
The notion of a 'European identity' complementing and interacting with national identities is often 
discussed. Do you believe there is European identity or commonality of European identities in any 
form? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Treaties and documents of the EU have identified the following factors as being important concepts 
within the EU as a whole, as well as its member states. Please rate each factor on its importance 
within a European identity. If there are other factors which you believe contribute to the framework of 
European identity please enter them in the space provided at the end and rate them using the same 
scale. 
 
Irrelevant Not Very Important  Important Vital Undecided 
 
Democracy 
 
Human Rights 
 
Civil Liberties 
 
Peace 
 
Justice 
 
Rule of Law 
 
……….……….………. 
 
……….……….………. 
 
……….……….………. 
 
 
 
If there is a European identity, do you believe it is connected to the European Union. If so, how? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………............... 
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Do you believe that the European Parliament embodies European identity? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………................................................................... 
 
 
Do you believe European identity to be dynamic or static? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………............................................................ 
 
 
If it is dynamic, what role does the European Parliament play in the shaping of identity? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………............................................................................................................................. 
 
 
In debates concerning enlargement, how important are issues of identity and its promotion? 
 
Irrelevant  Not Very Important  Important  Vital  Undecided 
 
 
How great an effect would you anticipate Turkish membership of the EU having on European 
identity? (1 is “no effect” going up to 5, “a profound effect”) 
  
1  2  3  4  5  Undecided 
 
 
How would you anticipate this effect being felt? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………............................... 
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The following factors have been identified as issues to be addressed in Turkey’s EU membership bid. 
Please rate how important you believe each factor will be to the outcome of Turkey’s membership 
bid. If there are other factors which you believe will influence the outcome of the bid please enter 
them in the space provided at the end and rate them using the same scale. 
 
Irrelevant Not Very Important Important Vital Undecided 
 
Turkey’s record on human rights. 
 
The Islamic faith of the majority of the 
population of Turkey. 
 
The role of the military in Turkish politics. 
 
The degree to which Turkish identity  
corresponds with European identity. 
 
The impact Turkish membership will have  
on the institutions of the EU. 
 
The impact Turkish membership will have  
on the budget and funds of the EU. 
 
The effect of Turkish membership on  
European identity. 
 
Ongoing problems concerning Turkey’s 
continued involvement in Cyprus. 
 
……….……….……….……….………. 
 
……….……….……….……….………. 
 
……….……….……….……….………. 
 
 
How do you rate Turkey’s chances of acceding, and on what is this assessment based? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………...................................................................................................................... 
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The final section of the questionnaire is questions about you. These answers are intended to improve 
data analysis and will not be shared. 
 
Name    ………………………………………………………….. 
 
Position   ………………………………………………………….. 
 
Length of time in position ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Previous positions within the institutions of the EU (If any) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………......................................................................................... 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. Please return completed questionnaires to:  
 
 
Hamish Leese 
School of Government and International Affairs 
The Al-Qasimi Building 
Elvet Hill Road 
Durham 
DH1 3TU 
UK 
h.r.leese@durham.ac.uk 
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